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The purpose of this study is to exailline the 
relations in Victoria between society and politics, 
and especially political organisation, during the 
period between the democratic reforms of the 'fifties 
and the beginning of the Labour Party. Limitations 
of space and time, however, have made it necessary 
to con0entrate on 1864 to 1883. This period contains 
the three great constitutional battles which so 
marked Victorian politics, a.~d, so far as can be 
ascertained, all major poli tioal orgm1.isations 
between the Land Convention of 1857-9 and the 
Labour Party. It divides conveniently into two 
cycles, each comprising three stages. The first 
was a personal ascendancy during the crises, vvhen 
rigid divisions between radical and conservative 
parties al)peared and political organisation 
flourished. The second was a brief interlude 
under an Irish Catholic Chief Secretary while the 
disintegrating parties of the ascendancy mc:wed 
towards a great coalition which ruled for several 
years. There were thus two stable forms of 
parliamentary organisation between which Victoria 
alternated, in contrast with the model v~1.ich Dr. 
Martin found in New South Wales of two political -
groups divided on the basis of allegiance to two 
dominant leaders. 
As this work necessarily deals largely with 
attitudes, the question frequently recurs, what was 
the connection between a group's experience and its 
politics? Was it simply one of economic interest? 
The conclusion here is that it was not. Even 
when Victorians sought to follow what they thought 
of as their interest, their assessment of what this 
required was based upon previous attitudes; a mass 
of fears, prejudices, assumptions and associations 
intervened between a situation and their reaction 
to it. Support for particular policies or 
individuals was the criterion for confidence; 
judgment went by association. This is not to 
deny the connection between a man's occupation and 
his politics, but simply to suggest that the 
connection is much more complicated than has often 
been assumed by writers on Australian history. 
Because of the variety of experience and problems 
among different groups, it is necessary to consider 
different sections of the community separately. 
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Three stand out in Victorian political organisation 
and structUTe: the Southern Irish, the rUTal 
community, especially the farmers of the northern 
wheatbelt which developed dUTing the 'seventies, 
&"'1.d the higher ranges of the working classes, 
particularly in the Melbourne artisan subUTb of 
Collingwood. 
There were also certain general problems of 
organisation which hampered its growth during this 
period: the isolation of many communities, the 
mobility of much of the population, local and 
sectional feelings, the individualism which 
colonial conditions fostered a.YJ.d the political 
apathy to which the country rapidly returned after 
the brief crises. Although certain featUTes of 
the electoral system, particularly the registration 
machinery and the multi-member electorate, encouraged 
organisation, it was on a small scale and in the 
short term. As well as difficulties resulting 
from colonial conditions, organisation in Parliament 
and electorate was hampered by attitudes based on 
individualist assumptions. These limited the 
3 
permissible forms to registration conlli'littees, 
election committees for individual candidates or 
a party, and promotional organisations agitating, 
by normal election activities and by reasonable 
persuasion, for particular policies after the general 
model of the Anti-Corn Law League, 
Such attitudes prevailed as long as they did 
largely because the colonial situation fostered 
political disorganisation, but partly because the 
experience of the businessmen and professionals 
who dominated politics for most of the period made 
them especia1ly willing to accept the conventional 
models, with which they hc_td achieve a., it seemed, 
some succem3. I'ilen of lower r-:iocial status, however, 
had begun their po1itical careers not in Parliament 
but in agitation, and had not achieved great success 
in business. Finding themselves thwarted under the 
old system, they "Nere mare ready to adopt different 
methods; seeing politics from the local rather than 
the parliamentary end, they were more concerned to 
control representatives than to maintain their 
independenceo 
4 
In 187.7, 2,fter one of th era: , GrsJ~am Berry, 
had been provoked into an especially successful 
agitation, these men at last entered Parliament 
in large numbers and obtained paN er o The 
parliamentary caucus came into much mare regLJ.lar 
use than before, and in the rrational Reform and 
Protection League, which combined the functions 
of a party election headQuarters with those of 
a promotional body, the first party organisation 
appeared which showed sie;ns of becoming really 
effective. Remaj_ning powerful for three years, 
it began to encou.n:~ er new organisational problems, 
perticularly in its relations with the parlia.r1entary 
party and with the provincial branches; it 
therefore began to adapt the structure inherited 
from the earlier small promotional organisations, 
which had rarely spread beyond Melbourne, and 
whose life had rarely exceeded a yearo It early 
made widespread use of pre-selection by ballot and 
other methods, developed the annual delegate 
conference and tried to set the relationship of 
Cou..c1'.1Cil and bra...Ylches on a formal basis. Meanwhile, 
it provoked conservatives into: creating political 
5 
forms and methods particuiarly suited to the 
conventional view of politics. All these 
developments had been foreshadowed, some in the 
Land Convention, based on Irish models, some in 
the Loyai Liberal Reform Association of the 1868 
Darling Grant crisis, when radicals had provided 
the merchants' and professionals' political 
organisers. The Convention, however, had not 
been allied to a ministry with sn overwhelming 
radical majority, and during the 'sixties the 
radical methods, regarded asenergency measures, 
were soon abandoned by the parliamentarian. 
Even the Reform League soon disappeared, 
however. Not until society had grovm together 
more, and ideas about the relationship of sectional 
organisations and politics altered enough to allow 
an alliance between a permanent sectional organisation 
and a parliamentary party, was permanent party 
organisation possible. This, perhaps, was the most 
important innovation of the Labour Party. Until 
then, large scale organiaation was possible only 
during those times of great political excitement, 
for which Victoria was nat edo These resulted 
from social conflicts which had parallels elsewhere, 
but which provoked much more powerful political 
6 
reactions in Victoria than elsewhere. Partly, 
perhaps, the especially large number and percentage 
of the population which hc:::,d arrived du.ring the gold-
rushes gave Victoria a more powerful democracy. 
At the same time, the forces of resistance vrnre 
also exceptionally powerful in the possession of a 
Legislative Council of remarkable strength and 
willingness to use this to the utmost. As it was 
the House exclusively of' the rich, and particularly 
of the least popular or liberal group in Victoria, 
the great pastoralists, its clashes with the 
Assembly tended to u.nite all men of low status 
against it, temporarily polarising and exciting 
the normally dull &"ld fragmented political society. 
Consequently it was the institution and the section 
of the cornmunitymidl was the least fertile in 
political organisation which was largely responsible 
for producing conditions favourable to the develop-
ment of organisation in other sections. 
By the end of the period, however, with the 
first significant reform of the Council achieved, 
with the decline of the gold.fields and the increasing 
separation of farmers from the radical alliance, as 
they turned increasingly to sectional action, the 
basis of the radicalism of the goldfields generation 
7 
was disappearing as the new generation began 
to assume control. 
8 
C H A P T E R 1 
THE LEGISLATURE AND THE COURSE OF EVEN~S 
I. Problems of a Premier. 
In 1863 Charles Gavan Duffy, Minister 
of Lands in the third O'Shanassy Goverrunent, 
tried to increase squatting rents, as his Land 
Act had failed to do so. A nwnber of 
ministerialists, largely interested in squatting, 
joined the radical opposition under Richard Heales 
to defeat the Ministry. The Government expected 
a mere Cabinet reshuffle, dropping Duffy and 
accepting some of "the Scotch element11 • 1 In 
fact, O'Shanassy never again held office; the 
McCulloch ascendancy, which was to last some eight 
years, was beginning~ 
McCulloch, having risen in a Glasgow 
mercantile house, had been sent to open a Melbourne 
branch in 1853, at the age of 35. He had soon set 
up a partnership with Robert Sellar, and prospered 
in squatting as well as commerce. He was elected 
first to the old Legislative Council, then to the 
new Assembly in 1856. There he had been prominent 
in the rise and fall of ministries, and had received 
1. Diary of James Smith, (Mitchell Library), 
8 March and 12 June 186'3. Sir G.G. Duffy, •.Mr 
Life in Two Hemispheres , Vol. 2, pp.236-7. 
9 
frequent offers of ministerial appointments. 2 
For all his early and sustained eminence, however, 
he remains one of the most impenetrable of Victorian 
politicians. An effective debater, highly regarded 
as administrator and financier, he allowed only 
his public self into his speeches; perhaps his 
public and private selves were identical. He 
was the commercial politician par excellence, 
cautious, moderate, looking to the profit, convinced, 
perhaps, that none could run Victoria so well as 
he. To be in the centre, to work by conciliating 
opponents between whose positions he habitually 
saw little difference, was his political instinct; 
he pursued this course with such success that he 
had no rival throughout his succession of Ministries, 
and when he fell in 1871, it was not because another 
10 
more powerful than he had arisen. "Poli tic,. cautious 
and meticulous", the skilful conciliator, the master 
manoeuverer, McCulloch attracted little affection 
but many supporters. 
2. For McCulloch's earlier career, see G. Serle, 
The Golden Age', pp. 252-263, passim. 
His Ministry, formed of Healesi tes and 
"the Scotch element 11 , bristled with talents on 
the one side capable of great development, and 
on the other well-tried. Its main aim, however, 
to settle the land Question, was frustrated by the 
Legislative Council, which rejected Heales• bills 
of 1863 and 1864. In the latter year, after Heales' 
death had led to his replacement as Minister of Lands 
by James Grant, 3 a radical Scots solicitor, 
McCulloch went to the country with a three-point 
programme, 4 the latest Government land bill, 
Council reform a...nd tariff-revision. When 
Parliament re -assembled, the IVIinisterial benches 
were crowded, the Opposition half-empty. Moreover, 
the Opposition was divided into several hostile 
groups.5 O'Shanassy had but three followers; 
most of the Opposition was composed of dissident 
radicals. Among these was one tight-knit group 
of a half-dozen, associated with a small radical 
3. James Macpherson Grant, b. Scotland 1822, 
arrived Sydney 1836, Victoria 1853. Helped 
defend Eureka Stockade prisoners. M.L.A., 1856-85. 
4. Argus, 20 September 1864. 
5. The Opposition contained 22 out of 78 
members. Estimates of groups in the Assembly 
have been based on examination of their voting 
record, and on analyses and other information in 
newspapers. 
11 
organisation called the Australasian Reform 
League, and voting with unusual frequency and 
cohesion. 
IVIcCulloch's position was weaker than it 
looked, however. Half' his supporters sat in the 
Ministerial Corner, and showed by their voting-
behaviour that they could not be relied on in small 
things, and might easily defeat the Government on 
a chanc·e is sue . His first problem, therefore, 
was one which plagued all Parliaments, the 
problem, of the independent member. The ideal 
of independence permeated political life. Where 
localism was so strong, moreover, and local needs 
were so great and so dependent upon the Government 
for satisfaction, the M.P. 's fu..YJ.ction as agent 
for his constituents was given renewed force. The 
influence of local questions was a favourite topic 
among men who thought less of the pressing needs 
of the provinces than of an ideal of politics. 6 
To theIIJ, 7 Parliament should be a collection of 
individuals chosen for good character and abilities, 
6. E.g. Higinbotham, Argus, 4 November 1875. 
7. Argus, 19 April 1876. And cf. Kerferd's 
conservative lawyer's exposition of the received 
doctrine, V.P.D., Vol. 28, p. 346. 
12 
to consult the general welfare, setting up an 
Executive Committee in which they had confidence, 
sitting in judgment on its actions, and replacing 
13 
it by another when it lost their confidence. 
Parliament must control the Government, not Government 
the Parlia::nent. Moreover, if the best was to be 
obtained from the system, each must be free to 
exercise his ovm judgment. His dignity as a man, 
and the seriousness of his functions, demanded it. 8 
All admitted, however, that a cry of 'independence' 
could be a cloak for self-seekers. Such members, 
a stabilising influence when a Ministry was firmly 
in power, began to desert when its grasp seemed to 
be slipping, and fled from it once it had fallen; 
a Ministry defeated by a handful of votes co:rrunonly 
8. Geelong Advertiser, 13 October 1868. 
"In any case of difficulty" (said one candidate) 
"I would try my explanation before my constituents, 
and would take their advice; but it would rest 
with myself whether I would resign, if I received 
a requisition to do so. I will not be the tool of 
any party, but assert my prerogative as a man. 
(Applause.) And I hold that unless your rep-
resentative has some little spirit, he is not 
likely to be of much use to you. I may remark, 
however, that no man having any sense of honour 
would continue to occupy a position when those who 
placed him in it desired him to vacate it. 11 The 
speaker, R. de B. Johnstone, a saddler, although 
defeated on this occasion, soon entered Parliament 
for Geelong, and was one of the most reliable 
radicals in the House. His seat was always secure 
until his death. 
found itself in a serious minority once it had gone 
into Opposition.9 
Well might McCulloch say to his electors, 10 
"I trust --- that not only this constituency, 
but every constituency throughout the country, 
will so unite on some particular leading ~uestions 
such as the settlement of the land ~uestion, for 
instance - as not to allow the candidates to run 
from the point, and say, 'We have this crotchet, 
or we have that crotchet'; because if every member 
of the House has a particular crotchet of his own 
on the subject, it will be impossible to carry 
any measure into law. The people must nail down 
the candidates on this point - will they support 
the IVIinisterial land policy or not?" 
14 
He was appealing to the other tradition of Parliament, 
which directly contradicted the ideal of independence; 
both ideas found favour in the same minds, and no 
mo1re could be expected than a balance between them. 
If a representative was the man of good character 
he should be, he would keep his word. Having 
declared his views on the Government's policy and 
any other Questions which interested him or his 
constituents, he would stick to them. Most candidates, 
however, emphasised that they supported 'measures, 
not men'; candidates promised to support the 
9. E.g. after Duffy's Ministry (1871) and 
Berry's (1875). And cf. Argus, 7 January 1872 
"'fo our shame there is always a band of free 
lances in our Legislature whose political belief 
consists in siding with the party that has the 
distribution of the plundero" 
10. Argus, 20 September 18640 
Government only as long as it adhered to its 
current 'principles', and whether it was doing 
that, especially on questions which had not arisen 
during the election, they alone could decide. 11 
It was often conceded that party was 
necessary for the proper functioning of represent-
ative government. 
electors, 12 
As one politician told his 
"Party was a necessary ingredient in 
constitutional government. A party consisted 
of men who thought the same, who had the same 
objects in view, and were influenced by the 
same principles." 
It was commonly complained, in fact, that parties 
did not exist in Victoria because men with the same 
'principles' sat on opposite sides of the House, 
divided merely into ins and outs. 13 Sometimes, 
it was alleged, matters were sttLll worse. The 
Argus early bewailed14 the lack of "that wholesome 
balance of powers which is exercised at home --- by 
the struggle of two broadly defined partieso our 
political distinctions in this colony are based, 
11. Age, 8 January 1876, tries to strike a sensible 
working balance between the ideas of M.L.A.s as 
representatives and as delegates. 
12. Argus, 8 August 1865. 
13. E.g. Argus, 1 August 1876, 25 April 1872. 
14. Argus, 21 October 1864. 
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unfortunately, not on party but on class ---." 
In this case, the national interest was forgotten 
in the struggle for class advantage and 'class 
legislation', which plundered one group for the 
benefit of another. Worst of all, party could 
be little more than a group of predators seeking 
no more than the speils of office. Whenever 
important legislation was before Parliament, 
therefore, there was usually a demand to treat 
it as a national ~uestion, transcending party 
divisions. 15 Let the normal struggle for place 
and pay, the parliamentary war-game, cease, for 
here was serious business. 
McCulloch had to foster the belief that he 
was engaged on serious business, while encouraging 
the idea that his following formed a party in the 
Burkean sense. His problem was the greater because 
some two-thirds of this Parliament had not sat in 
the last, and so ia~ked the habit of united action 
15. E.g. V.P.D., Vol. 28, p. 588 - "Surely, if 
there is one thing that should, on an occasion 
like the present, be more absent than another from 
the proceedings of a deliberative Qody like ours, it 
is a spirit of party. It is the interests pure and 
simple of the country, and not the question who is 
to occupy the Treasury Bench, that we ought to be 
considering." The sarne views were expressed by a 
large number of members during the debate, on 
Berry's 1878 Reform Bill; it was apparently one 
of the few things on which both sides agreedo 
16 
or community of views; nor had he or his 
ministers yet acquired the national stature 
which was later to add such prestige to their 
views. Finally, the la.YJ.d question was one on 
which 'crotchets' were especially numerous, and 
once it was settled, he had to face, in the tariff, 
a question which transected divisions on the major 
question. In the arts of managing a majority he 
was well-skilled, To control a party effectively, 
however, he must be able to influence their chances 
of re-election, to bring outside pressure to bear 
upon them. The effectiveness with which a Chief 
Secretary could do this varied greatly, for 
Governments could not be certain of a dissolution 
if defeated, least of all early in a Parliament; 
if an alternative Government seemed available, it 
was generally expected to be given its chance. 16 
Mcculloch and his Government had already 
tried mobilising public opinion by addressing the 
country through their constituents: it was capable 
of further exploitation, but this was hampered by 
16. The full principles governing dissolutions 
at this time are discussed in G.P. McCormack, 
Victorian Governors and Responsible Government, 
1856..:189 2 , (Mel • lVI. A. ) , ·c • 8 o · ·· · · 
17 
political convention. Each electorate was 
expected to make its own decisions, without outside 
interference, least of all from the Government; 
stump-tours were therefore generally condemned. 
This attitude was shared by McCulloch, always the 
Chairman of Directors, the parliamentarian to whom 
agitation was distasteful. His Attorney-General, 
George Higinbotham, the brilliant and passionate 
orator who could have had no peer in the stmnp-tour, 
was similarly inhibited, often refusing invitations 
to speak, when his party and his causes stood to 
benefit, because it would constitute interference. 17 
Principle inhibited him as much as custom and 
inclination in...hibited his chief. 
The :rnxt method suited McCulloch better: 
operating on electorate a_nd representatives by use 
of patronage. This took innumerable forms, ranging 
from temporary work for individuals to the routing 
of a major railway. Ex-ministers became judges or 
Agents-General. Lawyers were employed on drafting 
bills, and Royal Commissions had to be staffed. For 
friends and relations of M.L.A.s and deserving 
constituents, there were regular jobs in the public 
17. Argus, 10 May 1869. 
18 
service. The Civil Service Act had tried to 
control appointments, but left a loophole in the 
supernumerary system, intended to supply extra 
hands for sudden pressures, but which became a 
system of permanent temporary appointments. 18 
There was also a large number of posts to which 
the Act did not apply, particularly in Lands and 
Railways, and in electoral appointments. None 
attempted to deny that these were used for political 
purposes. Grant, as a witness in a trial involv-
ing a Government supporter, stated that "All things 
being equal, it is the rule of the DepartnBnt to 
allow the minor patronage to be dispensed by members 
of Parliament in the districts concerned who support 
the Government." 19 
This system had its political disadvantages, 
however. It absorbed much of a member's and a 
IVIinister's time, 20 and it was impossible to satisfy 
more than a very limited number. One Minister of 
21 Railways, · no doubt with some exaggeration, told 
18. V.P.D., Vol. 43, pp. 659-669 
19. Argus, 6 May 1867 (Sands v. Armstrong) 
20. This was one of the main reasons advanced 
for giving patronage to independent boards. For a 
discussion of the whole question, cf. V.P.D., Vol. 35, 
pp.1492ff, esp. Patterson's remarks, pp. 1502ff. 
21. John Woods, Argus, 13 June 1877. 
19 
one applicant that he was the four thousand and 
first in line for a particular job. The only 
area in which patronage was practically unlimited, 
in fact, was the Bench of Magistrates; consequently, 
mh A - t . t 22 r1Th t Ad . . t t. h " 1 d as t e ge pu . i , a an . minis ra ion s o"Lu. 
make a batch of J.P.s the day before it goes out of 
office is come to be regarded as natural as that a 
man should make his will before he dies." 
Much of the patronage arose in Departments 
which existed because of the Government's role as 
landlord and as development authority for necessary 
projects which private enterprise would not under-
take. These functions, and the desperate need for 
20 
development expenditure in many areas, also multiplied 
opportunities for a black market in land disposal, 
for individuals, and for localities in development 
projects. "La.nd is the bribery fu..nd of the Ministry", 
Niel Black complained, with, it seems, some justi-
fication. 23 Illinisterial discretion, the magic 
sword upon which Grant stumbled, was double edged; 
22. Age, 15 August 1876. 
23. Blac_k Papers_, Black to Gladstone, 23 March 1867. 
Cf. M. Kiddle, op.cit., pp. 247 ff. 
21 
intended to slay the dragon of land monopoly, it 
could carve up the land among the Government's 
friends, whether great squatters or publicans. 
The Government also had flexible control over 
works. Even when the list of projects had been 
approved by Parliament, it could still put 
proposals in the areas of recalcitrant representatives 
among projects which, for departmental reasons, it 
had been impossible to start. 24 Once again, there 
was little attempt at concealment. William 
Tytherleigh, M.L.A., added to the Berry Government's 
fame when, in the presence of ministers, he told his 
constituents 25 that they 
"were not --- the stuck-up nobs we had 
been accustomed to. If he went into the 
office of the ]Jiinister of Education for 
ariything, the answer was, 'All right, my 
dear boy.' Mr. Longmore also placed con-
fidence in him, knowing he would not bring 
a case before him without foundation, and so 
with all the members of the Ministry." 
These methods, however, had not prevented 
ministerial instability before, nor, probably, would 
they have maintained McCulloch in office with only 
24. Members fostered this power very often by 
voting more projects than Ways and Means. 
V .P.D., Vol. 21 , p. 696. 
25. Argus, 8 December 1877. 
brief interludes until 1871. Paradoxically, 
the answer to his first problem lay in his second, 
the Legislative Council. Intended as a check 
upon the democracy, this was as near perfect far 
its function as constitutional arrangements could 
make it. Property qualifications for members and 
electors ensured that it would be elected from among 
the rich by the well-to-do. 26 Electoral provinces 
were so large that cai~paigning was very expensive, 
and as the drawing of boundaries favoured country 
areas, an undue percentage of those elected came 
from the most conservative section of the upper 
classes, the great pastoralists. 27 The House was 
indissoluble: its members were elected for ten 
years, one fifth retiring every two. There were 
no constitutional arrangements for forcing it to 
withdraw its veto. Arry Bill to amend its con-
stitution or powers must receive an absolute majority 
26. G. Serle, op.cit., pp. 147-8, summarises this 
and other sections of the constitution. 
27. F .K. Crowley, ,Aspects o_f _the C~onsti tutional 
Conflicts Between the two Houses of the Victorian 
J.ie_gislS:ture._ 1_864-186~·, <.M~el. rvr.A.), p. 138; -
Parnaby, 'Economic and Poli ti cal Developments in 
Victoria, 1877-81, (Mel. Ph.D.), p. 309. Tfie more 
'liberal M:L.C.s tended to come from Southwest 
Province, dominated by Geelong and Ballarat, and 
from South Province, dominated by Melbourne. 
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in both Houses; the only alternative was to 
persuade the reluctant Imperial Parliament to amend 
the Constitution Act. 
It was generally accepted that the Council 
should bow to public opinion, but the form which 
this principle took made it almost valueless. As 
the fu..nction of a second chamber was to prevent 
'hasty legislation', to prevent the democracy, which, 
conservatives held, contained the um table elements 
of the p::>pulation, doing in times of excitement 
what it might regret later, 28 the Council had every 
justification for resisting strong public pressure, 
and when agitation had subsided, claiming that the 
public had thought better of it. Some even spoke as 
if the mass of the people could not be counted among 
the public. 
"It had been asserted," said Charles Sladen, 29 
leader of the Council during most of the con-
stitutional crises, "that the opinion of the 
2Q "'u 
country was in favour of the (land) bill, but he 
denied that there was any proof of this. Under 
universal suffrage, those electors who talked most 
loudly were, generally speaking, the most uneducated; 
28. E.g. Argus, 6 March 1874 - 11While the Assembly 
represents the popular will, the Council should 
represent the sober reason and deliberate judgment 
of the people." Note that at this stage even The 
Argus went on to suggest that the Council as then 
constituted was failing to do this, 
29. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11, p. 279. 
and if honourable :members concluded that the 
bill had the support of the country from anything 
which had been said during the recent elections 
they were :much deceived. No doubt the class who 
had the least capital would be the most favourable 
to the bill, because the bill thoroughly ignored 
capital." 
The Council ignored public opinion sufficiently 
to reject UcCulloch's bill to reform it by halving 
property qualifications, 30 but despite Sladen and 
others like him, and the absence of strong public 
agitation, the land bill eventually passed. The 
hopelessness of seeking a return to the auction 
system, as the Council had recommended before the 
election,31 had been demonstrated not only by the 
Assembly elections, but also by the periodical 
Council elections, which had favoured the Government, 
24 
and so increased the liberal component of the Council. 
Moreover, the Government had :made further concessions 
to the Council's views by including auction provisions 
in the bill, and resisting demands for increases in 
squatting rents. Many pastoralists had either secured 
much of their land already, or hoped to evade Grant's 
bill. 
30. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11;, pp.251-63. A slight 
movement in this direction had been made in 1858; 
G. Serle, op.cit., p. 318. 
31. Below, p.261. 
McCulloch now had to pass his tariff, 
which reduced duties on tea, sugar and opium, 
abolished the gold export duty, and increased duties 
on numerous other articles. Fearing that the 
Council, already hostile because of Grant's skilful 
use of administrative powers to prevent evasion of 
the Land Act, would heed the mercantile clamour, 
he tried to use the only parliamentary method of 
coercing the Council: he decided to tack the 
tariff onto the Appropriations Bill,32 The 
Constitution Act, attempting to reproduce in Victoria 
the financial relations of the Houses of Parlia.c'IJent, 
provided that the Council could reject but not amend 
fina...'1.cial legislation. The House of Lords had.not 
then dared to reject an Appropriations Bill, but 
the Council now did. The relations of the Houses, 
which previously had aroused little interest, 
suddenly monopolised attention. 
The contrast with the House of Lords was 
frequently made explicitly or implicitly. 
32. McCulloch's and other people's motives and 
positions are discussed more fully below, pp. 90ff. 
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"The real danger to this country," 
said Higinbotham,53 "consists in the selfish-
ness - in the want of education - in the want 
of a liberal tone of thought and character -
that marks the wealthy class of this colony. 
It is a small class - a very small class, but 
enormously powerful, and its power is derived 
chiefly from a monopoly of the public property. 
This class enjoys wealth which it has not inherited, 
and very many of its members are ignorant men, and 
have all the sordi.dness of character which 
ignorance entails." 
He exaggerated the Council's lack of education, 
but it was true that few of ability or political 
experience ever sat in the Council. The impreg-
nability of their position encouraged irres-
ponsibility, and the tendency of practically all 
Governments, when they included M.L.C.s at all, 
was to give them the more insignificant port-
folios. Few M.L.A.s moved to the Council; those 
who did were usually nonentities or defeated con-
servatives often eager to hurl thunderbolts upon 
33. Argus, 24 October 18640 
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their old enemies from another place.34 
Lacking the political experience and responsi-
bility of the Lords, the Council also lacked their 
social responsibility and easy asswn.ption of leader-
ship. The Victorian magnates had not come to their 
wealth and status easily, nor grown up to take it for 
granted. They lacked the paternalist tradition of the 
happy estate, which mitigated some of the evils of the 
English country class system;35 where the Lords met 
tenants, small freeholders, tradespeople and farm 
27 
workers bred to submission in their varying degrees, and 
werewere regarded as leaders of country interest, the Niel 
34. The leadership of the Council usually fell to old 
conservative politicians. Of the first 1linistry under 
responsible government, the leader, Haines, entered the 
Council after his defeat for the Assembly in 1864, but 
died early in 1866. His former colleagues of 1856, T.H. 
Fellows and Charles Sladen, became M.L.C.s in 1858 and 
1864 respectively, and held the leadership in turn, until 
Sladen left for England in 1868, and Fellows resigned to 
lead the Constitutionalists in the Assembly. The lead 
was then taken by O'Shanassy, who had taken over Fellows' 
old seat, until he resigned to stand for the Assembly in 
1874; failing to be elected then, he was successful in 
1877 and remained there until 1883; although he had been 
Haines' main opponent in the late 'fifties, they had been 
colleagues in the lfinistry :McCulloch had defeated in 1863. 
Sladen returned to the Council in 1875, a...'1.d continued to 
lead it until he retired in 1882. Apart from these three, 
only nine ex-IvI.L.A.s entered the Council between 1856 and 
its reform in 1882. 
35. Ha:n.1'1.am, Elections and Party WJ.anagement , c. 1-4, 
passim, and Kiddle, Men of Yesterday , s. II and c .14 
and 15, passim, would afford quite a detailed compari-
son. 
Blacks and William Campbells had met mcbs of 
diggers ruining their lands, selectors out to 
break up the basis of their lives, or to help land 
sharks fleece them, and hired men outrageously 
independent and den1anding. Whereas large numbers 
of landowners and sons of nob le houses sat in the 
Commons, relatively few squatters could gain a seat 
in the Assembly, nor did many now try. By the 
'seventies, if not earlier, pastoralists hardly even 
bothered to vote for the Assembly. 36 The separation 
of the Houses was about as absolute as it could be. 
M.L.A.s included few of really low status, but by 
1866 virtually all were tovmsmen. 37 However, bankers and 
28 
merchants, often tied closely by ownership or financial 
participation to pastoralism, allied socially and by 
marriage with the squatters, now, as a result of the 
tariff, formed a loose alliance with them. Suddenly, 
the conflict between Government and Opposition and 
between the Houses had become practically a battle 
between men of high status and low. 
36. V. and P. (L.A.), Session 1877-8, Vol. 1, C.9. 
37. For_ the composition of the Assembly during the 
crises of the 'sixt,ies, see Crowley, op.cit., p. 139. 
A similar polarisation took place in the. 
Assembly. The tariff had cost McCulloch the 
support of eleven M.L.A.s, of whom four were 
pastoralists, four merchants and three goldfields 
representatives. The tack lost him three more 
pastoralists and another goldfields man. IJifuen he 
took measures of doubtful constitutionality to 
maintain the public credit, he lost a pastoralist, 
t h t d .h f th d. . 38 wo more merc_an s an a.~ot er rom , e iggings. 
At the same time, he was gaining support among the 
radical opposition; the centre of his support was 
shifting to the left, and declining socially, for 
although he retained the confidence of several of 
his own status, the radicals generally came from the 
lower middle class and the lower ranks of the pro-
fessions. There were signs, however, that his new 
allies might be unreliable. Graham Berry, a Healesite 
protectionist who owned a small suburban newspaper, 
and opposed the 1863 coalition, attacked his handling 
of the crisis as being too cautious. Perhaps anxious 
for his majority, perhaps simply regarding an 
38. Pastoralists - Moffatt, Sherwin, Orr, Thomson, 
Fairbairn, MacBain, Pearson, Snodgrasso 
Merchants - Blackwood, Moore, Harker, Houston, 
Creswick, Coheno 
Goldfields Representatives - Carpenter, Zeal 
(engineers), Kerferd (brewer turning lawyer), Gillies 
(independent means?) and Howard - who described himself 
in his nomination as simply a 'quartz miner', was 
apparently the only one of these who was lower class. 
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election as the final appeal, McCulloch obtained 
a dissolution. 
Since the rejection of the Budget, the country 
had been in uproar. Members and radical militants 
declaimed against the Council, and discovered virtues 
in their conservative Chief Secretary. The 
elections brought him a greatly increased majority, 
so that his supporters now outnumbered his opponents 
by three to one. It was also a majority heavily 
committed to supporting, not just a measure, but 
the People's Ministry and its leader. The Council 
had achieved for McCulloch what the routine measures 
had failed to doo 
30 
II. 'lfue Fir st Cycle. 
~he popular hero, however, was not 
McCulloch but Attorney-General.. George Higinbotham, 
an orator without peer. Insanely principled, 
somewhat priggish, handsome and personally charming, 
a Sir Galahad bred from the Protestant Ascendancy of 
Ireland, he set his lance against Collins Street, 
and the Western District, and the crowds ran 
cheering after him. 
The crisis ended, however, not with a 
knightly triumph, but with a commercial compromise 1 
which left the Council's powers untouched. The 
Council had even won a victory in another respect. 
Governor Darling, who had assented to the Govern-
ment's doubtful expedients for maintaining payments, 
31 
and been increasingly attacked by the Constitutionalists, 
as the Council'ssup~or'."ter.3called themselves, had become 
so partisan in despatches that he was recalled. 
Numerous public meetings expressed sympathy and urged 
Parliament to pass a grant in his favour. The 
Assembly passed appropriate resolutions but the grant, 
made ostensibly to Lady Darling to evade Colonial 
1. A detailed account of this and the subsequent 
crisis, with a discussion of the constitutional points 
involved, is to be found in Crowley, op.cit.; or, 
more briefly and accessibly in R. Gollan, Radical and 
Workin Class Politics: A Stud of Eastern Australia, 
1 0-1910, c.3. 
-J') 
t]"" 
Service regulations, had to be delayed to see if the evasion 
was permissible. ·when Darling left, cheering crmvds 
attended him to his ship. 2 
Parliament was prorogued for eight months. 
Politics cooled off; the Ministry underwent a few 
changes, which allowed Iv1cCulloch to take in one of 
his more capable former radical critics.3 Nevertheless, 
there were rumours of a new protectionist Opposition, 
centred around the representatives for the Geelong area. 4 
C.E. Jones, a brilliant organiser and speaker, com-
pletely unscrupulous, most colourful of villains, had 
resigned as whip and gone into opposition because he 
had not been given office.5 The revenue was not 
encouraging; farmers around Melbourne and Geelong 
were pressing for agricultural protection. Nor was 
the new Land Act working well, for despite Grant's 
6 ingenuity, the land was still falling to the squatter. 
2. Argus, 8 May 1866. 
3. Macgregor replaced Sullivan as Minister of Mines, 
whose health was poor, but retained a portfolio without 
office. Bindon replaced Michie as Minister of Justice 
after the latter had lost his seat for st. Kilda, 
the main upper-class residential areao 
4. Argus, 24 September 1866. 
5. Argus, 9 November 1866, 
6. M. Kiddle, op.cit., pp. 246-7. 
However, the crisis predicted for the new 
session did not materialise. The Government's 
majority, on major question~had decreased only 
from 50-20 to 45-25. 7 The Budget, however, 
which slightly raised some duties and covered a 
wider range of articles, began the Government's 
troubles. Its majorities were falling; the, 
small corn duty was passed by only five votes. 8 
Rumours of dubious land transactions were heard; 
a Quieting of Titles Bill which passed its second 
reading against the Governrrent, and was eventually 
shelved by two votes only, was righly suspected as 
a squatter intrigue. 9 Higinbotham, having con-
ducted a Commission into education, produced an 
anti-clerical bill which pleased nobody and had to 
33 
be withdrawn. 10 Parliament was drifting, the ~linistry 
was not wholly in control, but the radical and 
constitutionalist Oppositions were unable to combine, 
and unlikely to succeed if they dido 
7. Motions of no confidence, moved by Geelong 
protectionist members, defeated on 30 January and 
28 February 1867, 42-24 and 45-24. Figures in text 
will usually be rounded, because on practically no 
occasion could a full vote be obtained, and on a given 
issue there were usually one or two who voted 
differently from usual. 
8. Argus, 11 March 1867. 
9. M. Kiddle, op.cit., pp. 250-252. 
10. Below, pp. 194-5. 
Then, in July, the rews arrived that Darling 
had left the colonial service, so that the grant 
could be paid. On 6 August, it passed the Assembly 
by 42 votes to 15. As the Cou.ncilp:'epared to reject 
it, McCulloch was obliged, if he was to retain office, 
to tack it to the Appropriation Bill, which the 
Council rejected. Another series of public meetings 
began, but these were generally less well-attended 
than those of 1865-6, and the crisis was postponed 
during Prince Alred's visit. When negotiation failed 
34 
to settle the crisis, the Governor granted a dissolution. 
The Government was returned with much the same 
majority as in 1866; 11 but for Catholic opposition 
to the Education Bill, led by Duffy, the Con-
stitutionalists would have been annihilated. 12 The 
radical opposition had either returned to the ·fold, 
or been crushed. A fortnight later, the Gover:nnent 
resigned. The Colonial Secretary, the Duke of 
Buckingham and Chandos, to keep the Governor out of 
party politics, had ordered him not to send the 
necessary message to the Assembly suggesting the grant 
11. Age, 21 February 1868, estimated 60-18, but 
when The Argus claimed 21 Constitutionalists, admitted 
(The Age, 22 February 1868) that there two or three 
doubtfuls. The voting suggests 20 Constitutionalists, 
the rest practically solidly ministerialist. 
12. Below, pp. 209-213 
until he was assured it would be presented in a. 
form which would let the Cou_Dcil consider it on 
its meritso 13 After prolonged negotiations, the 
Governor found another Governoont, led by Sladen, 
the only M.J~.c. to hold high office. The crisis, 
which had failed to take fire, now exploded. Public 
meetings were numerous, well-attended and vociferous; 
two ministers were defeated, and the majority flaunted 
its mastery of the Assembly. The agitation, co-
ordinated by the new Loyal Liberal Reform Association, 
which rapidly spread all over the colony, mounted in 
intensity; a huge meei{ing in Melbourne, attended by 
delegates from provincial centres, threatened a national 
C t . 14 onven ion. Suddenly, next day, news arrived that 
Darling had rejoined the colonial service, and his 
wife could no longer accept the grant. The crisis 
was over, the Govermnen t resigned, McCulloch resumed 
office. The Council passed an Act 15 reducing property-
qualifications for its members and electors, but 
otherwise the crisis had achieved nothingo 
13. C.O. 309/84, Noo 1, 1 January 1868. 
S. of S. to Governor. 
14. For this agitation, and the L.L.R.A. in 
general, see below, c.6, s.1. 
15. 31. Vic., No._334 
Discontent reappeared almost at once in the 
Government party. Used to consultation about 
every move, it was incensed to have the list of 
new Ministers presented to it as a fait accompli, 
the more, perhaps, because several of the new 
D6 
ministers had no established reputation above theirs. 16 
Two of them17 had lately been scheming against 
McCulloch. This may have been one of McCulloch's 
reasons for choosing them. He may also have chosen 
them from the radical wing because it was there that 
he saw the greatest danger. He had also lost his 
best insurance against another radical revolt in 
Higinbotham's refusal to take more than token office 
in a Cabinet µot prepared to continue fighting the 
Council. 18 
Discontent came to little, however, as all 
awaited Grant's bill to apply throughout the colony 
the system of free selection before survey, on easier 
terms, and controlled by ministerial discretion, 
which he had instituted in 1866 1Ulder delegated 
16. Argus, 11 July 1868. 
17. C.E. Jones, now Minister 
G.V. Smith, Postmaster-General. 
evidence in Alexander Vo Jones; 
8 February 1868.) 
of Railways, and 
(Argus, 5-8 March 1869, 
for Smith, Argus, 
18. Vice-President of the Board of Land and Works, 
a post which he resigned at the stext of 1869. For 
his chagrin at the outcome of the crisis, see Argus, 
18 August 1868. 
powers. 19 He remained, perhaps, the Ministry's 
last claim to radical support. Grant's presence in 
the Cabinet was especially valuable once C.E. Jones 
was first suspected, then proved, to have had 
corrupt dealings with a ring of squatters. 20 Before 
his guilt was proved, he resigned seat and office, 
to be re-elected by Ballarat West; when, with an 
accomplice, he was expelled from the House, he 
persuaded them that he was misunderstood, the 
victim of a plot, or no worse than the rest, and 
won again. As his opponent had been another 
minister, Vale, who had resigned to contest the 
election, there were now two ministerial vacancies. 
These McCulloch held vacant while the land 
bill was before the House, to add to the induce;nents 
to fidelity contained in iIIL~inent railway legislation. 
Soon he had need of his precautions. When the two 
leaders of the squatters' ring were released on a 
technicality, from the prison to which Parliament 
had sent them, radical suspicions of the squatter-
merchant Chief Secretary had increased. Then the 
land bill confirmed suspicions by proposing to 
19. Below, c.4, s.III. 
20. ?1!. Kiddle, op.cit., pp. 255-262. 
continue the squatting tenure another ten years. 
Although the Bill was never in danger, there was a 
good deal of cross-voting on its provisionso 
Then the names of the new ministers were 
announced. One was the leader of the Loyal Liberal 
Reform Association, popular but not a member of 
either House. Grant was estranged because of an 
alleged atternpt21 to have him put away until cured 
of alcoholism; Higinbotham had resigned in January. 
McCulloch was at last defeated. 
The new Ministry was headed by John Macpherson, 
a native-born squatter who had generally supported 
McCulloch. The Opposition, some of which were 
included in a Government otherwise formed from radical 
rebels, agreed to support him for that session, while 
the land bill, much amended in the Council, was seen 
ihrough. In the New 1,:ear, the Government would be 
judged on its merits. 22 Constitutionalist support 
was barely adequate; two ministers were defeated, 
and although it survived the session, the Government 
majority was precarious. 23 
21. Argus, 8 September 1869; Age, 9 September 1869. 
22. Argus, 17 September 1869. 
23. At time:i, only one or two. (Argus, 23-24 
December 1869.) 
During the recess, ministerial vacancies were 
filled by two, Constitutionalists - an old land-radical 
and a liberal lawyer - and one radical, Berry. All 
were re-elected. When Parliament met, however, the 
Ministry was defeated on Berry's budget; two, or 
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three radicals deserted, and half the Constitutionalists, 
aJa:med by Berry's talk about protection, abstained. 24 
There was talk of a dissolution, but Macpherson thought 
so ill of his colleagues that he refused to seek one 
without a Cabinet reshuffle. 25 McCulloch, free of 
a number of his previous radical supporters, could 
now appeal to Constitutionalists as the safe man. 
He formed a Ministry not conservative, but equally 
not radical. According to the former Minister of 
Railways, "it had all been selected from the upper 
crust, who had got few sympathies with the people. 1126 
The meeting Longmore was addressing, however, was 
small, and demonstrated that it still supported 
McCulloch. 
He had nevertheless begun the process of 
disillusionment by taking for his I\!Iinister of Lands, 
not Grant, but Macpherson. His appointment was 
unpopular, and his administration of the Lru1ds Office 
24. Argus, 26 and 30 March 1870. 
25. Argus, 16 April 1870. 
26. Argus, 18 April 1870. 
made his unpopularity increaseo 27 Once more, 
however, McCulloch had neutralised opposition by 
win_ning over its leader. Parliament drifted towards 
a dissolution whose main interest seemed likely to 
be the effects of payment of members, introduced 
on a private member's bill as a three-year experiment. 
McCulloch intended his secular education bill 
f th . . 28 or e main issue. It failed to dominate, and 
his part~, for the first time since 1864, lacked an 
·. t• 29 organisa ion. The absence of clear party lines, 
and the introduction of payment, brought out 
unprecedented numbers of candidates. McCulloch was 
hardly considered a liberal now; Higinbotham, however, 
would not come forward as radical leader, and in arry 
case lost his seat. Nobody else couid take his 
place: Grant was declining, as drink took its toll. 
The Constitutionalists were fragmented, and, apart 
from Duffy and his Irish allies, tended towards 
McCulloch. His power seemed secure. 
In some respects, the new Parliament resembled 
that of 1864. New men, generally somewhat higher 
27. Below, pp.304-5 and 472-3. 
28. Argus, 30 January 1871. 
29. Below, c.6, s.I. 
socially than in the previous two Parliaments, 
crowded the Ministerial Corner. Now, however, 
there was no conflict with the Council to polarise 
the House and maintain McCulloch's majority. Once 
again, there was a revenue problem, in face of a 
recession; increased ~uties were proposed, coupled 
with a property tax.30 Some radicals, including 
Government supporters, demanded higher duties, some 
alleged the property tax would harm selectors; 
McCullDch's amendment to prevent this failed to 
satisfy them. Constitutionalists objected to 
increased protection. Members on all sides opposed 
the property tax. Seven of the twenty-three 
remaining IVIcCullochi tes voted against it, with 
twenty-one of the thirty-one new members, eleven 
Constitutionalists, seven dissident radicals and 
two doubtfuls. McCulloch received fourteen votes 
from old supporters, nine from new members and one 
doubtful. He was crushingly defeated but the 
structure of Parliament was in chaos. 
Duffy, who had only recently been thinking 
of the Speakership, vras sent for as the most 
30. V.P.D., Vol.14 , pp. 507 ffo 
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prominent and experienced among the Oppositiono31 
The first Irish interlude began. An Irish free 
trade radical, Duffy stood some chance of appealing 
to several groups, and could hope for toleration 
from new members.3 2 By making Berry Treasurer, 
however, he opted for one side, as, with the 
revenue difficulty, he musto Berry increased the 
maximum duties to 20%; many old McCullochites 
supported him, but Constitutionalists began to oppose 
the Government. Then Duffy's other measures began 
to run into difficulties. The Council, having 
passed Berry's tariff, determined to destroy a 
1'/Iinistry which included Duffy and Grant; they were 
cried on by Duffy's old enemy, O'Shanassy, who, 
having abandoned the Assembly in 1866, had entered 
the Council in 1868 and was now its leadero33 
31. The choice was the Governor's; he, like 
41 
McCulloch, regarded it as improper for the outgoing 
Chief Secretary to advise on his successor. C.0.309/100, 
Confidential, 7914 Victoria, Governor to S. of S. 
32. His Ii/[inistry almost suggests such an attempt; 
it contained apart from Duffy, two Catholics (Walsh 
and O'Grady), three radicals (Berry, Longmore, Grant), 
two Constitutionalists (McLellan, O'Grady), and two 
new members (Walsh, Spensley). 
330 Below, pp.219-20. And cf. Black Paners, Black 
to Gladstone, 4 August 1871: "---- when you: ihin.."lc we 
have:got so far as to have Duffy for Chief with Grant 
for his henchman you may believe anything of us." 
Late in the session, while having difficulty -
with the Assembly, Duffy threatened to appeal to 
the people. During the recess, he seemed to be 
carrying out his threat in a triumphal provincial 
42 
banqueting tour.34 There were rumou.rs of combinations 
between former McCullochites and Constitutionalists. 35 
When Parliament re-assembled, the seating showed 
nTu'TI.bers about even; 36 the debate on the Address 
:Showed the Opposition better organised under James 
Francis, McCulloch's last Treasurer. Like his 
former chief, he was a merchant prosperous enough 
to devote his time to politics; he too was a 
parliamentarian, not an agitator. He lacked, 
however, McCulloch' s relish for manoeuvre, his 
ferocious ambition. He could be pugnacious,., 
but possessed a strong streak of decency and a 
touch of hTu'TI.ility. Although conservative by tern-
perame:nt, he gradually became a reforr.rer of the 
undemonstrative, businesslike variety. He was 
not plagued with principles, like Higinbotham, nor 
did he wear a tattered heart upon his sleeve, like 
Berry. In speech he was the antithesis of these 
two diverse masters, halting, involved and obscure. 
34. E.g. Argus, 22 December 1871. 
35. Argus, 31 January 1872. 
36. Argu7J, 2 May 1872. 
An excellent lieutenant or leader of a coalition, 
he needed quiet times and fair dealing to show 
his capabilities. 
He now condemned the Government's policy for 
lack of any reference to education. In his speech, 
however, 37 he brought out all the animus which many 
felt for Duffy. The Chief Secretary was a fine 
talker, but incompetent, and had struck at the 
authority of Parliament by his provincial tour. 
The Government barely survived the division. 
Immediately, a motion was moved condemning their 
use of patronage. The subject was safer, and one 
on which members had no pledges or scruples to 
consider. A handful changed sides; the Ministry 
was defeated by five votes. Duffy was refused a 
dissolution, as another Goverrurent was clearly avail-
able. Encouraged by public demonstrations arranged 
by a hastily-assembled radical association, Duffy 
prepared to fight the ministerial elections; perhaps 
because he had overestimated his support, perhaps 
because of his Bishop's intervention in politics, he 
failed completely 0 38 • 
37. V.P.D., Vol. 14 , pp. 29ff. 
38. Below, pp.41B-81, 490-2. 
43 
44 
So began the last stage of the cycle, 
the coalition which dominated politics for five 
years, and which represented the norm to which 
Victorian politics tended in Quiet times. The 
Wiinistry, formed of McCullochi tes and Consti tutionallits, 39 
soon attracted the support of many who had no strong 
preference for any other Government, and radicals 
who soon found that so far from being a rich man's 
plot, the coalition offered an age of reform. The 
Education Act was passed, introducing free, secular 
and compulsory instruction, and finally fragmenting 
the Opposition. Soon, hovvever, Francis, least 
radical of McCulloch's team during the constitutional 
crises, allied to the Cou...ncil's former defenders, 
met the same obstruction which had frustrated Duffy; 
the practical men were having no better success than 
the visionary with his scratch team. Permissive, 
Eight Hours, Land, Fencing and Impounding Bills, bills 
for mining on private property, were destroyed by 
rejection or amendment. In 1873, the Upper House 
rejected not only fresh bills on the previous subjects, 
but also a bill to reform the Council and, most 
startling of all, a comprehensive bill for reforming 
39. McCullochites - Francis , Casey, Mackay, 
Ramsay" Constitutionalists - Langton, Kerferd, 
Stephen, Cohen, Gillies. 
the Assembly. Having faith in the businessman's 
model of politics, Francis determined to send the 
rest of his programme to the Council, to see if it 
would mend its ways, and made Cou..~cil reform the 
maj.n election issue. 40 The Council was unperturbed; 
only the Regulation of Hines Act was alloNed to pass. 
The new House was slightly different in 
~embership, but not in character. The coalition 
returned with a similar majority, 49 to 28. The 
Opposition had not improved its numbers or its 
cohesion. Duffy, who had practically abandoned 
the leadership of the Opposition soon after his 
defeat, had left for Europe. Grant had fulfilled 
his task to some extent, but hopeless and lacking 
strong cause of quarrel with the GovenLment, the 
Opposition lacked fire; Grant himself, perhaps, 
was by now practically . ruined by drj_nk. Many 
Opposition radicals hoped that Higinbotham, re-elected 
in May 1873, would lead them as before. 41 He too 
was little more than a name, of his own choice; 
45 
seeing no better alternative to the present Governrn.ent, 
he generally supported it. Now, at the elections, 
McCulloch, back from Europe, returned to Parliamento 
40. V.P.D., Vol. 17, pp. 1414ff. 
41. Below, pp.478-81, 491. 
His election speech42 showed that his skill and 
ambition had survived his popularity, and that he 
had no intention of loyally supporting his old 
lieutena..YJ.t. Soon, with two of the least popular 
of his old ministers, Macpherson and G.P. Smith, 
he added another pocket of resistance to the 
Governrre nt o 
Francis' Reform Bill was named by its enemies, 
after the source of its inspiration, 'the Norwegian 
scheme'. 43 It passed its second reading by 48 votes 
to 28, but several supporters announced that they 
would call for amendments later. At tbis critical 
stage, with the problem of the independent member 
emerging again, Francis fell dangerously ill. Then 
Higinbotham noticed in one clause an implication 
that the Council might have some say in financial 
legislation. Principles bristling, practical sense 
420 Argus, 16 April 18740 
430 It proposed a joint sitting after a bill had 
been rejected by the Council in two consecutive 
sessionso The Opposition's attempt to explmit 
the feeling that in matters constitutional British 
models could not be bettered, is curiously expressed 
in a popular song. (!,rgu,s, 22 April 1874.) 
46 
"We really don't think this queer plan of the Storthing 
Is worth the one-half of an ancient brass farthing; 
And believe that the land would have made much more way 
If naught had been heard of the project from Norway." 
Francis' views may be found in Argus, 18 March 18740 
no more evident than usual, he deno1ll1ced the bill 
for a trifle, Sir Galahad wasting his powers upon 
windmills. Those in doubt and those who succumbed 
to his spell abstained or opposed the bill during 
its third reading. This passed by only 35 votes to 
33.44 The Council had the perfect excuse to reject 
it; the need to obtain an absolute majority for 
constitutional amendments saved it the trouble. 
Whether Francis would live was at first 
doubtful. That he couJ.d not soon resu.1."D.e his duties 
was certain. Despite the late vote, 44 attended a 
ministerial caucus, 45 two or three mare sending 
apologies. They wanted the Government to remain, 
and urged Francis to return to office when he could. 
Francis declined. Langton, Treasurer and head of 
the Constitutionalists, regarded himself as having a 
right to succeed Francis. However, he had offended 
the most powerful man in the Cabinet, Casey, the Lands 
Minister, who also, as a protectionist, refused to 
serve under Langton, arch-exponent of free tradeo46 
Francis recommended the Governor to send for the 
Attorney-General, George Kerferd, a Constitutionalist, 
but mild as Langton was harsh, colourless as Casey 
440 These events are sununarised in The Argus' 
47 
Slunmary for Europe, 15 June, 13 July and 10 August 1874. 
45. Argus, 29 July 1874. Higinbotham was among 
those who attended, and was sent with James Service 
to the sick Chief Secretary, to try and persuade 
him to retain office. 
46. V.P.D., Vol. 19 , PF· 746-757. 
was vivido 
So the constitutionalist element had reason 
to feel resentful, and Langton soon provided a focus 
for them among the Oppositiono His retirement, 
h01.~1ever, had opened the office of Treasurer to one 
of the most capable men in Victorian politics. James 
Service, a successful Scots merchant, had entered 
Parliament in 1857, and became Lai.'1.ds Minister within 
two years. Brought up among Chartist sympathisers, 
he was a natural refor:rrer, but had the disadvantage 
of being a free trader. This had put him after 1865 
into the position of supporting the Council, which 
had thwarted his Land Bill in 1860. 47 The few 
safe constitutionalist seats being pre-empted, he 
had vainly attempted several forlorn hopes. In 
1874, however, he had re-entered Parliament. 
Prolix as Higinbotham, less elegant in speech but 
more forceful, he had no equal for clear expositionp 
nor for the vivid contemptuous phrase. 
His Budget,48 necessarily a hasty, interim 
measure, began a remodelling of the taxation system, 
48 
reducing duties which hampered trade without protecting 
a.Dything (for as a practical man, he accepted that 
protection was settled policy), and promising for 1875 
47. G. Serle, op.cito, pp. 296-9. 
48. V.P.D., Vol. 19 , PPo 1075ff. 
and by introducing progressive taxation on land 
and houses. On the motion for increasing the 
spirits duties, the first item in theta.riff and 
therefore taken as the test vote, the various 
Oppositions, and several Government supporters, 
reduced its majority to one. When the Acting 
Governor refused a dissolution, Berry was sent for, 
as the leader of the protectionist Opposition, and 
mover of the amendment.5 1 
His chances of success were small. Many who 
had opposed the duties had no intention of felling 
the Government; some were free traders seeking 
more drastic reductions, some were in the liquor 
trade, some were protectionist supporters of the 
coalition. Even among the last, Berry was not 
regarded as the Tu.Ldoubted alternative leader, for 
his career so far had been undistinguished. He asked 
McCulloch, Macpherson and G.P. Smith to join him;5 2 
the first two pleaded ill-health, the third fell from 
his horse. Without them, Berry's chances of obtain-
ing the support of the more conservative Opposition 
51. For the Acting liovernor•s attitude, see his 
despatches, c.o. 309/113, A/Governor to S. of S., 
No. 85 (9 August 1875) and the following confidential 
despatch. As in 1871, the choice was entirely the 
Governor's. 
52. Ar!if"s, 24 February 1877, 27 and 28 April 1877, 
1 May 187 , give the accom1ts of the protagonists. 
50 
were very poor, but he formed a Government from 
his radical colleagues and two independents, IVI.ajor 
Smith of Ballarat and James Patterson of Castlemaine, 
who had lately opposed the Government for its lack 
of vigour in caring for the mining interest. All 
vrere re-elected wi thou.t opposition. Berry's Geelong 
speech53 had expressed a calm, assured trii.unph; 
after two false starts, he ruled Victoria. His 
Government, formed like Duffy's of provincial 
representatives, and including no merchants, bankers 
or pastoralists,·was about to set the country to 
rights. His Enain proposal was a land tax which, 
singling out the large estates and unaccompanied 
by other measures of direct taxation, would make 
them pay their share and arrest the development of 
great estates. He would rationalise the tariff, 
foster mining and reform the Councilo 
On his return to Parliament, his Budget was 
attacked by McCulloch e...nd Kerferd. McCulloch moved 
a resolution that the financial scheme should include 
a reduction in the burden of indirect taxation and 
53. Argus, 17 August 1875. 
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that direct taxation should reach all forms of 
we.al th. A Protection League hastily organised 
~blic protest meetings; Berry was still defeated. 
He was then, legitimately but foolishly, refused a 
dissolution. r·foCulloch formed a Govern.n1en t which 
included half the Kerferd Ministry a 54 
Berry, in alliance with the Protection League 
and a J\Tational Reform League begun by Major Smith's 
supporters in Ballarat, bega.n. a brilliant ac:Si tation. 
Two IIini s ters were defeated. Berry, claiming the 
Assembly was demoralised and unrepresentative, and 
that the people had shown by demonstrations and the 
ministerial elections that they demanded a dissolution, 
began systematically to obstruct Supply. His 
agitators kept up the clamour before rapidly-
increasing crowds. It was soon evident, however, 
that despite the narrowness of his defeat, mCEt of 
those who had supported the coalition supported 
McCulloch. All that had happened, it seemed_, was 
that McCulloch and his handful of conservatives had 
replaced the coalition's more liberal members, 
Service, Casey and Mackay. These opposed the new 
54. Argus, Summaries for Europe, 6 October 1875, 
3 November 1875, 1 December 1875. For the agitations, 
see below, c.6, s.II. 
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Goverrun2nt, but condemned Berry's methods.55 
Higinbotham, who had supported Berry's government, 
was disgusted with both sides; rather than do 
anything about it he ~ft politics for good.56 
Exhaustion and the introduction of the 
closure defeated the obstructionists. Despite his 
normally ample majority,57rvrcCulloch was soon hampered 
by the indiscipline which had increasingly plagued 
the coalition. His taxation proposals, for imposts 
on land, property and income, were withdrawn after 
being passed by a majority of three. Increases in 
succession duties, and a tax on ban..knotes, provided 
temporary relief; me anwhi 1 e the r evi val of trade 
was now relieving the revenue problem which had so 
convi~lsed politics.58 To take advantage of this, 
and allow the late excitement to subside, l\:IcCulloch 
twice had the prorogation extended. When Parliament 
reassembled in mid-July, all was quiet. He announced 
55. Argus, 24 April 1877, 1 May 1877. (Speeches 
by Mackay and Service.) 
56. Argus, 1 February 1876. 
57. During the stonewall, McCulloch had 42 
supporters, Berry 22; the rest were Corner 
or independent meno 
58. Argus, Summaries for Europe, 23 February 1876, 
22 March 1876. 
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that taxation reform could now wait until after 
the elections. 59 60 An Electoral Act was passed, 
remedying the worst inequalities, slightly increasing 
the number of :M.L.A.s, and providing for all elections 
to occur simultaneouslyo 
Dying as it had lived, the Assembly, having 
narrowly accepted TuicCulloch's proposal to expend 
part of a recent railway loan on buying the last 
private line, imposed impossible conditions. The 
Railway Construction Bill was with.drawn, McCulloch 
promising to take it up is'llliediately after tre 
elections, carrying out surveys of agreed lines 
in the meantime. 61 Late in December, Parliament 
was prorogued. I:rll April 1877 it was dissolvedo 
59. Argus, Summary for Europe, 7 August 1876. 
60. 40 Vic., Ho. 548. 
61. Arf;al.18, Summary for Europe, 27 December 1876. 
III. The Second Cycle. 
The election result was so startling that 
for it alone was adopted the Latin habit of 
referring to events simply by their dates. On 
the Eleventh of May two-thirds of the seats changed 
hands. Most newcomers were Berryites, pledged more 
or less to the same prograu"'1me, co-operating with the 
existing party and the National Reform and Protection 
Le~gue, 1 an efficient party organisation developed 
from the associations which had helped Berry during 
the stonewall. Although there were some independents 
or men of doubtful allegiance, including Service, 
Casey and Duffy, it was clear that even combined 
with McCulloch they could not form a :naj ori ty. 
McCulloch resigned without meeting Parliament; 
within a year he left politics for ever. 
The change involved mere than simply giving 
Berry a two-to-one majority in place of McCulloch's. 
There had also been a change in qualityo Not simply 
different men, but men from different backgrounds 
were now in power, with different attitudes to 
politics. Socially, they we:re:markedly inferior to 
1. Below, c.6, ss.II ff. 
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their opponentso 
. 
r. 
The original stonewallers 
followed such diverse occupations that they can_not 
be divided into any simple pattern of interests and 
are most easily described by contrast with the 
I1ifoCullochi tes. Of these, ignoring two or three 
whose occupations are unknown, almost three 
q_uarters were accounted for, in eq_ual proportions, 
by pastoralists, commercial men or 'gentlemen' 
living on investments and speculations, particularly 
in land and mining. Another half-dozen were 
lawyers in good practice. Three were farmers, 
two were chemists. The Corner and the independents 
56 
were composed of 'gentlemen', merchants, professionals 
and a nevvspaper proprietor. The Berryites included 
only four 'gentlemen,, out of twenty three, and the 
three lawyers were of no great prominence. The 
remainder consisted of three owners of provincial 
newspapers, a farmer, an engineer, two building-
society secretaries, six small businessmen, three 
auctioneers and one dependent upon his parliamentary 
salary. After the election, it was from occupations 
such as these that the radical ministry and party 
. 2 
were a.ra1J1m .• 
The immediate danger was the lack of exper-
ience and the habit of co-operation 82Ilong most of 
the majority; there was a risk of repeating the 
disorganisation of 1864, 1871 and 1874. Berry 
could not yet count on the Eeform Leag1.1B s to main-
tain discipline by threatening to withdraw its 
support at the next election: its branches were 
still relatively few, and on past experience it was 
likely soon to disappear. The Parliament had also 
been elected, as Berry later admitted, 3 against 
McCulloch rather than for him, a.11.d some would have 
preferred other leaders. He therefore followed 
IvicCulloch' s technique of trying to attract or 
neutralise possible rivals. He invited Duffy to 
join him; Duffy preferred to be made Speaker.4 
Service, in a.11. evil day for Berry, decided to remain 
a friendly neutral in the Ministerial Corner. Casey 
was appointed to represent Victoria at the Paris 
Exhi bi tiono 5 
2. The stonewall and TricCullochite groups vvere 
identified from di vj_sion lists and lists of those 
attending caucuses, especially in Argus, 18 November 
1875 and 3 February 1876. Information about their 
occupations has been drawn from obituaries, directories 
and numerous casual mentions in newspapers. For the 
composition of the 1877-80 Parliament see Parnaby, 
op.cit., c.14. 
3. Argus, 17 December 1878. 
4. Below, p. 236. 
5. Argus, 7 February 1878. 
Berry's first legislative task was to take 
up the railway construction which had been left 
in abeyance, and which .mea11.t so much to the 
provinces. Immediately the tone was set for the 
Parliament; the Cou.n.cil objected to certain lines, 
took evidence and made alterations. Not until the 
following year were all differences settled. 6 
IvTeanwhile, Berry began to implement his financial 
programme. The land tax, his main election plank, 
upon which he seems to have expected a great battle 
with the Council which would arouse public opinion 
sufficiently for him to carry a Reform Bill, was 
passed on the votes of mercantile M.L.C.s.7 His 
tariff produced no difficulties, and accepted so 
many mercantile suggestions that his claims to 
moderation perhaps began to obtain as much credence 
in the commercial world as among his uneasy ultras. 8 
The question of payment of M.J>.s remained among 
the urgent business; the 1874 Act, which had renewed 
it for another Parlia:nent, was to expire at the end 
r:s ~J . 
of the first session. To many of Berry's supporters, 
6. Below, pp. 335'-6>. 
7. Parnaby, op.cit., c.5, and below, pp. 10;3-4 
8. Below, pp. 540-2. 
provincials and not well-to-do, it was vital. 
They were therefore especially anxious to pass it, 
and their opponents to defeat it. This could not 
be done in the Assembly, but it could in the 
Council. To prevent this, and very likely to 
bring on his battle with the Upper House, Berry 
included the payment in Appropriations. The 
Council rejected them once mCir'e.9 After the 
Christmas recess, the Goverrunent destroyed the 
political quiet which had reigned since the 
election by the coup of Black Wednesday. Large 
nwnbers of senior administrative and judicial 
officers arrived at work on January 8th to find 
notices on their desks that they were dismissed 
as the Council had deprived the Government of 
money to pay them. The news was received, as 
Dea~in wrote1°with "feelings of dismay and terror, 
of stupefaction and rage, which made the beginning 
of 1878 forever ::nemorable in Victorian history. 11 
Wild talk by some ministers helped spread rumours 
9. Argus, SurrLmaries for Europe, 28 November 1877, 
27 December 1877. 
5Q • u 
10. Dea~in, Crisis in Victorian Politics , pp.16-17; 
pp.16-20 give a brief and vivid account of the start 
of the crisis o 
of a revolutionary plot; even those who did not 
believe them feared that the Government had begun 
a process which could not be halted. 11 The great 
agitation at last began; in face of the common 
enemy, although Service and a couple of Berryites 
joined the Opposition, the Government party was at 
last welded together. 
This, and the personal ascendancy which Berry 
speedily achieved, were the prime sources of party 
This was expressed and strengthened by 
Berry's use of the caucus. Party meetings had 
long been employed as an occasional measure, as 
well as ad hoc caucuses for gathering together 
members from different sides of the House to further 
a comm.on sectional interest or a particular policy. 12 
During the crises of the 'sixties, they had become 
so frequent as to constitute part of the regular 
unofficial machinery of Parliament, along with the 
whip system. 13 During these periods, the party had 
11. Argus, 23 January 1878, Francis' speech. 
12. It was a coalition caucus which persuaded the 
Francis Ministry to continue under Kerferd; for ad 
hoc caucuses, see, for example, Argus, 4 June, 27 
August 1874 and 11 September 18740 
60 
130 For early caucuses, see, e.g. Argus, 1 May 1867, 
24 August 1867, 1 April 1868, 24 April 1868, 6 June 
1868, 4 July 1868, 12 August 1868. They had occurred 
with a similar frequency during the former crisis. For 
the early existence of whips, see Argus, 3 June 1865; 
note that there was some prejudice against the office, 
which still seems to have existed around 18790 
(Ararat Advertiser, 21 January 1879.) 
been regularly consulted not only during 
emergencies, but also on q_uestions of tactics. 
McCulloch, however, as a traditional poli ticia.n, 
showed that he regarded the device as temporary, 
abandoning it after the crises o 
Its frequent use by both sides began again 
during the stonewall period, when detailed arrange-
Hents had to be made for maintaining and countering 
obstruction with relays of spea.kers. 14 After his 
victory of 1877, Berry used it regularly. Caucus 
discussed tactics, heard ministerial explanations 
and exhortations, a.YJ.d settled differences which, 
du.Ting the coalition, would have caused revolts. 15 
If there was any disagreerre nt, a vote was taken 
which bound all present, and was usually observed. 
Berry's opponents, who, like the Council's friends 
61 
in the 'sixties, had taken the name of ConstitutionalIBts, 
also employed it regularly, and for similar uses. 
There was, however, some uneasiness about 
the institution, especially among conservatives. 
14. Argus, 17 and 18 November 1875; Age, 17 
December 1875, 9 February 1876. 
15. Argus, 8 and 24 August 1877, 14 September 1877, 
6 February 1878, 6 and 7 March 1878. 
To The Argus, 16 it was 
" an institution ill1known to the British 
constitution, and abhorrent both to its letter 
and its spirit. --- The caucus is used as a 
massive steam roller. It is periodically passed 
over the party, which comes out smooth and flat, 
and altogether contemptible to the public eye, 
but in just such a condition as the wire-puller 
approves of • 11 
It was, in fact, another mec:.ms to make men who should 
be using their best judgnent for the public benefit 
dance as party leaders and political bosses pipedo 
This tendency was especially alarming in men who could 
perpetrate acts of terrorism like Black Wednesday, 
and make such thorough and ·unscrupulous use of 
ministerial powers as they did in the West Melbourne 
by-elections, when in the very stronghold of free 
trade they twice prevented Francis from returning 
to Parliament to lead the party of order. 17 
The justification for the caucus 18 was that 
it made parliamentary government work, by damming 
the floods of talk about which The Argus had 
complained so often, and reducing the risk of a 
chance defeat. With the external party machine 
of the Reform League, which, during the excitement 
of the crisis, had spread over the whole colony, 
16. Argus, 20 July 1878. 
17. Below, pp. 526-3.D. Francis was later elected 
for Warrnambool, after the resignation of McCulloch. 
18. V.P.n., Vol. 28, p. 266. 
it also provided a means of keeping representatives 
true to their promises. To Constitutionalists, 
the problem was to ensure the liberty of the 
representative; to the radicals, to rescue 
politics from his indiscipline. The caucus, 
however, operated successfully only if a sufficient 
number of members was willing to co-operate, and 
this depended upon maintaining a polarisation of 
Parliament through normal party management. The 
constitutional crisis provided perfect conditions 
63 
for this; the composition of Berry's party, larcely 
of men whose political life had begun in agitation 
and organisation, was he,tter material for it than 
ever before. 
The crisis ended19 in the passing of payment 
of members, although separately from the Appropriations 
Act. After a short recess, Berry introduced his 
first Reform Bill. It propo~ed to determine by 
plebiscite bills rejected by the Council in two 
successive sessions, except for money bills, which 
were to be determined by the Assembly. At the 
same time, Sladen introduced in the Council a bill 
19. Argus, Summary for Europe, 15 April 1878. 
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to reduce Coun.cillors' terms of office, double 
the electorate and prevent deadlocks by allovdng 
the Council to amend money bills. 20 The proposals 
were so far apart that the conference between the 
Houses, after each had passed its bill, necessarily 
failed. The basic attitudes towards a second 
chamber were too far apart. To Sladen it was 
s ti 11 a brake on demro racy. To radicals, it was 
part of British political institutions, but one 
which ought not to obstruct the popular will; 
they therefore sought to achieve practical mono-
cameralism in a bicameral .system. This entailed 
either ma~ing the composition of the Council resemble 
that of the Assembly, or proposing novel or foreign 
machinery for settling disputes. The prejudice against 
departure from British models made Sladen's attempt 
to increase the Council's financial powers hopeless, 
but equally helped prevent the radicals obtaining 
agree:.nent on new machinery. 
Both bills were rejected. Berry announced that 
he woul6. go to Britain, and persuade the Government 
to ffiilend the Constitution Act. 21 By so doing, he 
took the first step to reviving the problem of 
20. Arw~s, Summary for Europe, 5 August 1878. 
21. Argus, Summary for Eu.rope, 31 October 1878. 
indiscipline. It was an article of radical faith, 
since Buckingham's interference in 1868, that 
Downing Street had no voice in Victoria's 
internal affairs; some of Berry's party and of 
the League now objected to inviting interference. 
The two wings were beginning to crumble. The 
left wing, particularly in the League, had long 
been restiveo 22 Berry's land tax had not been 
progressive enough, nor his tariffs sufficiently 
protective; except on Black Wednesday, his handling 
of the crisis had been too mild. At the same time, 
the ultras reserved their strongest dislike for 
the right wing, particularly its leader, James 
Mu:..Ylro. One of the more prosperous men bers of the 
party, he was perhaps suspect of sympathy towards 
~he enemies of the people, especially after he had 
twice negotiated compromise settlements to whj_ch 
the left objected. 23 He now produced in caucus 24 
another compromise, suggested to him by an M.L.C. 
as likely to command wide support in the Council. 
22. Below, pp. 540-4 
23. One covering the purchase of the Melbourne 
and Robson's Bay Railway, the last private line, 
the other settling the deadlock. Argus, 6 and 7 
March 1878, 26 June 1878, 5 July 1878. 
24. Argus, 8 November 1878. 
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G6 
The party supported Berry, When Munro moved an 
amendment in the House to the Embassy vote, it 
was easily defeated; nevertheless, it attracted 
some radical support, and marked the first serious 
b h . t d. . 1. 25 Th lt f th reac in par y iscip ine. e u ras o _ e 
League, perhaps decided by their hostility to 1fu.nro, 
orga.~ised meetings in favour of the Embassy, and 
26 disrupted meetings held by Munro and his supporters, 
soon to be known as the Corner Party. 
After a successful farewell banquet and demon-
stration to Berry, 27 the country settled to six 
months of political quiet. It vms also, however, 
a period of mounting economic difficulty. Several 
times in 1878 a harrassed Berry had been faced 
with deputations of unemployed; 28 the ultras' 
desire for increased protection was increased by 
this spectacle, and Berry's refusal to make serious 
alterations before the reform ~uestion was settledp 
in case it divided and distracted the party, provoked 
some sharp exchanges. 29 At the same time, farmers 
in the northern wheatbelt, 30 created during the 
25. Ar~s, Summary for Europe, 28 November 18780 
26. Argus, 12 and 27 November 1878. 
27. Argus, 21 December 1878. 
28. Argus, 4, 15 and 24 June 18780 
29. Argus, 9 July 1878. 
30. Below, c.4, ss.rv onwardso 
'seventies by the operation of the 1869 Land 
Act, were facin3 another season of drought; 
the Government, preoccupied with Reform, did 
little to help them. Longmore's well-intended 
but mistaken credit-regulations had alarmed them, 
and were corrunonly blamed for the restriction of 
loans to selectors during the depression. In 
mid-1879 enough farmers had mewed against the 
Govern.ment to start the first farmers' organisation 
which looked at all formidable, the Victoria 
Farmers' Union. At the same time, political 
Catholics, who had apparently supported Berry 
generally in 1877, began to organtse, having been 
turned against the Goverrure nt by its two refusals 
to support Sir John O'Shanassy, who had retur:red 
to the Assembly in 1877, in his efforts to obtain 
assistance for Catholic education.31 
When Berry returre d in June, therefore, his 
position had seriously deteriorated. Despite a 
rapturous welcome, and his insistance that the 
31. Below, pp. 299.-41. 
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Embassy had been a success, he had in fact 
returned empty-handed. The Secretary of State 
had avoided committing himself, although he did 
not p1~eclude imperial legislation if Victoria was 
indeed unable to settle her own affairs.32 
Vfuen Parliament re-assembled, Berry could 
not avoid increasing taxation in face of falling 
reve:::1ue. The Budget, introduced by Major Smith, 
Acting-Treasurer during Berry's absence, went some 
way to?imrds conciliating the ultras by proposing 
increases in duties, but what Berry had feared 
in 1878 now happened. Agricultural and mining 
representatives demanded reductions in machinery 
duties, and objected to the general increases 
when their constituents vvere in such straits. 
The Gover11~rnent, nearly defeated, had to withdraw 
its tariff, revise it in caucus, and replace some 
duties with a stamp tax.33 
At last the Reform Bill could be taken. This 
differed from the previous one in making the Council 
a nominee chamber, and in providing, in Clause 6, 
32. Deakin, op.cit., p. 210 
33. Argus, Summaries for Europe, 6 August and 3 
September 1879. 
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for money to become legally available on the 
vote of the Assembly. These features caused 
dissent a..~ong radicals. Sladen, meanwhile, 
introduced another bill in the Council, similar 
to his previous proposal, but omitting the atte:npt 
to increase the Council's financial powers, and 
leaving the q_uestion of disputes machinery to the 
Assembly. Ivlunro, in close co11tact with a liberal 
M.L.C., proposed to accept Sladen's bill, adding 
the Norwegian system for settling disputes. 34 
As for Berry, although his bill passed its second 
reading by 53 votes to 31, he, like Francis five 
years before, fou.nd supporters calling for 
alterations. There was still no cons-ensus. 
To save his bill, he added to uncertainty by 
suggesting that he might drop some of the objection-
able features. 
To discipline NhlJiro, the Reform League in 
his constituency:tad a public meeting to condemn 
his actions and demand his resignation. He took 
the risk, resigned, and won both his seat and a 
propaganda victory just before the third reading 
of the GoverruLent bi 11. This was passed by 43 
34. Argu.s, Swmnary for Europe, 3 October 1879. 
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votes to 38, one short of the necessary absolute 
majority.35 The Opposition, the Corner and 
several Government supporters who had objected to 
the tariff, had combined against it. Berry obtained 
a dissolution. In one of the hardest-fought 
elections of the period, he was defeated. Most 
of the Corner lost their seats, but the increase 
in the Opposition was enough to bring Service 
to office.36 No more than Berry's, however, did 
his Bill represent the views of the Assembly. 
Although one of their number, Robert Clark of 
Sandhurst, was given office, the few Corner 
members had not opposed Berry to support Service. 
His vehement anti-Catholicism had cost him the 
support of O'Shanassy. Lven the political ghost 
of Higinbotham arose to turn a few votes, when 
Henry Wrixon, a Constitutionalist lawyer and an 
admirer of the former 'Dictator', assailed a clause 
which proposed to allow the democratised Council 
to prevent tacking. The Bill was defeated. 
35. Argus, Surrmiary for Europe, 24 December 1879. 
36. Argus, Surmnary for Europe, 4 March 1880. 
37. V.P.D., Vol. 33, pp. 167ff. It :provided 
for a considerable widening of the franchise, a 
double dissolution and joint sitting to settle 
bills rejected by the Council in two successive 
sessions, and for the British conventions governing 
financial legislation. 
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Service gambled on a dissolution and loot. 3S 
A few months later he resigned his seat and 
left for England. 
Berry, having limited hj_s aims to a simple 
reduction of qualifications, tenure and the size 
of provinces,39 was in little better position. 
His attempts to~tract liberal Constitutionalist 
support failed, nor could he make suffici.ent 
concessions to O'Shanassy.40 However, his Bill41 
passed the Assembly with little opposition. The 
Council then insisted on certain amendments, 
.. ~, par"jticu .. larly over the size of tb~e electorate. 
Some Berry accepted, at the risk of splitting his 
party, but the Council was not satisfied. Caucus 
voted to withdraw the bill, and another violent 
agitation seemed likely. A few ministerialists, 
ho-wever, refused to accept the decision of caucus, 
understru1ding that the Opposition had guarantees 
from enough N.L.C.s to ensure the passage of the 
bill as Berry had accepted it. It was passed, 
against the votes of the half-dozen ultras, who, 
38. Below, pp. 24'1-7, 571-3. 
39. Argus, 3 July 1880. 
40. Below, pp. 246-8. 
41. For an inside accou .. nt of its course, see 
Deakin, op.cit., c.7 and 8. And see below, pp. 577-90. 
as the old Corner disappeared, had formed a 
new Corner. 
Immediately, Sir Bryan O'Loghlen, Berry's 
Attorney-General in 1878-80, who h2vd refused 
to join the Niinistry for the same reasons as 
O'Shanassy, moved want of confidence. Although 
the new Corner eventually supported Berry, a few 
more votes were lost a...-vi.d he was defeated. The 
Berry ascendancy was over, and the second Irish 
interlude was about to begin. To everyone's 
surprise, O'Loghlen succeeded in forming a 
Government, of nonentities and rebels from all 
parts of the House. Only two had held office 
before, only one ever held office again.42 
Its main aims more or less achieved, Berry's 
party was exhausted, divided and lacking in policy. 
The Reform League, although it still existed, was 
but a shadow after the election of :81ebruary 1880. 43 
Neither party nor League seriousl;y attempted to contest 
the 1882 Council elections, although a dozen seats 
·were at stake. For the next eighteen months 
the Constitutionalists kept O'Loghlen in office 
42. Deakin, op.cit., pp. 78-81, gives 
of pen-portraits of the new ministers; 
not altogether :tree from biaso 
43. Below, pp. 570ff. 
a series 
perha~1s 
as the only way to keep Berry out. Perpetual 
agitation was to be replaced by practical 
legislation. 44 This, however, the GoverrL'Ilent 
failed to achieve, although saved from revenue 
difficulties by the return of prosperity. An 
irrigation act was :i;assed, but for all the time 
spent during 1882 on the Land and Railway 
Construction BilJs, both were wi thdravm at the 
end of the session. 
Berry took every chance to attract the more 
liberal Constitutionalists. 45 He obtained some 
response, and many Constitutionalists became 
restive about supporting O'Loghlen, but old 
animosities and the influence of Francis, who 
had succeeded Service, kept the ministry alive. 
Nor was Berry's party growing more cohesive. 
The estrangement of the ultras, an advantage in 
seeking Constitutionalist support, was followed 
by the loss of the handful of radical Catholic 
M.L.A.s. The party had always contained a strong 
44 o Argus, 17 May 1882. Francis' in te:n .. ded speech 
conveniently sums up the fears and aims of the 
Consti~Qtionalists during 1881-3. The article 
by 'Ptolemyr in Argus, 3 January 1882, performs 
a similar service for the structure and rationale 
of the Assembly since the July election. 
45. E.g. V.P.D., Vol. 37 , pp. 483 ff; 
A{£f/;;, 24 Ju..Yle 1882; Argus, 26 June 1882 .. 
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anti-Catholic element. This was now aroused 
by the thought of an Irish Premier and three 
other Irish ministers, although only one of 
these was Catholic. The news from Parnell's 
Ireland and the presence of his emissary in 
Victoria to found branches of the Land League 
added to their animosity. Patterson in particular, 
one of Berry's foremost supporters, began calling 
for a Protestant party. In May 1882 the 
exasperated Irish radicals helped save the 
Government, and were therefore expelled from 
the party. 46 Now Berry could bid strongly 
for anti-Catholic support; as in t~e coalitions 
of 1863 and 1872, national and religious prejudice 
were helping reconcile former antagonists. 
During the recess, news arrived of the 
partial failure of the latest loan. O'Loghlen's 
claim to stand for practical legislation was 
finally destroyed. Rather than face certain defeat, 
he obtained a dissolution is mid-recess. 47 The 
46. Argus, 9 December 1881, 22 May 1882; 
and see below, pp.254-5. 
4 7. Argus, Sucnmaries for :Europe, 17 and 31 
January 1883. 
Constitutionalists decided to abandon hi=n, 
but in the hope of Obtaining a party majority, 
both they and the radicals ran separately. The 
Ministry's defeat was sealed by O'Loghlen's 
failure to secure re-electiono Service, 
returfled from England, accepted the invitation 
to stand as Patterson's colleague at Castlemaine. 
The two anti-Catholics we:ce elected. dhen the 
Assembly met, it was clear that the two main 
parties had each narrowly missed a majority.48 
The second cycle had moved into its final phase, 
as another great coalition settled to rule for 
the rest of the decade. 
48. Argus, 23 February 18820 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CLIMATE FOR ORGANISA~ION 
I. Propaganda and Protection. 
Legend credits The Age with having been the 
greatest propaganda power of the time, to an extent 
which has obscuxed the activities and importance 
of other institutions: except in the case of 
Higinbotham, the power of oratory has been forgotten 
almost as completely as the great variety of 
organisations. As early as 1908, Ambrose Pratt 
was suggesting that from the middle 'sixties the 
population of Victoria, including Berry, dano ed 
as Syme piped. 1 Deakin, a mer e reliable ob server, 
had written in 19002 that "only those who were 
acquainted with Victorian politics from 1875 could 
realise the enormous influence exercised by The Age 
upon its 100,000 readers ---." 
It is difficult to know what criteria to 
apply to such claims. Deakin's appeal to figures 
is misleading. Not until the end of the centuxy did 
circulation approach 100,000. Du.ring the Darling 
Grant crisis, The Age's circulation was 13,000, 
rising rapidly to over 20,000 after Syme had cut the 
price to 1d. on 1 June 1868.3 
,,..,6 I .. 
1. Ambrose Pratt, David Syme: Father of Protection 
in Australia • c.13. 
2. A. Deakin, The Federal Story , p. 92. 
3. Australasian ~.Rographical Journal, February 1877. 
This initial rise in circulation can be traced in the 
audited figures which now began to appear above the 
editoriale~ 
Of this output probably a disproportionate amount 
was sold in Melbourne, since so many provincial 
newspapers, from substantial dailies to single-
sheet weeklies, could survive and flourish, despite 
the lower literacy rates outside Melbourne and 
Geelong. 4 Indeed, the 1870s saw a remarkable 
expansion in the nwnbers of country newspapers, 
mostly in the new agricultural areas.5 As the 
railway did not begin to reach the Wimm.era until 
,.., n 
' I l' ; 
1879, 6 they probably had few rivals. In the conditions 
of country life, especially in new areas, Syme's 
influence had to depend on his weekly, The Leader, 
which, although it apparently sold well, was pre-
dominantly an agrieul tu.ral, sporting and literary 
magazine. Its main competitor in this field, 
The Australasian, was owned by The Age• s main 
Melbourne competitor, The Argu.s. The circulation 
of these two is Dnkn.own, although after 1868 at 
least, The Argus, at 3d., sold appreciably less 
4. Census of Victoria, 1881: Education of 
the People. 
5. I am grateful to Mr. James Hagan of the 
A.N.U., currently carrying out research into 
Australian printing unions, for this information. 
6. Below, p.3?8. 
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copies than The Age. By 1881, its circulation 
seems to have been about 8,000.7 As The Age's 
circulation, having risen gradually to 28,000 in 1877, 
had increased rapidly to 43,500, it is quite likely 
that The Argus figure had formerly been higher. 
Nor was it the only competitor. There were also 
two other Melbourne dailies, a hes t of suburban 
papers and a number of sectional publications, 
mostly weeklies, like the Methodists' Spectator 
and the Catholics' Advocate. 
Although the most important single newspaper, 
therefore, The Age in the 'seventies was far from the 
dominance it achieved towards the end of the century; 
Syme's great leap forward in 1868 could not prevent 
the successful establishment of the Daily Telegraph, 
a political neutral, the following year. The next 
rapid rise in circulation coincided with the coming 
of age of increasingly large numbers of increasingly 
literate young Australians during the late 'seventies, 
increasingly concentrated in Melbourne. The marked 
7. ~ 18 June 1881, gives average daily circulation 
as 43,436 during May 1881, which it claimed to be more 
than five times as great as that of any other 
Australian :newspaper. It is probably reasonable to 
assume that The Argus would have been, if not the 
next largest, at least not far behind. 
improvement in rural communications during the 
'eighties probably helped increase sales outside 
Melbourne, and may, therefore, partly account for 
the difficulties which many small provincial papers 
encountered towards the end of the century. 8 
Circulation alone, however, is an inadequate 
index of a newspaper's influence, which depends also 
on who reads it. The Age was read by radical opinion 
leaders in Melbourne and some areas of the provinces, 
including provincial editors, and through them reached 
their followers or had its influence upon them 
strengthened. The Age's approach to journalism 
was also well-suited to make the maximum impact. 
The difference in its presentation of news and 
comment from that of its main rival is curiou~ly 
similar to the difference between the radical and 
the gentlemanly view of politics. Information and 
solemn argument predominated in The Argus, and views 
rarely encroached upon news. The Age was :t'u.11 of 
violence and personalities, sudden changes of 
front, cries of 'Treachery!' and 'Conspiracy!'; 
news was often distorted or suppressed, and political 
B. My source of information is once again 
Mr. Hagan. (n.5, above.) 
items in the news of the day columns were frequentry 
9 
partisan. 
If even the most effectively-presented 
propaganda is to be accepted, however, it must be 
tailored to the attitudes prevalent among its 
audience. "The result of propaganda," as Dr. Brown 
says, "depend upon the nature of the target --- as 
mu.ch as upon the power of the propagandist. 1110 
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Syme's technique was perhaps especially suited to 
appeal to the working classes' approach to politics, 11 
just as his pride was esP3cially suited to their 
pockets, but he was too much of the recluse and 
intellectual to have a clear understanding of those 
of their attitudes which he did not happen to share. 
Consequently he often campaigned for causes which, 
because they conflicted with ideas strongly held by 
his audience, or because they could not be attached 
to any powerful emotion or prejudice, had little 
9. .A:n:y issue of The Age during times of political 
tension will illustrate these points - in March 1868, 
for example. The parliamentary columns of 'Quip' (Age) 
and 'Timotheus' (Argus} during the O'Loghlen Ministry, 
(e.g. ige, 24 June 1882, Argu.s, 26 June 1882) express 
a simi ar difference of approach. For the suppression 
and distortion of news, see the treatment in the two journals of the National Reform League meetings, 
19 and 26 May 1876, 2 June 1876. 
10. J. A. C. Brown, · Teehni ques of Persuasion' 
(Pelican, 1963), p. 113. 
11. Below,pp. 383-5. 
hope of success. His opIX>:~on to federation 
in 1898 failed for the former reason, his advocacy 
of elective ministries, and earlier of leasing 
against alienation of Crown lands, for the latter. 12 
An alternative source of influence for a 
newspaper with even a small circulation is a 
readership which is in a position to make or strongly 
influence policy-decisions. It is unlikely that The 
Age was in this position until the radical victory 
of 1877. Thereafter, as Berry's party retained 
power, or a large share of power, for practically 
all the next thirteen years, The Age was in a far 
stronger position to influence politics at the top, 
at the same time as its rapidly-expanding circulation 
increased its power below. After 1886, when Berry 
left politics for some years, the radical leadership 
fell to Deakin, the golden boy of Vic tori an politics, 
who had been thrust into his public career by his 
employer, David Syme, and who seems never to have 
12. On Syme's outlook, see Deakin, 'The Crisis 
in Victorian Poli tics·, pp. 6-7 and 72-3; on 
Syme's failure in 1898, Deakin, The Federal 
Storz , c. 140 
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lost his admiration for the old newspaper-owner. 13 
With the departure of his other mentor, Syme•s 
influence probably became all the greater. 
It was also, perhaps, fortwlate for the growth 
of Syme's influence that the radical leader in 1877 
was Berry. Although his previous contact with 
The Age had been limited and not always cordial, 14 
he no doubt, having been a newspaper proprietor 
himself for as long as Syme, thought highly of the 
press, and particularly of the leading radical journal. 
He was also, for all his gifts as a practical 
politician, an unoriginal man, and cautious of new 
ideas. During the early 'seventies, he seems to 
have relied on Higinbotham to supply his lack; 15 
when the latter abandoned politics in 1875 it was 
easy to turn to Syme. 
13. Cf. his introduction to Pratt, op.cit., 
written in 19080 For the beginning of his political 
career, see 'The Crisis ±n Victorian Politics", c.1 
and passim. P.rpfessor J.A. La Nauze*s forthcoming 
biography of Deakin will no doubt illuminate the 
career and influence of Syme after 1883, at which 
point the present writer's detailed knowitedga of 
Victorian polities ends. 
14. The Age had, in fact, suggested during the 
election that he was not fit to be the radical 
leader. (~ 15 January 1877, 12, 14 and 16 
February 1877.) 
15. Below, PP•478fi. And cf. Deakin, The Crisis 
in Victorian Politics 1 , p. 14; and his reactions to 
suggestions that the Government should lend to farmers, 
which had long been in the air. (Argu.s, 30 October 1880.) 
and to factory legislation (Argu.s, 1 October 1880.) 
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Pratt's extravagant claims "that The Age 
ruled the country and that the Government was merely 
16 the channel through which its influence was expressed,n 
need not be taken seriously, but it is clear from his 
account that Syme was frequently consulted as if he 
had been an unofficial member of the Cabinet. 17 
At the same time, he was not the radical dictator 
he apparently liked to imagine himself. 18 Pratt's 
account, very likely derived from Syme himself, of 
the remodelling of the 1879 tariff after an Age 
onslaught on it as a mere revenue tariff, and high 
words in the newspaper's affice between an inflexible 
Syme and an irate but helpless Berry and Lalor, 19 
ignores the fact that Berry was compelled to remodel 
the tariff by its near-defeat in the Assembly at the 
hands of radicals representing farming and mining 
areas, and who wanted, not higher duties but lower. 20 
Syme was more interested in speaking his mind 
and in attacking any Government with which he disagreed, 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Syme 
19. 
20. 
Pratt, op.cit., P• 167. 
Pratt, op.cit., pp. 164-5, 1680 
Pratt, o~.cit., pp. 312-4. The letter 
on PP• 30 -4 verges on megalomania. 
Pratt, op.cit., PPo 170-2. 
V.P.D., Vol. 30, pp. 288 ff. 
from 
and in sauff'ling with The Argu.s, than in practical 
politics. 21 He attacked Berry's Government in 
1879 when it most needed his help. Unlike Berry, 
and like the wild men of the League, 22 he was free 
from responsibility for keeping together a brawling 
party, and carrying out important reforms against a 
hostile Council when economic distress made routine 
administration diff'icult enough. He was one of a 
mob of snorting bru.mbies - the Cabinet, the ultras, 
the moderates, the militants, The A.ge - which Berry 
had to keep moving in the same direction. He mu.st 
be cajoled and flattered, and might in some things 
prevail, but too mu.ch concession would make the 
others break away. 
Fortunately, Berry was also a power in his 
own right, and could count on two powers of the 
second rank, Major Smith of Ballarat and James 
Patterson of' Castlemaine. Whereas their po.-wer 
was local, however, his was national. Deakin's 
description23 of his position on his return from 
21. Deakin, The Crisis in Victorian Politics , 
p. 73; Pratt, op.cit., p. xviii, pp. 302-3. 
22. Below,pp.524-5. 
23. Deakin, ··The Crisis in Victorian Poli tics , 
p. 21. 
84 
England in 1879 was in some respects true of the 
whole period from 1877 to 1883: "His colleagues 
were all classed in public opinion far below him. 
He was the central figure lbloth in the House and 
in the country and knew it well." Syme might control 
one of the great instruments of propaganda, but 
Berry had no peer in the other, the public meeting. 
This was one of the great traditional methods of 
evoking and di.splaying public opinion; it was also 
one of the common forms of public entertainment. 
Public lectures were so popular as to be one of the 
favourite ways of raising :funds for a:ny purpose. 24 
At a great public mee,ting, literacy was no 
bar, and a sense of participation was possible which 
was beyond the power of any newspaper to conjure up. 
The crowd, having followed the parade of torchlit 
devotees and the brass bands to the meeting place, 
could see the gestures and grimaces of the orators, 
hear the passion of their voices and the shouts and 
applause of their more ardent supporters. They could 
feel themselves invincible, free in anonymity to 
vent their high spirits or their resentment at the 
boredom and uncertainty of their daily lives. No 
24. Including, occasionally, filling the coffers 
of a political association - Ballarat Courier, 
16 September 1869, 15 March 1870. 
35 
doub:t many, unmoved, wondered cynically what, 
the orators stood to gain; probably others, 
having purged their souls, returned home cheerful 
and at ease with themselves, and thought no more 
of it. If the excitement could be maintained, 
however, participation at all levels tended to 
increase, from the leadership through the militants 
down to the lumpenproletarian who now spoke of 
politics where he had not before, and thought of 
taking out an elector's right some day. This was 
the world where Berry's political career had begllll., 
and where the root of his power lay. 
Unfortunately, these two men, masters of 
propaganda, the two giants of Victorian radicalism 
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in the late 'seventies, were so different in character 
that co-operation was very difficult. Syme was the 
youngest son of a Calvinist schoolmaster, who 
educated him without companions, in a home where 
"Duty, not love, except to some extent on the 
mother's part, was the law ---. 11 25 His mother, 
however, hardly appears in the autobiographical 
25. Pratt, op.cit., p. 4. 
letter he wrote to his biographer; the memory 
of the old newspaper proprietor, like the house 
of his childhood, was dominated to a remarkable 
degree by the father he so admired and feared. 
This man26 died when David was sixteen, so that 
the event which Freud regarded as one of the 
psychological turning-points of a man's life 
occurred when he was a cloistered guilty adolescent. 
This terrible dead man was to haunt him to the end 
of the earth. 
His account of his early life was a tale 
of rejection. Having failed to gain the affection 
and approval of his father, he fared no better on 
the Californian diggings, where he found no friends, 
only a nation narrow, ignorant, xenophobic and 
violemt. 27 He left for Australia in 1853, less, 
it seems, in hope of riches than to be among his 
own people, where he would be an outcast no longer. 
The events which he recalled of his year on the 
d . . 28 f b . bb d d d t d b h. 1gg1ngs were o eing ro e an eser e y is 
mate when ill, of having his claim jumped, of failing 
26. Pratt, op.cit., pp. 4-8. 
27. Pratt, op.cit., pp. 17-25. 
28. Pratt, op.cit., c.2. 
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to obtain redress from. contemptuous, overbearing 
officials. Having amassed a little c~pital, he 
fled to his brother Ebenezer in Melbourne, where 
they bought The Age. It survived, but made so 
little profit that David turned contractor. At 
last he prospered, and, having just turned thirty, 
he marri ed1• 29 
Two years later his brother died. The Age 
closed around him. His father's ghost had caught 
him finally. He assumed the role of the stern, 
just father of several thousand ignorant, brawling 
children; at the same time, he could fight the 
88 
dead tyrant, who now assumed the shape of a squatter, 
a merchant, a banker. Having, just after his father's 
death, rejected his father's form of Christianity 
for one more gentle, and thrown himself into the 
studies to which this led him with such ardour that 
heal th and faith gave way, 30 he now devoted a 
religious zeal and the rest of his life to the 
worship of The Age and the propagation of the gospel 
29. Pratt, op.cit., pp. 45-53. 
30. Pratt, op.cit., pp. 12-16. 
of protection. 31 
Of Berry's early life32 little is known 
except that he was born at Twickenham in 1822, 
five years before Syme, the son of a moderately 
successf'u.l tradesman who yet took him from school 
at the age of eleven to become an apprentice draper. 
He too was an eager reader, but while David was 
fearfully beginning in hard languages and weighty 
abstractions, Graham was hidden behind a door in 
his master's shop, with one eye to the adult world, 
the other to Pope, Gibbon or Chambenf1~ Magazine. 
If his father was stern, he could hardly have been 
as grim as old Syme; and the gentlemanly God of the 
Church of England, in which Berry was brought up, 
had little in common with the malevolent deity 
whose servant drove David to his studies. 
So Berry grew up, an egotist like most shy 
people but eager to please and serve his fellows, 
anxious to be loved. Vulnerable, of ten clumsy, he 
possessed the talent to improve his talents, and 
31. Pratt, op.1ci t., pp. 299-301, cites a letter 
of Syme's aboui his first ten years as owner of 
The Age, during which he worked some fifteen hours 
a day. Deakin, in his Introduction, notes that 
Syme still retained a very detailed control du.ring 
the early 'eighties. 
32. Deakin, 'Crisis in Victorian Politics , 
p. 13; P. Serle, 'Dictionary of Australian 
Biagraph.y · • 
SS 
had a gift for words, not the Scots gift shared 
by Syme and Service of conveying precise meanings 
and connected arguments, but one of communicating 
powerful emotion. 33 Syme wrote with puzzled sadness 
of the impossibility of winning his father's 
affection, and was known among friends for startling 
generosity and kindness, but his public reputation 
for cold ferocity was richly earned.34 When 
Berry attacked the rich it was with a cr:y of 
uncomprehending horror at the hardness of their 
hearts; to Syme they were emblems of the wickedness 
and ignorance which he, the stern and wise father, 
must scourge from the nation. 11His estimates of 
men were not high nor his expectations sanguine."35 
The greatest propaganda achievement with which 
Syme has been credited was to turn Victoria from the 
Australian norm of :free trade towards protection. 
More recently, it has been pointed out that there 
were other protectionists in Victoria before hi~, 
and Professor La Nauze's view seems to be generally 
accepted, that "The economic crisis, combined with 
33. Deakin, Crisis in Vic tori an Poli ties , 
pp. 14, 21-2. 
34. Pratt, op.cit., P• xi. 
35. Pratt, op.cit., P• xii. 
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a nationalistic anti-English sen~iment, explains 
why he and others ca.me to advocate the protectionist 
remedy for a society faced with a sudden cessation 
of prosperity. 11 36 In such circumstances, 
protection appealed to "the 'natural' judgment 
of the unacademic man ---".37 Syme's part, 
although reduced to reasonable proportions, remains 
considerable, as the steady preacher of what others 
were ready to receive, "the most considerable force 
in Victoria in moulding public opinion. u38 
While all this is tru.e, it does not necessarily 
explain why Victoria became protectionist and New 
South Wales did not. Although the Victorian 
population increased so mu.ch more rapidly than 
that of New South Wales during the 1850s, the older 
colony's population nevertheless doubled, also 
suffered severe economic distress and dislocation, 
and, as it contained a much higher percentage of 
native-born,39 should have been especially open to 
36. J.A. La Nauze, Political Economy in Australia, 
p. 119. 
37. Ibid., p. 122. 
38. Gollan, 'Radical and Working Class Poli tics , 
p. 60. 
39. R. Ward, The Australian Legend , pp. 104-5, 
Tables VIII and IX. 
nationalist feelings. Nor is it easy to see why 
the natural judgment of Victorians should have been 
more natural than that of the New South Welsh. 
In 1860, in fact, when, with David Syme's 
assumption of control, The Age became steadily 
protectionist, the 'natural' cause for most of 
those who sought to remain in Victoria, or were 
trapped there, and who were inclined to political 
action, was still unlocking the lands. Irish land 
hunger, and perhaps the recollection of the land 
settlement phase of Chartism, could be appealed to. 
The assumption that land was the true wealth of any 
colony, the lack of hope for any rapid expansion 
of urban employment, and perhaps the hope of that 
independence which was soo ially approved and a 
condition to which diggers had become accustomed, 
made practically everyone, including protectionists, 
turn to land legislation. 
This agitation also had the advantage of offering 
battle with old enemies, the squatters and the Council. 
Having achieved, often in danger and hardship,40 a 
40. M. Kiddle, Men of Yesterday , c.4, passim. 
home, a competence or better, and a rise in social 
status, the squatter now fanatically defended 
himself against mobs who over-ran the lands he 
had made productive, destroyed pasture, fouled 
creeks, stole animals, menaced his life and home 
with bushfires, and now sought to take away all 
he had toiled to obtain. 
"The one regarded the other as an unwelcome 
intruder11 , as one old Bendigonian put it,41 
"while the new arrival looked upon the earlier 
settler as an obstructive monopolist in the 
possession of vast tracts of land of which he 
made but little profitable use. 11 
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Entrenched in the Council, having access to the banks, 
the squatter compensated for inferiority <lllf nwn.bers 
by superiority of position and resources. 
With the Oouncil, however, diggers and others 
had a longstanding feud. The old Council had been 
responsible for digger-hunting and prohibition on 
the goldfields. To diggers, and to democrats 
everywhere, it was the House of men aping an 
aristocracy. That the new Council was entirely 
,elective hardly affected its image', since half 
its members were squ.atters. 42 The Victorian 
working classes were not, of course, composed 
entirely of the politically minded and the politically 
41. G.E. Thompson, Leaves from the Diary of an 
Old Bendigonian of 1853' , p. 40, in T. W JI.Leavitt 
(ed.}, Jubilee History.of Victoria and Melbourne' 
(1888). 
42. G. Serle, ·The Golden Age' , p. 2540 
experienced, but the resentment was sufficiently 
widespread for squatters and Council to perform 
a psychological function in the Victoria of the 
post-goldrushes depression similar to that of the 
Jews in the Third Reich. .And like the Jews, they 
were continually accused of plots and conspiracies; 
stories of corrupt dealings with M.L.A.s, and the 
wholesale evasion of the Land Ac-bi 43 gave this some 
plausibility. 
The strength of their opposition, and the 
failure of two Land Acts, diminished the force of 
this agitation; the New Zealand gold rushes offered 
an alternative escape for some, the Methodist 
revival for others. Yet others were ready for 
another political panacea. Some had always 
rejected free trade because they were old-style 
Tories. 44 Many ex-Chartists no doubt continued 
to reject it, as they had done in Britain with a 
ferocity which had often led to v:idence, as a 
45 
manufacturers' plot. Others associated protection 
43. The A.ge's comments on one 'plot' are typical 
(Age, 4 May 1877.) Cf. Kiddle, op.cit., pp. 247-257, 
on the reality behind the mytho 
44. Like, for example, Capt. George Ward Cole,R.No 
(Retd.), the first McCUlloch Governnent•s represent-
ative in the Council, or Captain John Dane, an ardent 
protectionist later active in the N.R.P.L., who told 
his electors in 1864, "No man, reared as he had been 
in the British army, could possibly be a democrat;." 
(Argus, 26 August 1864.) 
45. N. McCord, ·The Anti-Corn Law League (1958) 
c.1-4, passim. 
with the United States, that hope of radicalism, 
whether they had been there or not. For others, 
no doubt 'protection' had a comforting sound. 
To some, determined not to be made fools of by the 
defeat of their hopes, it appealed to their desire 
to make Victoria something more than the humble 
handmaiden of the West Riding of Yorkshire.46 
Yet others, unable to earn their living at their 
trade or on the gold.fields blamed their misfortunes 
partly or wholly upon their old enemies, the British 
manufacturers, whose products, arriving irregularly, 
caused an alternation of glut and scarcity in the 
local market, and so distunbed employment. 47 Both 
were becoming Victorian patriots, as the England 
of their friends and relations conceded in their 
minds to the England of the rich, the boss and the 
overseer. The cliches of protectionist meetings 
hinted at this new nationalism; "native industriesn 
was the answer to the question, "What shall we do 
with our boys?" 
46. E.g. Treasurer Verdon - uNone would say that 
it was desirable that the colony should for all time 
consist of diggers, and shepherds, and stone-breakers." 
(Argus, 27 October 1864.) 
47. Serle, op.cit., pp. 240-1. 
McCulloch does not fit any of these categories. 
As Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Colony 
of Victoria he was faced in 1864 with a revenue 
problem. He was politically unable, and probably 
unwilling, to return to alienating land at auction, 
or to increase pastoral rents. 48 As direct taxation 
would cause endless di:t'ficul ties, he must raise 
money through the Customs. It was also necessary 
to reduce :the valuable tea and sugar duties, in 
harmony with neighbouring colonies, to avoid serious 
losses through smuggling. 49 Moreover, ma.r:GJ" of his 
supporters were Healesite radicals, some ardent 
protectionists, all partly committed to protection. 
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His conservative colleague Francis was a protectionist; 
so was his Healesite Treasurer, Verdon. 
The coalition might collapse, however, if he 
openly deserted free trade. Many supporters were 
free traders, especially softgoodsmen and lawyers, 
and intellectuals like Higinbotham. Nor, if 
McCulloch was to settle the land question, did he 
dare place such an excellent red herring before the 
48. Below,pp. 259 and 475-6. 
49. Argus, 6 September 1864. 
Francis dealt in these articles 
any p:i rsonal reluctance. 
That McCulloch and 
at least removed 
Council. He therefore sought credit among 
protectionists, while disclaiming any intention 
of departing from received principles, by presenting 
his tariff as one of 'incidental protection'.50 
Higinbotham, insisted it was a revenue tariff only; 
Francis and Verdon, that it was the beginning of 
protection.51 The Minister of Mines said that 
mu.ch nonsense was talked by the extremists on 
both sides, a view which Michie seemed to share.52 
Grant, Minister of Lands, urged the electorate53 
to ignore such trivialities: "-- of what use is 
protection", he asked, 11if this colony is to be a 
sheepwalk? 11 
The interests of the pastoralists were hardly 
affected by the tariff. Although they imported 
fencing wire54 and wool bales, the duty on these 
would have had little effect on production-costs, 
50. By this he meant that since duties had to be 
removed from tea and sugar, and the total raised, 
it could do no harm to put the dut:ie s on articles 
whose manufacture locally might be encouraged. 
Revenue was the main purpose, protection a mere 
bonus. 
51. Argu.s, 12, 24 and 27 October 1864. 
52. Argu.s, 8 and 21 October 1864. 
53. Argus, 19 Septenb er 1864. 
54. Used in the early 'fifties in the Western 
District. (Kiddle, op.cit., p.200.) 
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which depended much more on seasons, wool prices, 
transport facilities, and the quality, price and 
tenure of their land. They might also have reflected 
that this was preferable to direct taxation. When 
the tariff reached them, however, they had just 
been forced to accept Grant•s Land Bill. When 
they took comfort in the possibility of evading 
the Act, Grant•s use of administrative powers and 
espionage, although not entirely successful, made 
it mare difficult, uncertain and expensive. 55 
Unless this man, their avowed,::enemy, were remCJT ed, 
they might lose their lands.56 
It was therefore to men shaken by vengeful 
panic that the softgoodsmen appealed against the 
tariff. Whether this was entirely to their 
interests may be doubted. Anxiety about the 
effects on their profits of increased prices for 
their goods, during a time of poor trade, was 
55. Kiddle, op.cit~, p.246. 
56. Cf. ~lac.~ .Pa,per,s, Black to Gladstone, 21 
August 1865. "The last land act crowned all in 
setting class against class the gulph between them 
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is unmeasurable. Where or how it is to end heaven 
only knows. It has produced the Dead lock --- between 
the two Houses of Parlianent.n In his letter to 
Mackinnon (11 July 1865) he tells of Grant declaiming 
nthat he was a Revolutionist Atheist and that if he 
had lived in France during the Revolutionary times 
he would have been another Robespierre, that he 
carried a guillotine in his he art - and that he would 
cut the heads off the Squatters rather than that they 
should have the land." Deakin, ·The Crisis in 
Victorian Politics', p. 15, suggests that Grant 
commonly expressed himself in this way. 
understandable, but it was not in these terms 
that the question was a.rgaed. As there had been 
so much talk of protection against free trade, an 
adverse adjustment of taxation was inflated, with 
the aid of the doctrinaire Argu.s, into the thin end 
of a protectionist wedge, which would bring upon them 
dangers perhaps the more disquieting for not being 
very clear in outline. Protection would damage 
the economy, and raise up competitors to them. 
They do not seem to have considered that if anyone 
stoo·d to gain from attempts to foster industry, they 
did. They could command resotn"ces of capital and 
crecii.t, they possessed established reputations, 
business contacts and systems of distribution; they 
could afford to import machinery, expert managers 
and skilled craftsmen. 
In their anxiety, however, they listened not 
to McCulloch, but to the jeremiads of ~e Argus. 
They recalled that in England free trade was the 
doctrine of the Liberal Party, especially its 
radical wing; they saw in the New South Wales 
election signs of an Australian reaction against 
99 
protection.57 The people therefore would be on 
their side, except for Melbourne agitators and 
layabouts; the goldfields population, whom it 
was proposed to rob for the sake of a few 
metropolitan loafers, would rally to them.58 
Mistakenly attributing the achievement of 
free trade in Britain to the work of the Anti-Com 
Law League, they lavished money on the Free Trade 
Leagu.e;59 for all the expenses of starting a 
newspaper, working the registration system, 
producing pamphlets and arranging lecture tours, 
there was enough left to pay Langton, 60 the 
Secretary, a salary of £750 and the expenses of 
his election for East Melbourne. 61 ~ey urged 
57. Argus, 1 April 1865. 
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58. Ar~, 4 April 1865 (Fitzroy meeting) is a 
fair sampe of their arguments. And cf. Harker's 
description of protection (Argu.s, 14 September 1864) 
as "setting one set of men to rob another ... 
59. Inaugural meeting, Argu.s, 1 April 1865. 
60. Edward Langton, b. Kent 1828, arrived Victoria 
1852. A butcher, becoming an estate agent by 1865. 
Secretary of the F.T.L., April 1865-c.March 1866. 
Accountant and average adjuster thereafter. M.L.A., 
East Melbourne, 1866-8; West Melbourne, 1868-77. 
The mast active, and one of the most tedious of free 
trade lecturers. Treasurer, 1868 and 1872-4. 
61. Agj, 3 March 1877; · Langton's evidence in 
his libe case against The Age. 
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the Council to reject the tariff, and mercantile 
M.L.C.s helped defeat it. When eventually passed, 
the tariff did not harm them, but their actions did. 
Early mercantile opposition had decided McCUlloch, 
a month before the inauguration of the League, 
that despite its handsome majority in the Assembly, 
there was no hope of putting the tariff through the 
Council 1Ulless, following the Westminster precedent 
of the 1861 Paper Duties Bill, it were tacked to the 
Budget. 62 When this was rejected by the Council, 
therefore, the House of Squatters, the bunyip 
aristocracy, had done what the House of Lords, the 
real aristocracy, had not yet dared to doo It had 
stru.ck at one of the most firmly-held tenets of 
British parliamentary government, the popular House•s 
control of finance. The colony was in uproar; well 
might the Council eventually give way in fear of 
63' 
revolution. 
Yet there had been little sign at the 1864 
election that the protectionists were at all powerful. 
62. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11, pp. 423 and 428 ff. 
63. B:I.ac.k.,Pa:e~i:s,, Black to Gladstone, 20 April 1866. 
beneath harangues about the rights of the people 
and the iniquities of the rich. Such was the 
theme of the 1865-6 election, which gave McCulloch 
such an overwhelming majority. Graham Berry had 
caught the prevailing tone at a Protection League 
meeting69 in July: 
11He called upon the people --- to separate 
all questions of free trade or protection from 
the great constitutional question which was 
now before them---." 
On the goldfields, where there had been 
little sign of protectionist feeling previously the 
change of issue made speeches against taxing the 
poor digger, which might have been successful had 
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the Council not rejected the Budget, quite irrelevant. 
In popular myth, the merchant now became the enemy 
of the people. He had associated himself with 
the squatters in circumstances so dramatic as to 
make escape impossible. His illusions had trapped 
him in the illusions of others. So he helped destroy 
his influence and the cause he had so foolishly and 
unnecessarily sought to maintain. The 1866 tariff 
was now essential to the defeat of the enemies of 
69. Argus, 29 July 1865. 
the people; because opposed in the name of free 
trade, it was widely regarded as protectionist, 
and protection as beneficial to the people. 
Rational arguments and appeals to self-interest 
could find no market. 
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The softgoo,dsmen had not even gained reliable 
allies in the pastoralists. These were as ready to 
pass the 1871 tariff, with its twenty percent duties, 
as the merchants to pass the 1877 land tax.70 
When merchants organised promotional leagu.es an:l 
registration associations, they received little 
help from the pastoralists. During the 1868 election 
many even secretly supported McCulloch,7 1 their 
best hope of considerate treatment. When the 
rumours were shown to be true by the 1869 scandals, 
Robert Murray Smith, who had been intimately concerned 
in constitutionalist and free trade organisation 
and electioneering for some years, complained to 
Professor Pearson, 
70. V.P.D., Volo 13, pp. 1667-1682; 
Parnaby, op.cit., c.5o 
71. Bendigo Advertiser, 11 January 1868; 
Ballarat Star, 9 January 1868; Advocate, 
8 and 15 January 1868. 
"---it just shows what sort of trouble 
we have been subjected to, by being associated 
in popular opinion, with the squatting party, 
when now we find that the most eminent of them 
were helping the other side. We have all along 
found we could get no real help from them, but 
attributed it to individual fear. 11 72 
As protectionists recognised, however, the 
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1866 tariff, with its five and ten percent duties, 
had not established protection, even with additions73 
for the sake of the revenue in 1867. The victory 
over the Council, in fact, had brought the cause 
to a critical stage. It was vaguely felt that pro-
tection was established policy, so that serious agi-
tation seemed unnecessary. When the next crisis 
came in 1867-8, moreover, tariff policy had nothing 
to do with it, and as the depression lifted briefly 
thereafter, there was no economic basis for agitation. 
The defeat of Macpherson's Ministry, although largely 
protectionist, on Berry's tariff provoked no outcry, for 
the popular image of the Government was of a body of ra-
dical traitors supported by the Irish and the rich, and 
support for the People's :Ministry was in more demand 
than h]. gh tari· ff s . 7 4 Dur· the e · f 1870 ing . r cession o . , 
72. _Pearson Paper El, R. M .. Smith to Pearson, 28 March 
1869. 
73. V.P.D., Vol. 3, pp. 194-98. 
74. Below, pp. 409-11, 469ff. 
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Melbourne protectionists revived their agitations-, 75 
but their organisations were as ineffectual as 
The Age's propaganda; the public was uninterested. 
At the amorphous election of 1871, the tariff was 
but one question of many, and not the most prominent. 
McCulloch, however, now faced another revenue 
shortage. Land revenue could not be greatly expanded. 
Unlike New South Wales, Victoria could not continue 
to balance its budget by land-sales. Moreover, 
the 1869 Land Act76 had earmarked £0.2m. a year for 
railway construction, and produced a pomprehensive 
settlement politically dangerous to upset. As 
in 1865, therefore, McCulloch had to turn to the 
Customs. Francis, now Treasurer, seized the cha.nee 
of raising duties. He did not believe in exceeding 
a certain level, however. He and McCulloch must 
also have been aware of the need not to alienate 
the free trade support they had lately received, 
and to spread the load of new taxation among all 
interests. They therefore proposed to meet part 
of the deficit with increased duties, part with a 
75. Below, pp. 429ff. 
76. 33 Vic., No. 360. 
property tax. 77 
When this was defeated, Duffy replaced 
McCulloch, dependent upon the radicals with whom 
his sym111thies lay, despite his personal preference 
for free trade. Berry, as Treasurer, naturally 
introduced a still more protective tariff.78 
There were su.f'ficient high protectionists on both 
sides, and legislators who regarded this as a lesser 
evil than direct taxation, to pass it. Thereafter, 
despite attempts to rationalise duties and increase 
the Customs revenue, the general level and extent 
of protection remained unchanged until revenue 
difficulties led to further small increases in 1879. 
Protection had been established without great public 
demand, and produced no great public rejoicing. 
In 1879, however, the increases nearly brought 
down the Government. Whereas in 1871 agricultural 
prospects were hopeful, and mining was rapidly 
working up to a boom, in 1879 agriculture was 
depressed and mining was dull. Consecµ ently, there 
was an outcry against further taxation of these 
77. V.P.D., Vol. 12, pp. 507 ff. 
78. V.P.D., Vol. 12, pp. 699 ff. 
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industries, and a demand for reductions in the 
duties on agricultural and mining machinery. 79 
At the same time, there was no demand for a general 
return to free trade. After 1871 the cause which 
had first won favour among those who on a rational 
calculation would have S;ood to lose, by its 
association with the defeat of the s~uatters, 
became firmly associated with the prosperity which 
in England and New South Wales firmly established 
the reputation of free trade. Many avowed that 
the apparent results of protection had converted 
them. As for the merchants, many of them were 
becoming increasingly engaged in manufacturing 
by the late seventies. 80 To increase protection 
might be unnecessary, but to propose reductions 
suggested not only a leaning towards the oligarchs, 
but also the risk of destroying Victoria's lucky 
charm. When the second Free Trade League was set 
up in 1876, therefore, it had to face the combined 
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force of two major superstitions. Moreover, as will 
79. Below,pp. 331-4, 344-6. 
80. Parnaby, op.cit., c.2. 
be seen later, its support among the co:rrmercial 
classes was limited, and oncecgain its unpopularity 
was assured by association, not only with the 
squatters, but also with the most unpopular man 
in Victoria, McCulloch, who had been so largely 
responsible for establishing protection~ reputation. 
The League's appeals to reason were naturally 
unavailing. 
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II. Organisation Discouraged. 
According to the gentlemanly view of politics, 
electors, like legislators, should decide how to 
vote coolly and rationally, considering the common 
interest only, and free from external pressures. 
This severely limited the permissible forms of 
political organisation and activity, and although 
nobody, perhaps, believed the ideal to be really 
likely or practicable, it did limit behaviour, if 
only by calling for concealment. 
Organisation was not entirely precluded. 1 
Promotional organisations, on the lines of the 
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Anti-Corn Law League, perhaps the most frequently 
mentioned model, were formed to educate and persuade 
electors in favour of a particular policy, to 
demonstrate the extent to which public o;inion 
supported this by public meetings and petitions, 
and to work to elect candidates favourable to their 
views. Politicians might join the organisation, 
and were among its more useful acquisitions, but 
they might be required to retire from office in 
any organisation from which they stood to benefit 
1. The most complete statement of the received 
ideas about organisation appears in Ararat Advertiser, 
24 June 1879. 
t 1 1 . 2 to show that it was no a persona c ique; 
for the same reason, the committee of their 
friends formed to help them during the election 
was expected to disband afterwardso 
The same men might, however, legitimately 
form either a promotional organisation3 - or a 
branch of one already existing - or else, as several 
constitutionalist committees did after the election 
of July 1880,4 form a registration society. There 
was never any argument about the propriety of such 
organisations, although there was a good deal about 
the activities indulged in by some of them, and some 
of the promotional organisations which set up 
registration sub-committees. 5 Occasionally members 
might imply that a registration society should in 
theory work for the enrolment of all citizens 
irrespective of party, 6 but when Moses Alexander 
described himself as "agent of the Victorian 
2. E.g. Age, 10 June 1876. 
3. N.R.P.L. Branches commonly began in this 
way - e.g. Age, 16 and 28 February 1876. 
4.. Argus, 24 and 28 July 1880. 
5. Age, 6 September 1865. "The haul of shillings 
netted by the registrars during the past week has 
nearly rivalled in abundance the take of pilchards 
in the Bay, and the proceedings in both cases have 
been 91ually fishy." 
6. Argus, 18 September 1880. 
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Registration Association and interested in the 
welfare and progress of the said colony 11 , 7 nobody 
took him seriously. 
The principles governing the permissible acti-
vities of parliamentary parties were governed by 
somewhat similar assTu~ptions. Like promotional 
organisations, they might ensure that candidates 
representing their views stood at any given elec-
tion, but otherwise they were expected to avoid un-
invited "interference". The selection of candidates 
was to be left to their local supporters as far as 
possible; 8 they might intervene to control the number 
of candidates only if asked. Nor should they send 
members of the party to speak in a constituency, or 
otherwise influence the election, unless they were con-
nected with it; even if they accepted an invitation to 
speak, they must take great pains to emphasise that they 
were not trying to "dictate" to the electors or even 
to their own supporters.9 The position of the 
7. Argus, 3 August 1867. 
8. Conservative organisations laid greater emphasis 
on local independence (cf. below, p .464) but local 
radicals were always jealous of their rights. Cf. 
Deakin, Crisis in Victorian Politics , pp. 9-10, and 
below, pp.531ff. 
9. Cf. the pleading of exceptional circumstances in 
Grant's speech at Richmond (Argus, 17 June 1872), and 
Berry~s at Warrnambool (Argus, 5 Nov 1875); also Berry's 
attempt to persuade North Melbourne radicals to limit the 
number of their candidates, while avoiding accusations of 
interference (Argus, 14 April 1877). 
Government was especially delicate since although-
the political use of patronage was customary, its 
use at election-time was open to suggestions that 
it was being used as a form of bribery, 10 which at 
other tiines, by a polite fiction, it apparently 
was not. Again, just as candidates vvere expected 
to show that a particular organisation did not 
exist for their personal benefit, so party leaders 
(especially M:inisters) had to be ostensibly separate 
from their party organisations. G.P. Smith had 
political reasons to attack Berry during the 1877 
election, but could do so because Berry had in fact 
flouted a convention. 11 
"--- it was the first time" he said, 
"within his knowledge of political societies that 
he had ever heard of a political organisation in 
which the head of a Government and a leading 
politician became the President and chief actor. 
Such organisations were left to men who did not 
seek office or place for themselves - outside 
politicians - who were content to give their 
services in aid of their political leaders and 
their political party. 11 
10. V.P.D., Vol. 32, pp. 1990 ff. 
11. Argus, 24 February 1877. And cf. Bindon's 
and Higinbotharn's refusal to appear at the inaugural 
meeting of the L.J_J.R.A. while still Ministers. Argus 
21 April 68. 
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Finally, just as individual election committees 
were expected to disband after each election, and 
promotional organisations once the policy which 
they had been formed to advocate was achieved, 
so should a party headquarters orgaDisation after 
the election. Otherwise, the foundations of the 
representative system would be subverted, as they 
had been in the U.S.A •• In that unfortunate 
cou...~try, as the Ararat Advertiser put it, 12 
11
--- with two great organisations 'bossing' 
the people and the Parliament, the electors 
became a mere pack of cards shuffled by certain 
leaders, and the members of Parliament will be 
mere wooden dummies to vote at the command of 
the 'machines'. --- The organisation which gets 
the vote of the people rules the country and 
'annexes' all the patronage and profit, having 
in view purely the advantage of its own ring, 
and tyrannising over the unforturate minority. 
--- Representative institutions suppose responsi-
bility, but to whom are the leagues responsible? 
For instance, here we have the Central Reform 
League, with a membership of two hundred hobodies 
attempting to dictate a policy to900,000 people! 
Some people are disposed to laugh at and ridicule 
the leagues, but that is a fool's policy. The 
people are rather lazy, and if they get any league 
to think for them, and to propound a policy that 
saves trouble, - they are gratefulQ Besides, such 
leagues 'bid' high for the support of the unthinking 
and are ever ready with a bunch of carrots." 
12. Ararat Advertiser, 24 June 1879. 
Despite elements of hypocrisy, such protests 
were something more than cynical claptrap. This 
view of politics suited certain basic attitudes 
which constitutionalists and liberals shared, 
which restricted their political armoury, and which 
eventually put them at a disadvantage before the 
radical challenge. Commercial politicians had 
risen in business largely by their own efforts, 
and generally in one man firms or partnerships; 
participation in companies tenied to come later, 
perhaps more as a sign of their success than as 
its basis. McCulloch, Francis and Service might 
be bank-directors, but were regarded, and regarded 
themselves, primarily as heads of mercantile houses. 
The occupation of lawyers, the main group allied 
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to them in the Assembly, was still more individualistic. 
Such men naturally tended to regard the country as 
a business, needing practical, respectable men to 
run it efficiently and maintain the confidence of 
the lroal and London shareholders. 13 There might 
be disagreeTIBnt about the policy or competence of 
the Board of Directors for the time being, and others 
13. E.g. Argus, 28 July 1880, 21 August 1880. 
might seek their places from IErsonal ambition, 
but significant differences of interest or 
attitudes were so unlikely as to excite suspicion. 
Radical politicians, hovrever, usually lacked 
weal th and standing, having often been working-
men or small traders very recently. Francis, 
Service and McCulloch had entered politics as 
established businessmen having qualified themselves 
to lead the community by making money. In them the 
old attitudes prevailed; for them, the old methods 
had worked. Men like Berry, Longmore and Burtt, 
however, began their political careers in agitation. 
They had no ready-made theory of politics to take 
over, and they produced no theory of their ovvn, as 
the men of Birmingham tried to do. 14 To them, 
organisation was simply the means by which the 
people could be aroused to see through the plausible 
men who imposed upon and plundered them, and could 
be brought into unanimity so that they could 
14. H.J. Hanham, Elections and Party Management: 
Politics in the time of Disraeli and Gladstone , 
pp. 134-5. 
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effectively put pressure upon the legislature. 
The form it took was simply that which they could 
devise to be moot effective. The radicals must 
take acco1L~t of the gentlemanly view, and argue 
in its terms as far as possible, since they accepted 
parts of it, had no theory of their own, and were 
intruders in the gentlemants Parliament, but 
although the leopard became partly domesticated, 
leopard he remainedo 
After 1877, however, the gentlemen had to 
accommodate themselves to the intruders. Berry's 
opponents were obliged to crganise in self-defence, 
as in the 1860s. During both periods, however, 
their organisation bore the stamp of their idea of 
politics. 16 Although the Constitutional Association 
of 1868 was structurally similar to the Loyal Liberal 
15. Argus, 14 April 1877, 29 October 1878. Note 
Berry's suggestion, on the latter occasion, that 
the N.R.P.L. was simply a Constitutional Reform 
League, which would disband, like the Anti-Corn Law 
League, as soon as the Council was reformed, a 
suggestion which other parts of his speech belied. 
And cf. The Age's unquestioning acceptance of the 
idea of party organisation, as distinct from (although 
clearly related to) the promotional organisation -
"The disorganisation of the Liberal Party --- is due 
to the want of an organisation about which opinion may 
centre and form itself. Before a rarty can be con-
solidated its ideas must be crystallised for it. It 
must know the principles for which it is contending, 
and it must be provided with a platform round which 
to rally." (Age, 14 January 1876.) 
16. Below, c.6, ss. I and II. 
Reform Association, it was spiritually quite 
different, and much less successfulo Between 
1875 and 1880, however, they evolved distinctive 
forms which suited their conventions, and were as 
efficient as those of their opponents. 
In 1866 and 1868 they had been defeated by an 
existing Government and men of their own kind; 
tacking, mo re over, had arguable prece.den ts. In 
1877 a moderate coalition with a strong majority 
had been crushed by a group of maniacs who had halted 
public business, stirred up class hatred and turned 
Parliament into a bear garden. Having provoked the 
Council into rejecting the budget, they took the 
first steps towards destroying the machinery of 
order, and, it was believed, caused a profound 
depression, which, unlike that of the late 'sixties, 
came after seven years had aeeuetomed them to pros-
perity. 17 Nor could they rely on the Council so 
much, once Berry had defeated it, nor, despite 
Bowen's recall, on the support they had received 
from Governor and Downing Street in 1868. Moreover, 
by the end of 1878 Berry's support was dwindling, and 
to beat the revolutionaries at the polls seemed 
possible. They were therefore pushed and pulled 
17. Cf. Francis' speech, Argus, 23 January 1878, 
and Joseph Jones', Argus, 2 February 1878. 
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towards effective orga..~isation as never before. 
A similar mixture of frustration and opportunity 
partly accounted for the organisational zeal of 
radical politicians. Had they all been accepted 
in the gentleman's Parliament without reserve, they 
might all have forgotten their past as agitators. 
Some did; some hardly tried. Others, however, 
especially Berry and Longmore, key figures in 
the development of the small radical organisations 
of the early 'sixties into the radical power of the 
late 'seventies, hovered between two worlds, seeking 
acceptance in their new roles without abandoning 
the old. They cou~d never be ~uite sure of themselves, 
perhaps, in their new roles, nor lose the resentment 
of the unsuccessful for the successfulG When 
rejected, they turned to organisation. It was 
the three radical defeats of 1870, 1872 and 1875, 
after the briefest tastes of power, which led them 
t . t 11 . th t . d . t t 18 o organise, or o a y wi ou si e agi a ors. 
After 1877, the prestige which the victory 
had brought to the party organisation which had 
assisted Berry, and the frustration of a powerful 
Government by the Council, provided a further 
incentive to men raised to agitation and organisation, 
to maintain it as long as possible. The Council 
18. For these orga..~isations, see below, c.5., 
s. III, and c.6., ss. 2ff. 
and with some reason" since the shadier 
politicians were generally radicals. 22 At the 
local level, personal animosities and faction 
were common. 23 Whatever the strength of doctrines 
of individualism among these undoctrinal men, 
egotism was rife, fostered by colonial society 
in much the same way, perhaps, as by the industrial 
revolution in Britain. 
In both cases, there had been not only a 
prospect of rapid wealth to excite competitiveness, 
but the uprooting of large numbers from familiar 
surroundings and primary groups which established 
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some degree of individual and social stability by 
teaching and enforcing well-understood ways of 
behaviour, to dump them in outlandish surroundings, 
22. Those implicated in land scandals during the 
'sixties were nearly all McCullochites. Jones and 
Butters were expelled in 1869, and Kyte probably 
escaped expulsion only through death. CM.Kiddle, 
9p.cit., pp. 255-262.) Sands had to resign in 1867. 
(Argus, Sands v. Armstrong, 3-6 May 1867, gives the 
circumstances.) Mccann was gaoled for ~orgery in 1867 
(Argus, 21 August 1867) and Wardrop ran off to 
Valparaiso after certain malpractice upon a building 
society (Argus, 16 July 1867). Cowell attempted to 
cheat his creditors after becoming insolvent, and 
it appeared at his trial that he had been exploiting 
his mistress in a quite despicable manner. (Argus, 
27 February 1868, 20 May 18f$8). Radicalism also 
attracted men of ferocious righteousness, many in-
tellectuals, and many perfectly ordinary men, but it 
seems quite likely that for a large number, it was 
rooted in frustrations which turn some to drink, some 
to crime, some to religion, some to politics - or any 
to a mixture of these. 
23. Argus, 18 December 1879; 6,13,16 and 24 January 
1880. Ballarat :Courier, 26 and 3.1 Au.gust 1870; 26 
January 18'{6, and see below, pp. 544-b-. 
often among strangers. Many, of course, came 
with relations, men from their own area, or soon 
found them, giving them a basis to create new 
primary groups ~uickly. In Melbourne or Geelong, 
adaptation was generally easier than in the bush 
or on the diggings. In particular, the lack of 
women, limiting the number who could achieve the 
relative stability of family life, affected inland 
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areas more severely. For the married, however, there 
were other anxieties; the roving man was tied down, 
the good family man was often hard put to it to 
feed a growing family. Even the best husbands might 
be forced to seek work away from home. The temporarily 
or permanently deserted wife therefore became a 
serious social problem.~4 
For many, only the small group of mates 
possessed sufficient mobility to endure; as it 
had to carry such a heavy emotional burden, it is 
no wonder it became legendary. When it did, it was 
extended by some enthusiasts to include all working 
men in one mateship. This idea was something 
completely different from the mateship of Victorian 
24. Argus, 15 October 1864. 
diggers, a grouping of two or more against the 
world. A sense of common diggerhood did develop 
during the very early 'fifties, but this was no 
more than the ordinary consciousness of a common 
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way of life, common interests and grievances, which 
also appeared among the upper classes. 25 • Moreover, 
for large numbers, particularly after 1857, the 
diggings became a trap from which they hoped to 
escape. The relative anonymity of the goldfields 
and the crowds of unemployed who occupied the half-
formed suburbs of Melbourne during the depression 
were fertile soil for egotism; the organised 
political activity which expressed something of 
the co-operative side of the radical classes was 
always shot through with personal quarrels and 
suspicions which weakened or destroyed many promising 
ventureso 
25. Especially after Black Wednesday, which made them 
co-OP3 rate as never before. For a different view of 
the diggers, see R.Ward, The Australian Legend , 
pp.109-11. The diggers no doubt co-operated more than 
the rich in the details of everyda:y life, like many 
groups whose life is precarious, but whether that 
amou_nts to something so different from the mutual 
assistance of other deprived groups as to deserve a 
special name may be doubted, nor does this kind of 
co-operation preclude egotism in other directions, 
especially when the group is not under attack. One 
may also doubt Ward's suggestion (po109) that it was 
'mateship' rather than the hope of riches which made 
many diggers continue working small, co-0})3 rative 
claims when employment was available in company mines. 
(Cf. Blainey, '.Rush that Never Ended , pp. 294-300.) 
The vigour of the politically active, 
however, whether co-operative or not, was played 
against a matt back-cloth of general political apathy, 
the norm to which Victorians tended; for all the 
uproar into which they could be thrown, the speed 
with which demonstrations and organisations dis-
appeared after these political saturnalia was remark-
able. The frequent complaints, and the general 
impression, received some statistical confirmation 
in the low percentage of the adult male population 
registered to vote, despite automatic enrolment 
of ratepayers, and of those registered who voted, 
even when registration and voting occurred during 
the most agitated times. Roughly two-thirds of 
adult males registered, of 1whom only two-thirds 
voted, so that the Assembly was elected by somewhat 
under one half the enfranchised population. 26 
Naturally, percentages varied considerably 
with area and the density and composition of 
population. During the 1877 election Avoca polled 
39.6% of the poll, Kyneton 77.7%; the average, 
26. See the return prepared by the Government 
Statistician covering the elections of 1871, 1874 
and 18Tl,, on which the following paragraph is 
based. (V. ··and P. (L.A.), Session 1877-8, Vol. 1, 
C.9). Cp. ~he polling figures :fbr 1865-6, V. and P. 
(L.A.), 1st Session 1867, Vol. 2, C.6. 
however, despite the rad:icals' passionate campaign, 
and the concentration of polling into one day, 
was only 63.1% where a contest took place; in 
four constituencies, none occurred. Local and 
personal factors affected some areas; Avoca was 
Grant's pocket county by then, Ballarat West's 
poll of 52% was u...11usually low because of a recent 
exodus to Queensland, and the absence of a contest 
in its county, Dalhousie, probably freed voters 
a..11d workers for Kyneton. In general, large 
constituencies and safe seats tended to poll 
small or be uncontested. It is not easy to group 
constituencies according to economic and social 
characteristics, since these were so mixed, but 
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in general older agricultural areas and towns 
dependent on them polled below 58%, the numerous 
inland constituencies combining a number of diggings 
with agriculture 58-65%, the few gold towns with 
separate representation (excluding Ballarat West) 
61-68%, Melbourne working class areas 63-70%, and 
Melbourne upper class concentrations 68-75%. The 
Government Statistician~ investigations into the 
polling rates of different occupations showed that 
of the five major groups, the highest percentage, 
69, was polled in 1877 by the artisans, the lowest, 
60, by the labourers. Farmers polled 62%, miners 
64, and commercial and professional men of all 
grades 66. His figures for 1871 and 1874 show a 
very similar pattern. Unfortunately he did not 
continue his investigations before or af'ter that 
date, but the percentages polled overall and by 
electoral districts in the quiet year of 1874 are 
mu.ch the same as during the political ferment and 
economic depression of the 1865-6 election. 
One reason for these low figures was probably 
the mobility of the population. It was long after 
the gold rushes before it settled; for many years, 
in fact, it was difficult to say who might be 
considered a Victorian. Large numbers left for 
gold-rushes elsewhere at various time& not a few 
to other forms of mining. Many turned farmer, in 
one colony or another, or followed the pastoral 
1"'16' <· . 
expansion northwards. Some turned planter or store-
keeper in Fij.i. J .A. Brooke, Minister of Lands in 
1860-61, died a newspaper editor in Japan. Of 
those who remained, a large number moved arom1d a 
g-.ceat deal. The Victorian gold-rushes decreased 
in intensity, but never entirely ceased during this 
period. 27 Even when deep-sinking predominated 
a large number remained on the fringes, hopefully 
scratching a bare living, cut off from society by 
the memory and the expectation of gold, mixing 
mining with shearing, fencing, harvesting and 
general labouring. These occupations also 
attracted in their seasons miners with steady 
jobs in the company mines, and townsmen seeking 
the high wages which could be vvrung out of the 
farmer. Many abandoned mining practically every 
year for farming or :Melbourne, or moved from 
declining fields to the quartz mines of Stawell 
and Bendigo. 28 Nor it only diggers who moved. was 
From the late 'sixties until the drought which 
closed the 'seventies the land rush to the Wimmera, 
the Riverina and Gippsland absorbed large numbers 
of labourers, miners and townsfolk; farmers moved 
from the coast and from South Australia. 29 At the 
same time, the influx into Melbourne was gathering 
27. Cf. AGgus, Su.rnmary for Eu.rope, 22 March 1876, 
10 July 187 , 8 July 1878, 3 September 1879, 3 and 
31 October 1879, 2 September 1880. 
28. Parnaby, op.cit., c.9. 
29. Parnaby, op.cit., c.4. 
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strength far the city rush of the 'eighties. 
Even among more stable citizens, however, 
the nature of the society made the organiser's 
task extremely difficult: so many fissures cut 
across it, so many factors influenced voting, 
that organisation was severely limited in area and 
membership. Class was not usually an adequate 
basis. Some, indeed, thought openly in terms of 
a class war, but they were rare. 30 The divisions 
in what would now be called the working class will 
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be considered later, but the position is conveniently 
summed up in the use of the word class. It was 
commonly employed to distinguish Bny section of 
the IJ)pulation on an occupational or other basis. 
Bishop Goold, for example, could accurately call 
the 1872 Education Act "class legislation11 .31 
The phrase "the working classes" was common, and 
pointed to a loose community of status which, as will 
be seen later, could be politically important, but it 
commonly included farmers and manufacturers,32 and 
30. E.g. William Ryan, of the Seaman's Union 
(Argus, 16 October 1874) "There had been too much 
of the 'goody goody' business about the working 
man's rights. With capitalists it was merely a 
q,uestion of taking as much flesh and blood as they 
could for their money, and when the working men had 
a chance they should take an advantage also. 11 
31. Argus, 20 April 1875. 
32. Cf. Berry's speeche~; in Argus, 26 February 1880, 
and 5 November 1881, and Dow's in St. Arnaud Mercury, 
4 February 1880. 
even when limited to wage-earners, pointed to 
a division between skilled and unskille d, and 
between miners and the rest.33 
Religious and national feeling complicated 
matters. Sometimes their effects were merely 
local. It was no accident, for example, that 
East Melbourne elected Cohen, Levi and Zox. In 
Dundas it was an advantage to be a Scot, and not of 
just any clan. 
"What claims had his opponent on them?" 
asked James l\facpherson of his electors. 34 
11Was he a Highlander, or what? Why, at the 
last election the Highla.:.~ders voted for him 
because he was a Mac; but his opponent was 
not a Mac - he was a f-funro. How came he to 
think of coming here? 11 
The mast important, however, was the so-called 
Catholic vote, strong in numbers and the coincidence 
of religion, nationality and the sense of special 
grievances.35 The status of the Southern Irish being 
generally low, moreover,/8a.~%i-Catholicism especially 
strong among miners, 36 their cohesiveness was rein-
forced, and the chances of uniting the working 
classes, the most receptive of radicalism and 
organisation, were drastically reduced. Eventually, 
33. Below, c.5, s.I. 
34. Ar~s, 5 October 1869. 
35. Below, c.3o 
36. Below, c.5, s,. I. 
national differences were to weaken with the 
growth of the native population, but for many 
years this appeared as yet another division. 
Even had the electorate been homogeneous, 
however, another influence would have fragmented 
it. IVIen who had helped found their tovm or 
village took especial pride in their offspring, 
all the more because many had been uprooted, 
wandering men for some years;previously, so that 
something of the emotional strength of mateship 
attached to localism. Many areas were ill-supplied 
with communications, and if their total population 
was small, this was offset by the weighting of 
the electoral system against the larger concen-
trations.37 It was also weighted in favour of 
the stable, ratepaying electorate,38 the section 
in which local pride, and the awareness of local 
needs, were strongest. The abundance of local 
newspapers stimulated local pride, narrowing 
horizons as it diversified opinions. Local needs 
37. For the figures of distribution during the 
last election under the 1859 Act, and the first 
under the 1876 Act, see V. and P. (L.A.), Session 
1877-8, Vol. 1, C.9. 
38. See next section on the operation of the 
registration system. 
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were so pressing that each settlement competed 
with its neighbours for sums which, trifling to 
those who in metropolitan ease deplored the 
sordid aims and limited views of the provinces, 
could make an appreciable difference to the welfare 
of large numbers of their fellow-citizens, and were 
essential if their views and aims were to be 
extended. Nor was local feeling limited to remote 
villages. Elections in Southwest Province were 
always contests between Geelong and Ballarat; when 
Mackay was Minister of Mines, he was suspected on 
Ballarat because he was a Bendigo man.39 The 
Councillors of Collingwood, moreover,, opposed 
Vale to a man during the 1869 ministerial election, 
because it was he who, as Commissioner for Public 
Works, had diverted to Richmond money intended for 
draining Collingwood. 40 As local Councillors and 
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Members of Mining Boards were prominent in electoral 
affairs and organisations, such opposition could be 
very serious. As local Councillors frequently 
39. Ballarat Courier, 9 June 1870. For an inside 
account of Southwest Province electioneering, see 
_1)5.a,ry of_ Geor,ge Belche:r, (Victoria State Library), 
~'.) JUJ..y 1d'{ 4-~ April. -it:$75 o 
40. Argus, 30 September 1869, 1 October 18690 
entered Parliament, localism permeated the 
entire system. ~he late 'seventies suggested 
that such influences were waning, but once quiet 
returned, two Geelong by-elections showed that 
this was not so when they resulted in the easy 
return of two blatantly localist independents.41 
Closely connected with localism was personal 
feeling. There was alw~ys some prejudice in favour 
of a local candidate, and he necessarily had the 
advantage of being known and having friends in the 
electorate. Nor was this so only in remote areas. 
Practically all Ballarat representatives came from 
Ballarat, and it was even suggested that citizens 
of Ballarat East should beware of electing rep-
resentatives who lived in Ballarat V/est, 42 
Fitzroy's ex-Mayor, Albert Tucker, 43 was rightly 
regarded as unbeatable because of his local 
services. Sometimes, of course, personal followings 
were a very minor factor, especially during the 
41. Ar~s, 29 November 1881. Cunningham, 
eventualy elected unopposed, promised to "squeeze 
the Government like a sponge" in the interests of 
Geelong. And cf. Connor, Argus, 5 April 1882. 
42. Ballarat Courier, 25 February 1871. 
43. Albert Lee Tucker, native-born Fitzroy 
property-o\'V'Iler; active in local building societies 
and local government. JILL.A., 1874. 
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constitutional crises; nor would Tucker's fol-
lowing have availed him much if he had turned 
constitutionalist. At the other extreme were a few 
cases like C.E. Jones, re-elected after expulsion 
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from Parliament over the 1869 land scandals, purely, 
it seems, on personal grounds.44 Narrowly defeated 
in 1871 after having alienated the Orange and tem-
45 perance interests, he left for the U.S.A. On his 
return, standing at the 1882 Geelong by-election, 
with no clear platform, no party affiliations, 46 
a Ballarat man facing a large body of new electors, 
he came a good second to a Geelong local, Berry's 
radical trailing badly. At the next general 
election, only the returning officer's casting 
vote kept him from the third seat at Ballarat 
West. 47 
Just as local and personal feelings tended to 
coincide, of course, so did other factors. Ballarat 
was perhaps the most striking example. It was 
44. M. Kiddle, pp. cit., pp. 255-262. 
45. Ballarat Courier, 26 and 31 August, 1870, 
8 September 1870, 18 April 1871. 
46. Age, 20 April 1882. 
47. Argu.s, 6 March 1886. 
overwhelmingly a mining tovm, where even those 
not directly engaged depended for their livelihood 
on the mines; practically everyone had shares in 
them. The town was overwhelmingly ~rotestant, 
and its radical leadership was closely connected 
with Methodism, Orangeism and temperance. Balla.rat 
radicals had longstanding contacts with radicals 
in the adjacent county. 48 Most goldfields tended 
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to radicalism and therefore protection; sometimes 
they combined to press mining demands. 49 Eventually, 
however, apathy or other divisions broke up the 
alliance. ~ven inside Balla.rat, matters could 
become very complicated, as during the 1871 
election, 50 when the Jones and Clarke factions 
of the radical ascendancy fought each other, while 
Major Smith, an ex-constitutionalist turned 
protectionist, and Joseph Jones, an unrepentant 
free trader, ran more or less together on a 
platform of mining reform, opposition to assisted 
immigration, and the aggrandizement of Ballarato 
48. Below, p.494 
49. At least at the parliamentary level. 
Argus, 31 August 1877; Age, 28 May 1880. 
500 Ballarat Courier, 8 September 1870 -
17 March 1871. 
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In Ballarat East, the usual battle took place with 
the Catholics; in both constituencies other 
candidates, each with his following, stood on 
various platforms. There was scope to spread the 
mining reform movement to other fields, or co-operate 
with the late protectionist, anti-immigration and 
eight hours movements in MelbourrE,5 1 but nothing 
was done. If this was the case in Ballarat, large, 
relatively wealthy, exceptionally well served 
by early railway development, how could anything 
more be expected in the remote places? 
51. Below, c.5, ss. II and IIIo 
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III. Organisation Encouraged. 
In the long run many of these influences 
weakened. Communications improved, the population 
became more stable. Imported divisions weakened 
as a new generation grew up. These changes were 
only beginning to take effect by 1883, however; only 
in the short term when circumstances were exceptionally 
favourable, was successful organisation possible before. 
Meanwhile, certain features of the electoral system 
encouraged lesser organisations, and maintained a 
continuity of organisational experience. 
The most important was the registration system. 
This had raised such problems that Registration Acts 
were legion until O'Shanassy's Act of 18631 set the 
system for the rest of the period. The main problems 
had been the expense and inefficiency of previous 
methods amoiag a mobile population. Collectors were 
not always thorough or honest. Nor did all voters 
loyally co-operate. One collector had a harrowing 
visit to a group of diggers who mocked and terrorised 
him, scrawled nonsense or obscenities over their 
claim forms, or "applied them to unmentionable 
1. 27 Vic. No. 168; slightly amended in the 
consolidating Act of 1865, 29 Vic. No. 279. 
purposes". 2 
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The Act provided for all ratepayers enrolled 
for local elections to be entered automatically on 
the parliamentary rolls. Others could, provided they 
had lived in Victoria for one year, followed by 
three months in the electoral district for which 
they claimed, pay one shilling and take out 
elector's rights for the division of that district 
in which they lived. A move to another division 
required re-registration and another shilling; a 
move to another district also entailed another 
three month qualifying period. 
O'Shanassy intended to limit the franchise~o 
long-term residents, and to give especial facilities 
to those who had given the strongest proofs of their 
intention to remain by acquiring property.3 In 
practice, it was a serious lim.i tation on manhoo,d 
suffrage. The discriminatGJ:J' contracting-in system 
would have reduced the working class vote even in a 
stable society where the registration :machinery was 
2. p11·,1~.~~ Ja}D;~S Smith. t86_~, 20 February 1863. (Mitche 1 Liurary.) 
3. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 9, p. 481. And cf. P~8:-1:1. o~ 
James Smith, 7 February 1863; O'Shanassy had told 
'smith ·,rthat he anticipated from the operation of the 
new Electoral Bill, the introduction of a superior 
class of men into the House." 
138 
perfect. The mobility of the population, entailing 
frequent re-registration for many, 4 exacerbated its 
effect. Many workers were also ratepayers, especially 
in the larger towns, but as the Local Government 
Acts5 required rates to have been paid by June 20th 
for enrolment in the local elector's lists, depressions 
led to their disfranchisement in large numbers6 unless 
·eac.h obtained an elector's right. 
In country areas, where the local franchise 
required a £10 qualification and property-values 
were lower, working men were at an especial dis-
advantage. According to one Shire Secretary, 7 
only 850 of his 2,220 ratepayers had the £10 
qualification; of the remaining 1,370, one-tenth 
took out electors' rights. The reason lay partly 
in defective administrative arrangements. 
4. According to the National Registration Society's 
report (Daily Tele~aph, 2 April 1880) analyses of the 
rolls as late as 1 9 had shown that even in Melbourne, 
half the names on the ratepayers• roll changed du.ring 
the three-year period between compilations of completely 
new rolls; changes in the general list (elector's 
right voters) were still more frequento 
5. 27 Vic., Nos. 184 and 186. 
6. Age, 1 May 1868. 
7. Age, 14 September 1866. 
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"I ask arrJ' sane and respectable aduJ. t, 11 8 
wrote the Hamilton Spectator's Redru.th correspondent, 
"--- whether patriotism must not be at fever heat 
indeed when a man can be found to brave the cold, 
the blinding rain, and the twenty-four miles of 
sand and mud he must of necessity traverse, in 
order to hand in his name and gaze for about 
three minutes on the amiable face of Mr. Garton!' 
Nor were registra.:ta always punctilious over their 
ill-paid duties. One Warrenheip registrar deputed 
his functions to one person, who delegated them to 
another, until nob~~y was quite sure who issued 
electors' rights, or where the lists and forms were.9 
Errors and omissions were, according to one 
rate-collector, 10 among the most frequent causes ot 
disfranchisement of ratepayers, because rate-collectors 
so often garbled names; he might have added that as 
many electors were illiterate or semi-literate, and 
country printers especially often inaccurate, the 
most conscientious officers faced considerable 
difficulties. They often foynd it difficult to 
locate the person responsible for paying rates. 
A politically-minded landlord responsible for paying 
his tenants' rates, might delay payment simply to 
disfranchise them. Councils sometimes made matters 
8. Hamilton Spectator, 2 September 1868. 
9. Age, 31 Augu.st 1865; Argu.s, 6 May 1864. 
10. Age, 31 January 1866. 
worse by leaving little time between striking 
the rate and the twentieth. 11 Many collectors 
were not conscientious, and it was alleged that 
they often failed to seek out those who had mCYl'ed, 
or deliberately avoided political opponents. 12 
Whatever the truth of these accusations, many who 
were out when the collector called were obliged 
to contract in. Many failed to do so, even when 
conscientious registrars or CoUllcils seeking prompt 
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PS¥ment placarded the area, or political organisations 
put out handbills and advertisements and canvassed. 
~he possibilities for error and fraud, and the 
contracting-in provisions, caused a great deal of 
organised political activity. Sectional assoo iations, 
promotional bodies, registration leagues, bands of 
zealots for a man or a party, all made a point of 
"seeing to the rolls 11 • The weighting of the system 
against the poor and migratory made this espi'C.i.ally 
important for radicals, but even the stationary and 
affluent had to beware of omission; if entitled to 
more than one vote they might have several rolls to 
11. .Argu,s, 26 August 18700 
12. Argu.s, 25 May 1866. 
check. 
Radicals and conservatives approached 
registration differently. Radicals, it was 
generally agreed, excelled at canvassing, 13 large 
numbers of volunteers going out on well-organised 
house-to-house visits, confirming the faithful, 
converting waverers, collecting names, ticking off 
interminable lists. Conservative leaders felt that 
outside election times, canvassing was a breach of 
privacy; when Berry's opponents began to indulge 
in this activity seriously and efficiently, they 
expressed surprise that their efforts were not 
resented. 14 No doubt the surprise was genuine; 
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a life of individualistic enterprise and relatively 
spacious housing, had doubtless produced among the 
middle classes - including, perhaps, if only through 
imitation, its lower ranges - more demanding attitudes 
towards privacy. Probably there were also many too 
dignified to knock on ~ust anybody's door. The 
working and living conditions of the lower orders 
limited the areas in which they expected privacy, 
13. Argus, 24 August 1878. 
14. Argu.s, 1 October 1880. 
they were more accustomed to menial work, and less 
likely to meet hostile or suspicious receptions for 
their views, appearance, speech and behaviour from 
their own order and its uninhibited children. 
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There were, of course, many constitutionalist 
working men and shopkeepers, who might have done such 
jobs. However, the tendency on both sides was for 
the local conduct of politics to belong to the men 
best-known in the groups to which it appealed; 
committees tended to include a large number of 
artisans or radical shopkeepers; conservative 
committees tended to come from a higher social level. 
The former were well-suited to canvassing, the latter 
were not; used to hiring labour, they preferred to 
use paid canvassers. This tendency characterised 
their registration as much as thei~ electoral 
activities. Several registration associations 
were set up by both sides, but the most promirent, 
the Victoria Registration Association of 1867 and 
the National Registration Association of 1878 and 
after, were conservative; since its registration 
activity was so vigorous, one might almost add the 
1865 Free Trade Leagu.e. 
Constitutionalists also had a special incentive 
to form such organisations, as they were the ones who 
stood to gain most from the exploitation of plural 
voting. 15 The first way in which this was attempted 
was by claiming votes for shareholders for company 
property, as joint owners. Under the Municipal 
Corporations Act, joint owners and occupiers could 
each vote, provided the rateable value divided by 
the number of claimants was at least £10; if it 
was less, then only as many could vote as gave that 
result. The general position was early conceded; 
in 1865 eight of the Free Trade Leagu.e Committee 
obtained votes in East Melboll.rne for the Leaga.e's 
offices. 17 It seems, in fact, to have concentrated 
on that district. According to the Age, 18 125 names 
were down for the Melbourne Club, where the form of 
membership had been altered to make it a share in 
the freehold. Banks and insurance companies swelled 
15. They were not alone in this, however; in 
1876 Munro and Longmore, two leading radicals, were 
enrolled for several votes. (Argu.s, 7 September 1876.) 
16. 27 Vic., No. 184, s. 47. 
17. ~. 4 October 1865. 
18. !f!&., 6 September 1865, 29 January 1866. 
the numbers; 19 it was hardly surprising that 
Langton, the Secretary, should have captured the 
second seat in 1866. 
During the 1866 registration season, the 
Registration Association was more ambitious, instig-
ating claims for the Melbourne and Robson's Bay 
Railway Company and the Melbourne Gas Company, the 
former for the land over which its lines ran, the 
latter for its gas mains. Something of this sort 
had been attempted in 1865, but only on a small 
scale. The claim now presented to the Town Clerk 
of Sandridge was, according to him, 20 for 369 "men, 
women, children and deceased persons", in a small 
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electorate. He refused to enter them in the burgess 
roll, and the Revision Court dismissed their claims, 
on the grounds that shares were personal, not real 
property; the Court also dismissed the Gas Company 
claims on the additional grounds that its pipes were 
not rateable, and that the property was vested in 
trustees, who were excluded from voting as such. 21 
Other courts generally followed the same reasoning, 
but not all. Hawthorn allowed 24 Railway Company 
19. ~, 19 October 1865. 
20. Age, 5 July 1866. 
21. ~. 17 July 1866. 
votes because nobody appeared to contest the 
claims; other places decided that as the Municipal 
Corporations Act allowed no more than three votes 
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to aIJ:3' individual, it intended the same for companies. 
In such cases, three were selected at random, the 
claimants• representative being refused the right 
to select them himself, but the methods used varied 
widely~2 
The Registration Association's Secretary, 
Moses Alexander, 23 also sought to induce con-
stitutionalists to subdivide properties and sell 
the bare minimum for a ratepayer's qualification 
to reliable men. Such an attempt at Brighton, 
Higinbotham's narrowly-held constituency, was 
disallowed on a technicality; after the test claim 
had been dismissed, no less than 93 more were with-
drawn. Next day, the Kew Revision Court made a 
similar decision, but referred the case to Mr. 
Justice Barry who decided that the claim was just. 24 
22. ~, 17 and 18 July 1866. 
23. A comne rcial agent whose name appears frequently 
in conservative political organisation, but of whom 
little is known., Something of his business activities 
appears in Alexander v. Jones. (Argu.s, 5-8 March 1869.) 
24. Argu.s, 17 and 18 July 1867, 3 Au.gust 1867. 
This method, however, was rare. Registration.-
associations were expensive, partly because of the 
use of professional agents and partly because the 
complexity of the law called for the employment ct' 
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counsel at the Revision Courts, especially when, as 
in 1867, the radicals formed counter-organisations. 25 
Having wasted large sums on the Free Trade Leagu.e in 
a period of bad trade, Melbourne constitutionalists 
rapidly closed their purses. 26 Secondly, many 
cons ti tutionali sts disapproved of Alexander·• s 
activities. Although Robert Murray Smith, a man 
of integrity and one of the Brighton and Kew sub-
dividers, defended his actions on English radical 
precedents, 27 he forgot that manhood suffrage was, 
at least in theory, established in Victoria, so that 
what had been in England virtually a means of extending 
the franchis.e, in Victoria seemed tantamount to 
restriction. Even The Argus disapproved of such 
25. ~ 20 June 1866; as C.E. Jones and Burtt; 
were associated with it, very likely it had 
Government support, since they were McCulloch's 
two chief organisers. Soon its counsel were facing 
V.R.A. counsel (Age, 17 July 1866)in the revision 
courts, but it seems to have been a short-lived and 
purely defensive organisationo 
26. Argus, 22 April 1868. 
27. Argu.s, 6 August 1867. 
activities as improper, and likely to alienate more 
votes than it created. 28 
The National Registration Society of 187829 
was set up to combat roll-stuffing rather than to 
engage in it, after the success of West Melbourne 
radicals in exploiting the possibilities of tlE 
general list. It was not difficult to obtain 
electors' rights by impersonation or inventing 
fictitious names. Registrars were required to 
check qualifications and put a series of questions 
to prevent fraud,30 but boredom and low pay made 
many lax, and the large, shifting population of the 
urban constituencies where these practices were most 
common made such scrupulous attention to the law 
impossible even for the most zealous. On polling 
day, the rights, and any which could be acquired for 
a drink or some other price, could be handed to safe 
men. Alternatively, 'dummies' could be hired, in 
·· which case, it was alleged, the first was supplied 
with a right, collected a ballot-paper, pocketed it, 
put a similar but blank sheet in the box, and gave 
the paper to the dum.:my-master, who marked it. 
28. Argu.s, 5 .A.ugu.st 1867. 
29. For its other activities, see below, pp. 
30. 27 Vic. No. 168, s.16. 
The next dummy collected his paper, pocketed it, 
voted with the first, and so till rights and 
dummies were exhausted.31 
It was also possible to impersonate those 
who, ~ing on the ratepayers' list, were not 
required to produce an elector's right as evidence 
of identity and entitlement,32 and who had died, 
left the district, or not yet polled. This was 
safer, of course, with obscure men and in urban 
areas. If a name appeared twice, or if a division 
had more than one polling booth, it was possible for 
its owner to poll more than once, or to be imper-
sonated. 33 The only check on these practices was 
certain ineffectual questions which officers conducting 
the poll could, and at the request of a candid ate' s 
scrutineer mu.st, put to those seeking to vote.34 
31. Age, 8 November 1867. 
32. The frequeney of reminders on election day to 
those on the general lists not to forget their 
elector's rights suggests that some always did. 
33. During the Emerald Hill by-election of June 
1866, the following message fell into the wrong 
hands. (A.rgu.s, 18 June 1868. Ji 
"Andrew Brown and William Edward Cross, two 
coloured men, has (sic) not yet voted - could 
be polled, I think, with safety. --- One is in 
India, and the other at sea." 
34. 27 Vic., No. 168, s. 98. 
The normal organisation for such activities 
was the temporary election comm.ittee. 35 Although 
set up for one election only, virtually the same 
comm.it~ees often reappeared at subsequent elections, 
especially if the seat had not changed hands for 
some time, or if elections were frequent. Sometimes 
they were formed from the friends of a candidate 
standing of his own volition, sometimes men of 
similar outlook would form a committee to bring 
forward a candidate or candidates, or to decide 
which of those standing to support; such groups 
were often the members of an already existing 
political organisation acting under another name, 
partly because they hoped to cast their net wider, 
partly because of the distiro tion between a pro-
motional and an electoral organisation. Committees 
of this sort, however, were rare outside larger 
constituencies and times of political excitement. 
Often they would invite candidates to address the 
committee, which then voted, openly or by ballot, 
35. The description which follows is derived from 
too many small scraps of routine election-time 
information for detailed references to be useful; 
election adverti~ts are particularly helpful. 
For examples of the more advanced methods, see 
c.5, s.2, below. 
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to decide whom to support. The candidate might 
be pledged, verbally or in writing, to a programme 
or a party, or even to resign on request.36 
To avoid the accusation of being hole and 
corner meetings dictating to the electorate, such 
committees usually had candidates endorsed by public 
meeting. This was also one method of demonstrating 
to an llll.Certain candidate that he stood a goo:d chance; 
the other was the requisition, signed by as many 
electors as possible. Those who signed had made 
an act of affirmation which was likely to increase 
their zeal; despite complaints by beaten candidates 
that pledges had been broken, promises of support, 
whether verbal or written,were regarded seriously 
enough to make the Collingwood radical committee 
of 1865-6 devote much time and effort to persuading 
electors to withhold pledges until it could examine 
the candidates and make recommendations. The 
requisition also identified a pool of workers and 
votes, and, if published, could be the means of 
impressing o,ther voters, whether friendly, hostile 
or undecided, with the size and influence of one's 
support. 
36. E.g. Argu.s, 8 January 1868, 1 February 1871; 
~. 14 April 1874; Ballarat Courier, 31 January 
f871, 22 February 1871, 6 and 9 March 1871. 
Requisionists formed the nucleus of the 
General Committee. The functions of this unwieldy 
body, which grew during the campaign, were 
necessarily exercised by a series of smaller 
bodies, an Executive Committee with sometimes a 
separate Finance Committee, supported by local 
sub-committees in electoral divisions, ward~ or 
even streets in the towns, while in the country 
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the major town (often a separate electorate) was 
occupied by the central committee, with sub-committees 
in smaller centres.37 
In constituencies with more than one member, 
there was an especial incentive for organisation. 
In these, electors had as many votes as there were 
to be members, but could give them only one each; 
it was possible to favour one man, however, by 
voting for him and nobody else, an operation known 
as plumping. The multitude of influences at work 
on the voters ensured some plumping, together with 
split voting for candidates of different persuasions. 
Consequently, whenever an election was being managed 
37. Deakin, ·.·The Crisis in Victorian Poli tics - , 
c.;, gives a detailed account of electioneering 
in a country constituency. 
by something mare than a series of individual 
committees, it was advantageous to keep the number 
of its candidates down to the number of seats, to 
avoid splitting the votes of its supporters, while 
selecting candidates who would attract split votes 
from other groups by appealing to religious, 
national, personal or other loyalties.38 It was 
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also possible for a strong minority to run fewer 
candidates than the number of seats, persuading 
their supporters to plump for tnem, and seeking split 
votes from the other side. So successful were these 
tactics that it was very comm.on for constituencies 
to have men on both sides of the House. 39 To be 
at their most effective, however, these manoeuvres 
called for considerable voting discipline, and 
careful organisation. 
38. fille operation of plumping and split voting 
is explained in some detail in Argus, 27 February 1880. 
39. This could be an advantage as far as seeking 
public works went. Ararat, for example, had one 
of its members, McLellan, in the Macpherson Cabinet, 
and the other, Wilson, in its successor, at a time 
when it was agitating for a railway. (Below, c.4, 
s.2.) 
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IV. Background to the Maj or Orga...n.isations. 1 
These encouragements, however, were short-
lived. Election campaigns and registration seasons 
were brief, and often excited only desultory interest. 
Nor did organisations produced by these routine 
stimuli cover wide areas. The Loyal Liberal 
Reform Association of 1868 and the National Reform 
and Protection League of 1877-83, however, spread 
all over the colony, on waves of political excitement 
which made people read newspapers more eagerly, 
attend public meetings and sign petitions more 
readily, demand more drama, more news, mare meetings. 
These the radicals were eager to supply. 
The most obvious reason for excitement was 
economic distress, which coincided with the periods of 
organisation. The post-goldrushes depression saw 
the outburst associated with the Land Convention, 
and later the first two constitutional crises; the 
depression of the late 'seventies saw the third. 
The recessions of 1870-71 and 1874-5 were accompanied 
by minor sputters. Political excitement did not 
1. Much of the evidence for this section is to 
be found in later chapters; detailed references 
will therefore be left till later. 
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follow mechanically from economic difficulties, 
however. In the first place, the prolonged 
depression after 1857 illustrated the principle 
that discontent arises, not from miserable conditions, 
but from a contrast between expectations and reality, 
a frustration of hopes or a sudden fear of worse 
things to come. With the economic shock of April 
1857, therefore, Victoria became ripe for the 
political outburst of that year; 2 the explosion 
of 1865 came after the Council had obstructed 
measures to restore prosperity for some years, and 
had suddenly, by rejecting the Budget, threatened 
to dislocate the economy further.3 Between these 
outbursts, as the depression wore on, political 
excitement had worn out. By 1859 the Convention 
was dying; when the depression reached its nadir 
the following year, it was practically dead. 4 
Ma.nY, disappointed in the results of the early lands 
agitation, had turned to other consolations, the 
2. G. Serle, op.cit., pp. 239-48, 266 ff. 
3. It also came in mid-winter, when the employ-
ment of labourers and building workers was least 
certain. 
4. G. Serle, op.cit., pp. 288, 295. 
Bible or, probably, the bottle. It would be 
surprising, however, if large numbers had not 
simply lowered their expectations. 
In the second place, most popular outbursts 
followed some dramatic political event. Recessions 
usually affected Governments almost simultaneously 
with the working population, by reducing revenue; 
as large-scale retrenchment was difficult, this 
entailed increased taxation. Many governments were 
thus endang~red, some defeated, but by itself this 
need not have caused much excitement.5 A 
sufficient number of the public had to feel, or be 
made to feel, that events in Parliament closely 
concerned them. Economic distress might achieve 
this, but even in 1857 there were other factors. 
The defeat of O'Shanassy•s first ]finistry coincided 
with the start of the depression, although these 
events were unconnected, but the violence of the 
reaction which began at the ministerial elections 
and continued into the Convention, owed much to 
radical frustration at the abruptness of the defeat 
of 'the People's Ministry~ and the fury of Irishmen 
5. In 1871, for example, the defeat of McCulloch 
passed almost unnoticed, like the resignation of 
the Kerferd Ministry in 1875. 
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seeing Duffy and O'Shanassy so defeated on gro1.lllds 
largely sectarian. 6 
At the other extreme, the two great peaks 
of popular excitement during the Berry ascendancy, 
in 1875-6 and 1878,7 were almost entirely political 
achievements. The resignation of the Kerferd 
Ministry in 1875 had been the result of another 
attempt to revise the taxation system, partly 
because of the recession, but partly, since Service 
began it in 1874 during a time of prosperity, as 
a matter of policy. Thereafter, the rationale 
of events was political, deriving from the bitter 
conflict of Berry and McCulloch, and Berry's arrival 
at mastery in an agitation which tied the title 
'conservative' to McCulloch's coat tails. Berry 
provoked the 1877-8 crisis because he wanted a 
fight with the Council to excite public opinion 
against it, and so reform it. The depression began 
after the constitutional crisis; the great 
agitation began with the political coup of Black 
Wednesday, which may even have hastened the 
6. Below,pp. 422ff, 
7. The stonewall and the constitutional crises; 
considered in more detail below, c.6. 
1fi6 
depression. 8 Once this had set in agitation 
beca.me easier at first; the people could be 
persuaded that the rich were deliberately 
sabotaging the economy to unnerve the people. 9 
Anger and alarm made audiences suggestible, and 
memories and prejudices were confirmed by the 
suggestion. Later, however, the disillusionment 
and antagonisms aroused by the Government's failure 
to control the weather and the international economy 
made it almost impossible to continue the agitation. 
As much depended on politics, much depended 
on who made the decisions, and what was his 
political position. Berry sought cause of quarrel 
in 1877-8, and used every means of agitation to 
excite and to maintain excitement. Duffy, in 1871 
had equal cause for quarrel, but re~pected the 
gentlemanly ideal of politics too much to anticipate 
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8. According to The Argus' monthly reports on the 
state of trade, 1871 had been a rather dull year for 
trade; 18718 was one of the worst for some time. It:eL start 
coincided with Black Wednesday, in January 1878. 
(Argus, Summary for Europe, 23 January 1878.) 
Considering the exaggerated fears which this event 
aroused, it is more than likely that it should have 
temporarily destroyed business confidence. 
9. Ar~s, 4 and 15 June 1878, 3 September 1878 • 
.And cf. Cingmore's accusations that the banks were 
deliberately restricting credit to selectors to turn 
them against the Government. (St. Arnaud Mercury, 
5 October 1878.) 
Berry's methods. 10 When Francis, his supplanter, 
was faced with the same brute obstruction by the 
Council, his distaste for agitation, and the 
presence in his Cabinet of the Council's former 
defenders, made him, although fighting the election 
on Reform, deliberately eschew the methods urged 
by the radicals. 11 Berry, by contrast, was in 1877 
1rJ8 
the first unfettered radical Premier, and had learned 
his politics, not from John Stuart Mill, nor simply 
from parliamentary infighting, but by bawling himself 
hoarse from innumerable platforms. 
Just as economic factors do not entirely 
explain the great periods of popular excitement, so 
economic interest is an inade~uate explanation of 
the way the country then divided politically. 
One side claimed to represent the working classes, 
the miners, urban workers and farmers. Manufacturers 
generalJysupported this alliance, but as they were 
politically insignificant in nu.mbers, organisation 
10. Although he believed Berry had faced great 
provocation in 1875, Duffy disapproved of the 
stonewall, and urged electors, while returning 
opponents of McCulloch, not to elect just stone-
wallers. (Argus, 17 March 1877.) 
11. V.P.D., Vol. 17, pp. 1414 ff. 
and representation in Parliament, 12 and as so 
many were indistinguishable from working men, it 
gives a false impression to co1.lllt them as a separate 
1ri9 
element of radical power. Against these, in general, 
were arrayed pastoralists and most of the commercial 
and professional communities. 13 Despite their 
marked inferiority in seats, 14however, the con-
stitutionalists were far from overwhelmed in votes. 
Like their opponents, they obtained support on local 
and personal grounds. They also benefited particularly 
12. For their general 1.lllwillingness to take an 
active part in politics outside the House, see below, 
pp. 402 and 483-4 • In 1866-8, manufacturers 
acco1.lllted for four M.L.A.s out of 141 (including 
those who did not serve for the whole Parliament) 
and in 1877-80 for 4 out of 98. (F.K. Crowley, 
Aspects of the Constitutional Conflicts Between jhe Two Ffouses of the. Victorian Le€i1Slature, .. 
(Mel.'M.A.) Appendix B; Parnaby, Q.12.J_cit., p. 296.) 
13. Deakin, tCrisis in Victorian Politics , 
pp. 11-12. The areas where the parties' support 
mainly lay, and, where they can be found, the 
occu~ations of their leading local supporters, 
confirms this general impression. 
14. E.g. Argu.s, 2 February 1866, shows that, 
although the Opposition had obtained only 20 seats 
out of 78, it had won 22, 904 votes to the Government's 
28,428. The basis of calculation, taking the highest 
number of votes polled for each side in multiple con-
stituencies and ignoring elections either 1.lllcontested 
or where all candidates stood for the same party, 
is reasonably fair, although on this occasion it 
somewhat under-represented the Government vote. Had 
registration and voting been comp.ulsory, and had 
plural voting been abolished, the Government might 
have been further ahead, but as much of the 'Catholic 
vote' was concentrated among the lower classes, and 
this tended at that time to support the Opposition, 
the Constitutionalists might also have done well. 
from plural voting, although not until 1880 do 
they seem to have taken much advantage of this. 15 
The considerable support they obtained on the gold-
fields and the Melbourne maritime constituencies, 
where they had several safe seats, 16 suggests a 
conflict between feelings that protection was 
robbing the needy miner and wharfie for the benefft 
of Collingwoo,d; and that if free trade were favoured 
by s~uatters it must be bad for the working man. 
Those who took the former view had no reason to 
withdraw their support from men who had served well 
in the lands agitations, like McLellan of Ararat and 
Gillies of Ballarat, simply because they opposed 
McCulloch. Finally, the Southern Irish voted 
largely constitutionalist during the 1860s and 
early •seventies, and again during the early ~ighties. 17 
15. mo organise the plural vote became more important 
when, under the 1876 Electoral Act, all polling was 
to take place on the same day. (A)g1l.S, 21 and 28 
February 1880, Age, 3 March 1880. 
16. During the crises of the 'sixties, maritime 
Sandridge and Emerald Hill returned Constitutionalists; 
on the goldfields, they held one seat at the Ovens, 
Ararat, Ballarat East and Ballarat West, losing the 
last one by a narrow margin during the 1868 by-
elections. The rest of their strength in the Assembly 
came from the Melbourne co:m.rrercial centres and the 
upper-class suburb of St. Kilda (6 seats) and the 
Irish country strongholds. (4 seats, with a large 
influence elsewhere.) 
17. The 'Catholic vote' was, of course, far from 
solid, and more noticeable in country than in town. 
(Below, c.3.) 
Moreover, although the general alignment of 
forces approximated to a division between different 
occupational groups, its roots lay not so much in 
conflicts of current economic interest, although 
some undoubtedly existed, but rather, as had been 
suggested above, in the memory of past conflicts, 
and the fears, preconceptions, prejudices and 
psychological needs of anxious men. One group 
which, generally pro-McCulloch in 1865, was anti-
Berry ten years later, namely the tea and sugar 
merchants, provides an instructive example. 
McCulloch's tariff reduced the duties on their 
commodities, and it has been suggested that this 
gave them an economic interest in its passage. 18 
Ignoring the questfuon of the price-elasticityaf 
demand for tea and gugar in Victoria during 1865, 
and how far they were aware of it, it is clear 
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that assuming the tariff to affect consumption of 
their goods at all, it should have tended to increase 
it. If this is a full explanation, however, it is 
odd to find the same people opposing a Berry who 
proposed a further heavy reduction in tea and sugar 
18. Crowley, op.cit., c.5; and cf. a curious 
meeting of tea and sugar merchants in support of 
the tariff, Argus, 16 May 1865. 
duties, and to meet a revenue deficit by taxing, 
not all forms of wealth, as McCulloch and Service 
proposed, but only large freehold estates. 
Two other explanations seem likely. The first 
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is that the 1865 tariff did not alarm them sufficiently 
to overcome their political inertia and make them 
desert McCulloch for the Council. As, so far as 
it touched their trade, it could not but benefit 
them, they were disposed to believe it a revenue 
tariff. Their belief in the conventional wisdom 
of free trade, was not called into play. In 1875, 
however, they were used to supporting the 1872 
coalition, now taken over by their old chief, 
McCulloch, and Berry's proposals were not sufficiently 
attractive to overcome th~s inertia. 
The second explanation is suggested by the 
frequency with which not only McCullochites, but 
anti-McCullochites like Higinbotham, Duffy and 
Service disapproved of Berry's antics after his 
defeat as wanting moderation. 19 To a successful 
businessman or professional, bred to gentlemanly 
politics, Berry and his supporters, who had long 
19. Argus, 1 February 1876, 17 March 1877, 
1 May 1877. 
ranted indiscriminately against all merchants 
and others of the successful classes, and who now 
were setting the country and the Assembly in uproar, 
seemed a gang of adventuring maniacs, whereas 
Mcculloch ten years before had led a Ministry of 
all the Talents. They reacted, in fact, not to a 
proposal but to the effect of their image of the 
proposer upon the attitudes they had previously 
acquired. Their attitudes in 1875 did not diverge 
markedly in fact from those of groups of similar 
status and background; they behaved, not just as 
tea and sugar merchants, but as members of a social 
class, which had not simply interests, but also its 
own myths and customs. 
The sarr1e applied to members of the working 
classes. Al though the plural form af the phrase 
indicates a significant difference between the 
homogeneity and cohesion of the groups it comprised 
then an:itnow, 20 it is significant that such a term 
existed. To some extent, no doubt, similarity 
of experience in the 'fifties provided a bond, but 
that experience had varied, and had been interpreted 
differently according to the difference of attitudes 
20. Below, c.5, s.I. 
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formed in Britain; considerable diversity of 
experience had followed it. During the late 
'seventies, a large number of native born members 
of the working classes, whose experience in their 
formative years had been very different from their 
fathers•, 21 was coming of age. Despite all their 
1G4 
differences, however, these groups were linked by their 
social status. 
The Council was the stronghold of high status; 
when it so dramatically blocked measures proposed by 
the Assembly, therefore, it not only increased 
political excitement and activity at all levels, 
but also affronted all men of low status so dras-
tically that most of them, forgetting other 
differences, were driven together in support of 
the parliamentary party which was attacking the 
Council. That this group was dominated during the 
McCulloch, and to some extent during the Berry 
ascendancy, by men of high status, did not alter 
this, for they were the leaders of the House of the 
People. Berry and Longmore even spoke of themselves 
as if they were still members of the classes with 
which they identified themselves. 
21.• Below, pp. 574-7. 
Perhaps a status component can be added to 
the reasons why certain groups supported the 
constitutionalists. Two of the mos t important , 
port-workers and the urban Irish, were generally 
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of very low status, being labourers. It is therefore 
likely that sufficient numbers of them to be 
electorally important resented artisans and miners 
more than they did the rich. Storekeepers, then 
particularly numerous and given disproportionate 
influence by the automatic registration provisions, 
seem to have reacted to the need to choose between 
the men of high and of low status according to their 
•t• . th . 22 own posi ion in eir area. It hardly mattered 
to a shopkeeper whether he obtained his supplies from 
home or foreign industries, and in the late •seventies 
the land tax proposed by Berry should have been the 
least objectionable of all the proposals put forward. 
Modern example, however, suggests that some regarded 
themselves as middle class, and that during the 
constitutional crises, they voted accordingly. 
Probably most shopmen in Collingwood, living and 
22. These suggestions are necessarily no more than 
hypotheses based on the probabilities and the appear-
ance of shopmen on the committees of one side or the 
other during the times of political polarisation. 
Any firmer and more detailed conclusions must await 
detailed research into the social history of 
different areaso 
dealing exclusively with artisans, tended to 
vote radical, and their counterparts in St. Kilda, 
like those in Fitzroy, tended more towards the 
constitutionalists. In the provinces, shopkeepers 
1G6 
were far more common among the local constitutionalist 
leadership, and more rare among the radical, than in 
Melbourne. It seems that in country towns their 
status, particularly in their own eyes, was higher 
than in the metropolis; even a St. Kilda shopkeeper 
might resent his inferiority to the important 
businessman, but in the country the great grazier 
lived out of town, so that coIIlllB rcial men who would 
have been small beer in Melbourne were among the 
local leaders. This is especially likely with 
country entrepreneurs who owned perhaps a substantial 
store, other town property, a number of selections 
and mining or other shares. In mining towns where 
there was a distinct working class quarter, no doubt 
many shopkeepers there would vote radical; in 
agricultural areas, where most of the working classes 
lived out of town, as mobile labour or small farmers, 
this effect would be much less likely, and for all 
the interdependence of farmers and shopkeepers, 
the differences arising from the desperate poverty 
and dependence of many farmers led to a good deal 
of hostility, which had its political effect. 23 
Finally, there was one group, politically 
very important, and of high status, especially in 
country towns, whose behaviour can hardly be 
explained in terms of economic interest, since 
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they can hardly be said to have had any. Professional 
men, especially lawyers and doctors, seem generally 
to have supported their social peers; as men of 
education, were they not the very guardians of 
conventional wisdom? At the same time, they pro-
duced a large minority of radicals. This can be 
explained partly by the large nwnber of Irish among 
the lawyers, ,'bred. to suspicion of any Protestant 
ascendancy and therefore of the Council. Others 
had taken to the Jaw, often mixed with journalism 
or bookselling at some stage, as the career most 
open to intellectual talent, and their relatively 
humble origins no doubt coloured their later attitudes. 24 
It is also likely that all professional men laid 
greater emphasis on education in their criteria 
23. Below, pp.311-2,. 
24. Eog. J.J. Walsh and William Vale were book-
sellers turned lawyers, James l\IIirams a bookseller 
turned businessman. G.P. Smith and Alfred Deakin 
(although the latter was born in relatively easy 
circumstances) combined law and journalism at 
different stages. 
for status; 25 many of the wealthier classes were 
not well-educated, and probably some therefore 
tended to belittle education. 
Without such Councillors, however, it is 
doubtful if anything like the constitutional 
crises would have occurred to group the fragmented 
society of Victoria, even temporarily, into two 
well-defined and bitterly antagonistic parties; 
and if this had not happened, it is unlikely that 
any widespread and powerful organisations could have 
developed. These also, however, derived strength 
from a continuity of experience among organisers 
which underlay the discontinuity of their organi-
sations. Each constituency had its regular band 
of such men, who re-appeared in one organisation 
after another. 26 Much the same people also kept 
re-appearing in promotional organisations; mostly 
these were from the local elites, but there was 
also an important body of unattached central organisers. 27 
25. Cf. Higinbotham's speech in Argus, 24 October 
1864; and Michie's remarks on the comparison between 
the Lords and the Council, in Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11, 
p. 468. 
26. For the Collingwood men, see below, c.5, 
ss. II and III. 
27. Sometimes Melbourne men without strong local 
ties, like Walsh, Mirams and Yeomans; sometimes 
provincial M.L.A.s like Berry and Longmore,. 
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Suen local and central elites existed among 
constitutionalists, but were more apparent among 
their opponents, who made much greater use of 
promotional organisations. Constitutionalists 
generally organised only to meet a challenge; 
it is not surprising, therefore, considering their 
generally conservative position, that their associations 
had no progra..-rnm.es beyond defeating the enemies of 
order and restoring'good government', leaving the 
country to be run ~uietly and economically by 
practical men. 28 The only exception to this was 
their addiction to free trade, which it was not 
always opportune to agitate, since it stirred up 
the demagogues and so jeopardised the country's 
business. Even the first Free Trade League was 
necessarily not so much a promotional as a conservative 
association. 
Radicals, by contrast, sought so many changes 
that their problem~0-was what and how much to seek 
at once. The basis of their programmes 29 was 
28. Below, pp. 561-2. 
29. E.g. Ar~s, 24 July 1868, 23 January 1871, 
13 January 187 , 4 July 1879. 
land-settlement, protection, shifting the 
burden of taxation further onto the rich, the 
extension of education, and perfecting political 
democracy, particularly by reforming the Council. 
There was also a strong undercurrent of sectional 
demands, like eight hours legislation, prevention 
of assisted or Chinese immigration, assistance to 
mining and improved working conditions. Naturally, 
different circumstances brought forward different 
parts of this programme, or clothed it in different 
sets of concrete proposals. 
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Any reforming group, unless politically 
omnipotent, must take especial care in deciding 
priorities, and avoid fatiguing the public by 
agitating too much at once. The radicals, hONever, 
were strong in the Assembly for limited periois 
only; these coincided with the constitutional 
crises and the insistent economic problems which 
accompanied them, and during the first it was not 
they who ran the Government. Consequently they 
followed the traditional promotional method of 
agitating very limited sections of their broad 
programmes, whichever parts seemed most practicable. 
Limitation was difficult to achieve. Each measure 
had its partisans, who, suspicious that their allies 
might desert them once their own pet schemes had 
succeeded, insisted on adding to the programme. 
Even when this was successftill.y limited, speakers 
could hardly be restrained from bringing forward 
30 
their own crotchets. The hope o~ semblance of 
power, however, produced comprehensive party 
programmes. This was so with the Loyal Liberal 
Reform Association in its later stages, and with 
the National Reform and Protection League. Being, 
not struggling promotional organisations but limbs 
of powerful governments, they had to propose 
measures, not just because they seemed desirable, 
or possible, but because their Government faced 
particular problems and, to maintain power, had to 
appeal to as many groups as possible. 
When the promotional had become a party 
organisation, combining the propagandist functions 
of the former with those of the party headquarters, 
its problems greatly increased. Relationships with 
the Government, electors, branches and party became 
30. Cf. Argus, 6 January 1871; 
Ballarat Courier, 27 November 18750 
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complicated. The Loyal Liberal Reform Association 
did not survive long enough to do more than start 
to encounter these problems. The National Reform and 
Protection League, therefore, had little to guide 
it through the problems, and could do little more 
than suggest the answers, especially since it was 
simultaneously beset with the promotional 
organisation's old problem of mere survival. 
Excitement could not be maintained. Even if new 
sources of drama occurred, like Buckingham's 
instructions in 1868, or were manufactured, like 
Black Wednesday in 1878, people tired, and so did 
the protagonists, in whom tension was strongest and 
most unrelieved. Other matters demanded attention; 
what did Berry's second Reform Bill matter to a 
northern farmer facing another drought? Was victory 
possible, or compromise unacceptable? So excitement 
declined, propaganda lost its effectiveness, and 
there was more talk of a return 1:n political q_ui et 
and 'practical legislation• than of a fight to the 
finish. Despite recurrent agitations, by-election~ 
social occasions, and even occasional participation 
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in local elections, 31 there was a constant struggle 
against decay. Permanence came from the combination 
of a parliamentary party with a sectional organisation. 
Having other day-to-day functions, and being the 
spokesman for a large and increasing number of 
electors, this could continue despite fluctuations 
in political feeling, or the most catastrophic 
splits in the party. 
Like the Australasian Reform League a 
generation before, the first Labour Party organi-
sation) 32 elected a number of M.I..A.s, mostly 
metropolitan, 33 who, although few, were remarkable 
for voting discipline and could attract a number of 
other radicals on certain questions. Both 
organisations disappeared soon after the elections; 
310 Cf. BlfoC~ ,PaE~~~, 24 August 1867; Bendigo 
Advertiser, 14 August 1868; Argus' 12 August 1872; 
Age, 18 January 1876, 29 August 1 78; Hamilton 
Spectator, 14 August 1877; and St. Arnaud Mercurz, 
30 June 1871, 7 and 11 July 18Tl, 1, 8 and 11 
August 18770 Not all these refer, of course, to 
the activity of particular organisations; they 
suggest not a deliberate strategy of taking or er 
local government in the interests of particular 
ways of running it, but rather the pursuit of 
personal ambition or an attack upon a class or 
political enem.ieso 
32. The Progressive Political League of Victoria. 
Argus, 1, 2, 6 and 10 June 1891. 
33. Australasian, 16 and 23 April 18920 
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both parliamentary groups soon split and became 
partly absorbed in a larger body. The parliamentary 
Labour Party, however, never disappeared as an 
organised group, and electoral organisations succeeded 
one another until one became permanent. The simpli-
fication of the old multiple social fissions 
simplified the task of the Labour Party, and the 
marked increase during the 'eighties in the industrial 
populati8c~p1bi~r and cohesion of unionism34 made the 
alliance much stronger than it could have been before; 
the crucial step, however, was the formation of an 
alliance with a permanent body representing a large 
section of the community. 
Radicals had sought this earlier,35 and their 
organisations' appeals had been mostly sectional, 
but al though many prominent unionists suppar ted them 
or joined their organisations, nothing had become 
of their approaches to Trades Hall, individual 
unions, or the short-lived Manufacturers' Associationso 
Inter~ention by sectional organisations in the 
interests of a party was generally condemned in 
34. Gollan, op.cit., c.5 and 6. 
35. E.g. Argus, 10 May 1870, 8 October 1875. 
democratic theory36 and in all parts of the 
community. Not only was politics concerned with 
the national interest and other high matters into 
which selfish and sectional motives should not 
intrude, but nobody wanted to alienate one 
parliamentary group when concessions might have 
to be sought from it later; still less, split an 
organisation set up for other purposes. Members 
wishing to start or support a political society 
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could do so. Middle class radicals were continually 
forming radical associations, and working men were 
often busy in these or in others which, although 
any might join, were run by working men primarily 
for the benefit, through political action, of 
working men.37 During political crises, moreover, 
parties tended to appear in Parliament which could 
reasonably claim to represent the working man. 
36. Argu.s, 25 November 1882. 11--- a House 
containing groups of Catholic clauses men, bulwarks 
of Protestantism, enthusiastic Bible in state 
schools delegates, publicans' members, rigid 
supporters of local option, and representatives of 
the rival claims of the Mudford and the Peg Leg 
deviations of the Bung Bung to Dong Dong Railway. 
--- Amid such struggling interests and collective 
egotisms, what chance would there by for the 
representation of the general interests of the 
country and for liberal attention to the legislative 
and administrative requirerrents of the community 
at large?" 
37. Below, c.5, s.II. 
Finally, it was difficult enough already to 
maintain a sectional organisation; only the 
Chamber of Commerce achieved permanence with ease 
before 1880. Although unionism and :rarticular 
unions persisted, their history was full of 
organisations which had split, collapsed or 
survived only with a struggle. Why look for new 
difficulties? 
Around 1880, while unionism was beginning 
to extend among the unskilled, and Trades Hall to 
expand its functions, came the first signs of strong 
sectional organisation among farmers, in a movement 
which sought ~irect representation at once.38 
Indeed, it was largely exasperation at the failure 
of politicians to comprehend or alleviate the 
sufferings of the new agricultural areas, in a 
community which regarded itself as entitled to 
Government assistance, which led to its formation. 
As one of the mainstays of the radicalism of the 
goldfields generation, the miners, died out, the 
other two, farmers and urban workers, both expanding 
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in numbers and self-consciousness, were moving apart, 
and towards their own political parties. Long before 
38. Below, c.4, ss. VI and VII. 
that, political Catholics, with varying degrees 
of support from their Church, were beginning their 
long career as an organised political force which, 
in alliance or isolation, could never be fer gotten. 
For all its distinctive problems and pride in 
its achievements, the first generation remained to 
a degree expatriates whose attitudes had been formed 
originally on the other side of the earth. Just as 
their new land was insensibly encroaching on their 
old patriotisms, however, so it was encroaching on 
the structure of their politics. They might think 
of it in terms of British mroels, but even before 
their sons had begun to assume their inheritance, 
the new co1U1.try and the new society were gently 
asserting themselves. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
\ 
THE SOUTHERN IRISH 
I. The Irish Asoenda:qc1, (1856-1863). 
From the 1860s, one fifth of the Victorian male 
population was Catholic, mostly Southern Irish. 
Their distribution was even enough to make them 
potentially influential in most constituencies but 
not so even as to be a crippling disability. 
heaviest concentrations were in the Belfast-
Their 
wa.rrnambool area, half-way along the west coast, and 
a, south-eentral region bounded roughly by a line 
joining Melbourne, .Kilmore, Kyneton, Balla.rat and 
Geelong. In a northeasterly extension of this 
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region, along the Sydney road to the area between the 
Rivers Gou.lburn and Ovens, they were an important 
part of the sparse population. 1 
Their social concentration was even more marked. 
Although Irishmen could be found in all occupations, 
the stereotype was a labourer in the towns and a 
farmer or labourer in the country; the policeman and 
the publican. were minority types. 2 fhe rough 
coincidence of social status with nationality and 
religion made the Southern Irish particularly 
homogeneous; geographical concentration reinforced 
their homogeneity. Sometimes status brought them 
into alliance with the rest of the lower classes, 
1. Census of Victoria, 1861, 1871, 1881; Religions 
of the People. 
2. V.P.D., Vol. 26, p. 1088; Advocate, 7 March 68. 
sometimes the.ir views on education allied them with 
the wealthy, or, wLth their nationality, put them 
on their own. Rarely, however, could they forget 
that on all three counts they were half feared, 
half despised, an inferior class. 
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The Melbourne artisans ignored and perhaps 
despised the unskilled who were outside their unions 
and radical associations. The percentage. of Catholics 
was particularly low in the two leading working class 
constituencLes, Ballarat West and Collingwood, 
which in 1871 showed respectively 19.53% and 18.85%. 3 
Racial may therefore have been added to social pre-
judice. Artisans with Irish names do appear in these 
areas, but some were Protestants, nor does acceptance 
of individuals from a despised group prevent a gene-
ral prejudice. In the countryside prosperous Irish 
farmers were more likely to be envied, but modern 
example suggests that envy may have confirmed 
prejudice. The "Catholic vote", in fact, was always 
much more apparent in country areas, probably because 
of the lower density of rural population, the higher 
3. Census of Victoria, 1871; Part 4. I am grateful 
to Professor O. McDonagh, who had worked out the 
percentages, for letting me use. his figures. Anti-
Catholicism was particularly vocal on Ballarat, but 
according to The Argus, 3 Oct. 69, Orangemen and anti-
Catholics were numerous in Collingwood. 
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Irish percentage in their main country than in their 
urban centres,4 and the greater stability of farming 
life, all of which kept their contacts with other 
nations, religions and attitudes to a minimwn. 
One thing, however, urban and rural Irish had in 
common: the memory of ancient and modern wrongs. 
Even when emigration and reforms had begun to ease 
conditions and remove grievances in the real Ireland, 
their dreaming country was the Ireland of the famine. 
National feeling, augmented by distance, was 
nourished by private news of hardship and public 
news of distress and violence; it was treasured in 
homes, in Hibernian associations, in churches and 
schools, and was lovingly passed on to the next 
generation. As with all who have strong memories 
and traditions of oppression and inferior status, 
improvements in their situation still left them 
expecting insult, oppression and grievance. 
Unfortunately, they did not have far to look. 
Wnen John Gavan Duffy complained, "the majority 
ofthe people do not sufficiently realize --- that 
Catholics are essentially a part of the community ___ n 5 
4. The five most Catholic constituencies showed the 
following percentages in 1871: Kilmore, 52.75; 
Dalhousie, 39.77; Villiers and Heytesbury, 38.26; 
West Melbourne 33.54; East Melbourne, 33.26. (Census, 
1871, Part 4.) 
5. V.P.D., Vol. 26, p.1110. 
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he hardly exaggerated. All Protestant churches -
contributed to the army of bigots. If the worst 
were Irish Presbyterians; perhaps the most numerous 
were Methodists. 6 Second only to Catholicism among 
the religions of the lower classes, its evangelical 
fervour made it especially suspicious of pope1'7• 
fo the bigots, Catholicism was and always had been a 
persecuting faith, forcibly depriving men of the 
right to read the Scriptures and worship according 
to their conscience. !he lesson which Catholics 
drew about Protestantism from the history of Ireland, 
they drew about Catholicism from the history of 
England and the Continent. The contemporary Italians 
and the Irish provided dreadful examples of the eff eets 
of Catholicism on society; keeping men ignorant of 
learning sacred and profane, it imperilled their 
souls and retarded their prosperity. Crime, squalor, 
drunkenness,damnation and Catholicism were constant 
. 7 companions. 
6. On Ballarat, for example, it was largely Methodist: 
lay preachers like Henry Bell, John James and Richard 
Hain who led radicalism and anti-Catholicism. 
7. Victorian Banner, 9 Feb 81, 6 May 82. 
!he Irish were also notoriously seditious. 
This affronted the national feeling of English and 
Scots of all classes, but particularly of the rich. 
Seeing themselves as gu.arclians of the British 
constitution, law, and traditions against t:te·mob, 
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they were equally on guard against the Southern Irish. 
Demagogues and priests, what was there to choose 
between them? Political necessity and similarity 
of views on education might dictate soft words and 
temporar.r alliance, but both sides played with one 
hand under the table. After Catholics had saved the 
Constitutional Party from annihilation at the 1868 
elections, some of the upper classes, facing a 
bitter no popery campaign by their opponents, grumbled 
at the damage done to their causeby their Catholic 
saviours. Well might the Adv&oate ask, "Why does 
The Age eomaent upon the fact of the Catholics 
voting with you more than the Methodists or Independents? 
Because he (sic) knows you have imbided prejudices 
which are easily alarmed."8 
Many Protestants, of course, were not bigots, 
nor did all Catholics seek insult in their neighbours• 
every word and gesture, but prejudice was widespread, 
8. Advocate, 7 March 68. 
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and those who were free from it were offset by 
those for whom it was an obsession. These had 
their stronghold in the Loyal Orange Institution 
of Victoria. The ideal Orangeman described in 
its rules9 expressed the love for God and man whieb 
Jesus had shown in his life; the real Orangeman. was 
begotten by an inhuman theology on human intolerance. 
!heir greatest weakness, however, was their 
reputation as fomentors of sectarian strife. 10 To 
the moderately prejudiced, abhorrence of bigotry 
emphasises their moderation. To the moderately 
religious or the irreligious, the soul was not worth 
fighting about. To others proud of their new 
society, the feuds of the old were misplaced. To 
ma.DJ'" Englishmen and Scots, perhaps, the Orange 
movement was objectionable because it was Irish. 
Laelcing numbers and reputation, it depended on 
organisation and local leadership. These made it 
particularly successful on Ballarat. William 
"Bogu.s" Clarke, a Sou'thern Irish Protestant and 
9. Laws and Constitution of the Loyal Orange 
Institution of Victoria,(1878), Semm.ens Collection, 
Melbourne University Archives. 
10. Argus, 8 Feb 68; Victorian Banner, 29 April 82. 
Gxand Master during the late 'sixties, 11 a bitter 
man possessing ev ery political skill except the 
ability to compromise, lived nearby; lay preachers 
and Nonconformist miners provided his officers and 
army; the power of Catholicism in Ballarat East 
was a standing provocation. Elsewhere, however, 
10~ 
the Institution was just another minor vote; although 
its activities were complained of, none attributed 
to it great electoral power. The arrangements for 
deciding whom to support at local and parliamentary 
elections, as set out in the rules, look impressive. 
No Orangeman was to pledge his vote until the 
Grand Master had considered the fitness and chances 
of each candidate:, and obtained pledges on matters 
interesting the Institution. Lodge decisions bound 
all members. How far the rules were obeyed, 
however, is uncertain. The frequent exhortations 
of the Orange papers in the 1880s suggest that 
11. William Clarke, b. Cork, 1827. Journalist in 
Liverpool (E".agland} and Ballarat; migrated c. 1858. 
Secretary of Buninyong S.C. in late £sixties, 
until elected M.L.A. for Grenville, 1871-7. Church 
of Ireland. 
the Institution was not particularly well orga.-
nised.12 The 1883 election saw a determined al-
though hastily-organised effort, but next year 
1n5 
Grand Lodge was again considering setting up election 
machinery. 13 
Protestant clergymen, except for the few in the 
Orange movement, took little part in politics, how-
ever exercised about education, State Aid to re-
ligion and Catholicism. To most Protestants 
religion must be kept out of politics, because it 
aroused extreme bitterness, and on questions about 
which few cared. Zealots of bo,th sides early 
exploited this feeling. After the 1872 Ecducation 
Act, Protestants used it against Catholic attempts 
to obtain an education grant, while Catholics urged 
concession partly to take religion out of politics. 14 
The Catholic Church and its apologists, however, 
believed that on education and the relationship of 
Church and State, religion and politics must not be 
separated. 11'A t times, 11 as the Advocate pointed out, 
11 the trustee of a vote is obliged, on moral grounds, 
to vote in a particular way; if, from corrupt motives, 
12. Victorian Banner, 19 Nov a1, 24- Dec 81, 24 June 
82, 23 Sept 82. 
13. A:rgus, 6 Feb 83; Victorian Standard, 9 Dec 84. 
14-. V.P.D., Vol. 37, pp. 27 and 31. 
he is inclined otherwise, it is the duty of his 
pastor to warn him that it would be unrighteous. 1115 
In any other Church these views would have been 
ineffective. The position of the Catholic priest, 
however, was exceptional. For Protestants, a 
minister was a godly man selected by state or 
congregation to direct their worship and inform their 
lives. Their personality might make a few very 
influential, but, if necessary, ministers could be 
dispensed with. The Catholic priest fulfilled the 
same functions, but was also Christ's local 
representative, who exercised, under God, powers 
of granting or withholding absolution. A Protestant 
could find salvation in another church, in a sect 
founded by himself, or, in theory, without any church 
at all. For the Catholic, there was no salvation 
outside the Church; on any question which it declared 
within its province and on which it announced its firm 
decision, appalling spiritual consequences would 
follow disobedience. 16 
15. Advocate, 22 Feb 68. 
16. I am grateful to lf~ John Moloney, formerly of 
the University of the Propaganda,for correcting my 
understanding of these and other points. 
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The seeond difference was national. Bishop 
Goold, who held the see of Melbourne from 1848 to 
1886, obtained his priests from his native Ireland, 17 
where Catholicism was the religion of an oppressed 
nation and a desparate, half-savage peasantry. As 
the Irish gentry differed from their tenants in almost 
every social attribute, rarely saw them and were 
blamed by them for every misfortune, the priests, 
often peasants themselves, became the leaders of 
their villages in secular as in religious matters, 
and the universal agents of nationalism. 
The lay equivalent was the overcrowded legal 
pref ession, the impoverished intelligentsia of a 
distressed and exploited province. If the priests 
were the hands and feet of nationalism, the lawyers 
in Dublin were its brain and voice, the lawyers on 
circuit its nervous system. 18 Relatively large 
nU11bers of these had come to Victoria, to findthat, 
as in Ireland, the land was occupied by a largely 
Protestant class, small but strongly entrenched in 
the political system, while large numbers were in 
17· G. Serle, The Golden Age, p. 340. 
18. J.A. Reynolds, The Catholic Emancipation Crisis 
in Ireland, co. 3 and 4. 
great distress or fleeing the country. If this 
had appalled them in Ireland, how much more in so 
1G8 
new a...nd hopeful a country? As religion, nationalism, 
and economic and social frustration had put them on 
the side of the Irish lower classes and given them 
political experience, they soon became prominent 
among the Victorian democracy. 
In Parliament Catholics were disproportionately 
few. Up to the 1868 election, the maximum had been 
eight, in an Assembly comprising 78 members. There-
after, not even the Past Grand Master of the Protes-
tant Alliance Friendly Society could count more than 
ten in any Parliament until 1877, and 16 out of 86 un-
til 1883. 19 At that election, the number was appreci-
ably reduced. From 1856, however, the Catholics had 
provided two dominant personalities. In the old Council 
and the new Assembly John O'Shanassy was already the 
popular leader, when in 1856 Charles Gavan Duffy, for-
merly a leader of the Tenant League, editor of 11 Nation", 
a prisoner of the English and for three years a leading 
Irish M.P., arrived in Melbourne. Welcomed hys-
terically by the Victorian Irish, who, like their 
fellows in New South Wales, subscribed liberally from 
scanty funds to give him the necessary property 
qualifications, he was soon persuaded to stand for 
19. Advocate, 1 Feb 68; Victorian Banner, 19 Nov 81. 
the first Parliament, 20 the Irish stronghold of 
Villiers and Heytesbury elected him. He and 
O'Shanassy dominated the Opposition, and when the 
latter became Chief Secretary in 1857 and 1858, the 
former became Minister of Lands. After the first 
iG9 
O'Shanassy l\/Iinistry's defeat immediately on meeting 
Parliament, in a debate full of religious and racial 
prejudice, 21 Irishmen were particularly'prominent in 
the radical uproar outside. A Land Convention was 
formed, modelled on the Irish Tenant League, to face 
an unrepresentative Assembly with a representative 
one. It was led by two Irish intellectuals, 
Moses Wilson Gray and J.J. Walsh. Duffy~s later 
assertion that it began with his suggestion to 
Wilson Gray may be doubted, but he is unlikely to 
have been mistaken, that he was in contact with the 
Convention, and gave it some assistance with money 
and influence. 22 The organisation's establishment 
also owed something to an existing Irish network, 
since the organisers' initial contacts included, 
as well as the Chairman of goldfields reform meetings, 
20. For a fuller sketch of Duffy's career and 
character up to his election in 1856, see G. Serle, 
op. cit., pp. 249-51. 
21. G. Serle, op. cit., p. 262. 
22. G. Serle, pp. cit., pp. 266-95. Duffy, op. cit., 
vol. 2, pp. 193-4. 
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the local Secretaries of the Duffy Qu.alifieation-Fund. 23 
The Southern Irish minority, therefore, seemed 
to be talting over popular polities. By then, 
however, a fatal breach had been made between Du:ffy 
and O'Shanassy. Only in vanity and ambition were they 
similar. O'Shanassy was the son of a Tipperary 
peasant, an O'Connellite, increasingly conservative 
and jealous of his educated colleague, an Ulster 
Catholic who had allied with Protestants and opposed 
O'Connell, who had simply to land in Victoria to 
achieve the eminence which O'Shanassy had reached 
only after long hard work. 24 Indeed, it was very 
likely jealousy of the radical Duffy, as much as 
his recently-acquired squatting interests, which 
drove O'Sha.nassy into conservatism. !he politics 
of past and present, and the clash of personalities, 25 
led Duffy to resign from the second O'Shanassy 
Ministry just before the election. The quarrel 
dismayed and divided the Irish. Even the Church 
was involved, Bishop Goold, whose O'Connellite 
sympathies had led him to boycott Duffy's reception 
23. Duffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 193. 
24. G. Serle, op.cit., pp.15-16, 249-250, 285. 
25. Duffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 194-8. 
in 1856, supporting O'Shanassy. 26 Du:ffy, relieved 
that it had not imperilled his re-election, was 
not surprised that afterwards his committee men 
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urged reconciliation. "!o our people in Australia", 
they said, "it will be as fatal as the quarrel of 
Flood and Grattan, 1127 
The elections annihilated the Government. 
Re:filsing to join Nicholson's Government as being 
too conservative, Duffy agreed to lead the major 
part of the Opposition, the mining and Convention 
men. After Nicholson's defeat, however, O'Shanassy, 
with some few allies, held the balance. He had 
his revenge by refusing to support a radical 
government which included Du:ffy. The radicals 
aecepted his terms; Du:ffy was furious. 26 Soon, 
with a characteristic mixture of reverence for law, 
political irresponsibility and self-seeking, he 
assailed theGovernment over its use of do~btful 
administrative powers to promote land settlement, 
and helped defeat it, despite the loss of its 
conservative members. He then confirmed his isolation 
26. G. Serle, op.cit., p.340. 
27. Du:ffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 199. 
26. Duffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 211 
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by refusing to join the 11 Comrni ttee of the Opposition rt 
to which he was elected, because it included 
O'Shanassy. 29 
Bishop Quinn of Brisbane rescued him.30 
"It was not merely a question of local politics, 
he said. Irish Catholics had fair play and 
fair recognition nowhere on earth so unreservedly 
as in Australia, and if this quarrel continued 
it would divide them into two parties in 
every town and settlement on the continent." 
On the basis of Irish unity and land settlement, 
therefore, the last O'Shanassy Government was formed. 
Four ministers out of ten were Irish. In the key 
posts, O'Shanassy and Duffy were again Chief 
Secretary and Minister of Lands, while an Irish 
Protestant, Richard Ireland, was Attorney-Genera1. 31 
The Irish, and especially the Catholic predominance, 
seemed to have been re-asserted. Now, however, it. 
was in opposition to the Healesite radicals; the 
split between Duffyi tes and o•·shanassi tes might be 
healed, but it is unlikely that the poor Irish were 
happy at having to choose between an Irish Government 
29. Duffy, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 217-8. 
30. Duffy, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 218. 
31. Charles MacMahon, 1linister without Portfolio, 
was the fourth. 
and a,democratio Opposition. At first, however, 
the Government also eould be regarded as democratic, 
while Duffy's Land Aet was being put through, nor 
can the opposition have placated the Irish by 
passing against the Government a Common Schools 
Aet intended to end denominational education. 
Unfortunately for Duffy, his Act was a 
catastrophic failure. His reputation as the<only 
Victorian legislator with Wes~:minster experience 
was irretrievably ruined. On his amending Bill 
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to increase squatters• rents, resented by O'Shanassy 
and half the Cabinet, the Ministry was defeated by 
the defection of several of its conservative 
supporters.32 In coalition with the democrats, 
these formed the first McCulloch Ministry. The 
Irish ascendancy was over. 
32. Duffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 235. 
II. The McCUlloeh Ascendancy and the Catholie Vote 
(18fi3-1870). 
The 1864 election confirmed the decision of 
19! 
Parliament. Duffy; finally estranged from O'Shanassy, 
left for three years in Eu.rope. O'Shanassy•s 
following was now pitifully small. Land reform, 
and therefore, very likely, many Catholic votes, 
had been taken over by the new Government. This was 
predominantly Sects and English, with only two 
Irish.men, one a Wesleyan, 1 the other, Higinbotham, 
an anti-clerical Protestant, brought up in the 
Chureh of Ireland. 
As the tariff crisis alienated the more eon-
servative Government supporters and attracted the 
radical Opposition, its supporters in the country 
probably included an increasing number of Methodists; 
as it had defeated the Irish Government, it was 
opposed by many Catholics and supported by the 
Orangemen. 2 After the crisis, therefore, with the 
Land Act and the tariff out of the wa:y, all was 
ready for an attack on the education problem, which 
1. J.F. Sullivan, Minister of Mines, buried in the 
Wesleyan section ofthe Melbourne·General Cemetery. 
(ArS!f!, 7 Feb 76) 
2. Advocate, 1 Feb 68; Argus, 27 Jan 66. 
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entailed a clash with the Catholic Church. This -
was to IrOVide the Southern Irish, conscious ofa 
separate existenc~ and fearful of renewed discrimin-
ation, with the grievance necessary to make them, 
although divided over politics and personalities, 
a separate political force. 
Before 1862, education had been controlled by 
two state-subsidised boards, one for denominational 
and one for national schools. The National Board, 
in financial difficulties, told Haines, Treasurer 
in the last O'Shanassy Government, that it mu.st 
"' dismiss teachers unless it received more funds. 
Haines' refusal was apparently constru.ed as an attack 
on the national system by the Chief Secretary. The 
Act which Heales forced on O'Shanassy dissolvedthe 
Denominational Board, leaving its property in the 
hands of local tru.stees, and transferred the property' 
of the National Board to a new Board of Education. 
This was to administer the education vote, but was 
forbidden to help build or maintain any school not 
vested in it, and which did not meet minimum 
requirements; religious instruction was not mentioned, 
although in practice the ministers were allowed to 
teach in school buildings outside school hours. 
The denominational schools, it was hoped, would 
soon be vested in the new Board, and the du.al 
system would disappear.3 
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Protestants virtually stopped building schools; 
most were now provided by the Board, a few by 
Catholics.4 Their number, however, was inadequate. 
Denominational rivalries were now fought out inside 
the Board itself, composed of representatives of the 
five leading denominations. Many denominational 
schools continued separate from the publie system; 
scarce resources were wasted by the Board's laek of 
power to compel the amalgamation of unnecessary 
numbers of small schools.5 The system needed money 
and reorganisation; Governments struggling to balance 
budgets could not increase the education vote, even 
had the land question not been so explosive. But 
for the interest taken in education by Higinbotham, 
in fact, it is unlikely that the Commission of 1866-7 
would have been set up. !he impetus was his, and his 
6 was the final report. 
3. G.W. Rusden, History ofAustralia, {1884), 
Vol. 3, pp.556-8. J.S. Gregory, Church and State in 
Victoria, (1851-72), pp. 99-101. 
4. Gregory, op.cit., Appendix E, Part 2. 
5. Gregory, op.cit., pp.104-5. 
6. Gregory, op.cit., p. 105. 
This proposed the complete withdrawal of 
support from denominational schools; edueation 
was to be compulsory, a.ndonly non-denominational 
religious instruction was to be given in state 
schools.7 Higinbotham's power compelled the 
Government to grant his Bill every facility, but 
McCulloch's canniness prompted him to avoid making 
it a Government measure. Had he not done so, his 
19'7 
Ministry might have come to a sudden end. The second 
reading was abandoned, when defeat was clearly in-
evitable. 
Protestants were horrified at the idea of non-
denominational religious instruction, more tl\air :at the 
end of Government aid for their few schools. Catholic 
objections went deeper. All churches agreed that 
training in basic skills was not enough; right 
attitudes must also be fostered. Otherwise, the 
souls of the young would soon be in peril and their 
bodies in gaol. Without religious instruction, 
morality would collapse, the State would decay. It 
must be denominational, otherwise the right of 
parents to bring up their ehildren in their own 
faith would be infringed. Nor should it be left to 
7. Gregory, op.cit., pp. 105-7. 
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-teachers, who must inevitably introduce their own 
denominational views, if Christians, and mightbe 
deists, spiritualists or atheists. Where the 
Catholics differed was in holding that godf earing 
men could not be produced by a system which separated 
religious from secular instruction. As religion mu.st 
permeate life, so it must permeate education.8 
~o Higinbotham. and his like this strengthened 
their exasperation with priesteraft and denominationalism, 
which divided men and citizens, and which, by diverting 
all attempts to reform the education system into 
squabbles over theological trivialities, deprived 
children of skills which would help them lead usef'u.l. 
and prosperous lives, and of the mental training which 
would enable them to choose between, or reject 
altogether, the dogmas whieh the priests clamoured 
to thrust down their throats. Their main opponent, 
the Catholic Church, they regarded asihe most 
obscurantist of all. Higinbotham, kindliest and 
most generous of fanatics, had as little patience with 
his Catholic compatriots as with theUpp~r House.9 
8. Advocate, 22 Feb 68. 
9. y,P.D., Vol. 4, pp. 898-9. Duffy, op.cit., pp.292, 
301-2. 
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Meanwhile, Duffy had landed in Melbourne in 
circumstances very different from those of his 
triumphal entry into a new life ten years before. 
Whereas in 1856 he was the obvious man to lead the 
radicals and unlock the lands, these roles had now 
been assumed by Higinbotham and Grant respectively. 
Had he remained in Victoria during the constitutional 
crisis his popular sympathies might have swept him 
into McCUlloch's accommodating harbour; in Europe 
he had apparently heard only the version of Victorian 
affairs supplied to the Press by conservative sources. 
He had heard of the violence the radicals had done to 
the constitution, their backsliding from free trade, 
and the swindles perpetrated at the Lands Office 
under Grant's arbitrary, if well-intentioned rule. 
Higinbotham., chief violator of the constitution, 
soon revealed himself as the most dangerous enemy of 
the Church, Grant, having committed the venial sin 
of occupying the Lands Office for which Duffy yearned 
as his compatriots yearned for the land itself, had 
made it mortal by succeeding where Duffy had failed, 
by making his reputation where Duffy's had been lost. 
As for Grant's chief, McCulloch was to Duffy not the 
man who had fought the enemies of the people and 
drawn not back, but the wealthy s~uatter-merchant 
who had deserted the Irish Tulinistry to prevent 
Duffy from raising s~uatting rents. 10 
The Irish were still divided. O'Shanassy was 
now permanently estranged, his political power was 
destroyed utterly, and before the 1866 election he 
had left for Europe. As for the popular leaders of 
the Irish ascendancy, nAn old agitator," Duffy re-
called later, 
"assured me that this apathy over the adminis-
tration of the Land Act arose from the death 
or insolvency of most of the early agitators, 
who had been ruined by neglecting their own 
affairs. Many of them were Irishmen, and 
their zeal was abatei1since the Duffy and 0' Shanassy ~uarrel." 
In 1856, Duffy had landed, acclaimed by his 
countrymen, in a hopeful, prosperous new land, from 
a country where they were oppressed and his career 
had ended in honourable defeat; ten years older, 
he arrived ~uietly in a colony gripped by economic 
depression, where his countrymen were divided, 
powerless, facing an attack on their Church from 
the most powerful man in Victoria, and which he 
had left after a defeat which was humiliating and 
10. Advocate, 1 Feb 68; Duffy, op. cit., Vol. 2, 
pp. 285-90. 
11. Duffy, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 290-91. 
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ludicrous. 
However, he still had the loyalty of a large 
number of his co-religionists, and was the only 
politician who could hope to lead them against 
Higinbotham. O'Shanassy was still in Ireland; 
the Bishop was in Rome. The Superior of the Jesuits 
therefore consulted Duffy and together they called a 
meeting at St. Francis' Church, attended by delegates 
from all over the colony. This meeting established 
a committee to watch the Education Bill, arrange 
deputations and draw up petitions for local adoption. 12 
Much more important than the part played by the 
deputations and petitions in the defeat of Higinbotham's 
Bill was the part they played in creating the legend 
of the Catholic vote. It was already a commonplace 
that to be an Irish Catholic was useful in many 
constituencies, and in some, essential. Few 
objected to this. Soon, however, it was commonly 
alleged that the priesthood, with or without central 
instructions, and working in co-operation with 
politicians, was issuing voting instructions to 
Catholics, and enforcing compliance by the threat 
12. Argu.s, 24 May 67; Duffy, op.cit~, 
Vol. 2, P• 293. 
of spiritual penalties. To Protestants and 
secularists, especially when they believed the 
vote was being worked against them, this was a 
monstrous infringement of individual freedom. 
Preventing the proper expression of public opinion, 
it undermined representative government. Stirring 
up sectarian feeling, it poisoned political and 
social life with the irrelevant rancours of the 
old world. 
"The right of every man to be free in his 
choice of religion and politics is higher than 
any mere tissue' upon which any Ministry goes to 
the country, and priest, or minister, or Grand 
Master, or head centre, or any other person or 
thing that encroaches upon that sacred right 
should be peremptorily condemned by every man 
who values his rights and desires the welfare 
of his country. The bloody records of Ireland 
stand out in scarlet warnings against the 
introduction of theological fanaticism into 
politics." 13 
So said the Ballarat Star. 
"The priest," retorted The Advocate, 
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"loo.ks on the Supreme Being as the Author and 
Guardian of Society; he is fully persuaded that 
without sound political ideas society must speed-
ily go to ruin, and he therefore feels it his 
duty to interest himself, or, as it is said, to 
interfere, in political affairs. 11 14 
Two quite irreconcilable views of man and 
13. Ballarat Star, 28 Jan 68. 
14. Advocate, 22 Feb 68. 
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society were in conflict, and that not in the 
study, but in the heat of a violent political battle, 
reinforced by national feeling and social prejudice. 
It is hardly surprising that during the political 
excitement of the Berry ascendancy, the power of the 
Catholic vote was blamed by the vanquished; 15 this 
enabled them to claim that they had been defeated 
not by a change in public opinion, but by a 
conspiracy. The victors, sharing their views about 
the Irish and the place of religion in politics, denied 
either that they had received Irish support, or that 
they had obtained it through the influence of the 
priests and a corrupt bargain over education. Well 
might 1rTimotheus 11 liken the use made of the Catholic 
vote in political explanation to the use made of 
comets in explaining other things. 11For the 
benefit of those politicians, who must have mysteries, 
who would darkly explain the perfectly explicable, 
Providence has given the Catholic vote."16 
It is clear that Catholicism, for all the nwnbers 
of its nominal adherents, the reinforcements of 
nationalism and concentration, and the powerful 
15. Below, pp.233ff. 
16. Argus, 8 May 82. 
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organisation of the Chureh, was politically 
relatively ineffectual. It could not prevent 
the introduction of secular education in 1872, nor 
obtain state aid thereafter. Lack of potential 
voting strength was partly to blame. Although 
numerous, Catholics were only a fifth of the 
population; although sufficiently concentrated and 
united to control five or six seats and to influence 
several others, 17 they could never elect a fifth of 
the Assembly. 
Probably much less than one fifth of votes 
ease were Catholic. Of those eligible to register, 
an unusually high percentage presumably suffered from 
the relative disfranchisement of the labourer. Of 
those registered an unusually high proportion would 
have been general list electors, and therefore an 
unusually low proportion of the Irish enrolled would 
have voted. The eff eets of the registration system 
would have been less marked in the country, however, 
since Irish farmers were necessarily ratepayers. 18 
17. Under the 1859-76 distribution, Ia.lmore, 
Kyn.eton Boroughs, Dalhousie, and the second seats 
at Ballarat East and Villiers a.nl.Heytesbury; the 
1876 redistribution added Belfast. 
18. Above,pp. 13.5ff. 
It is certainly clear from election results 
that even those who voted were far from Ullited, 
and that their degree of unity varied. The effects 
of a disciplined, swinging vote of even ten percent 
would have been very obvious indeed. In con-
stituencies with heavy concentrations of Catholics 
the variety of their voting behaviour is still 
more obvious. In Ballarat East, where little more 
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than 25 percent of the total population was Catholic, 
they controlled the seat; 19 yet in the eight other 
multiple constituencies with a similar or greater 
proportion of Catholics under the 1859-1876 
distribution, there was only one safe Catholic seat; 
the contrast is all the more marked after 1876. 
The occupations followed by the Southern Irish 
also suggest that when there was a clear choice 
between radical and conservative candidates, most 
would have chosen the former, although a conservative 
Catholic would do better than a conservative 
Protestant. As the Irish leaders were outflanked 
on the left, however, radicalism and patriotism come 
into conflict. As Duffy and O'Shanassy drifted 
19. The sign of the Catholic choice in polling figures 
is a heavy majority for one candidate in the Warrenheip 
Division, which contained Bungaree. See, for example, 
Brophy's divisional totals during the February 1880 
election, when James and Russell were run by a joint 
committee of the L.O.I.V., the Reform League and the 
Education Act Defence League. Ballarat Courier, 29 
and 30 January 80, 2 and 13 February 80, 1 March 80. 
apart, a conflict of personal loyalties was added-
to the tension between Catholic liberals and 
conservatives. Indeed, without such a coincidence 
of tensions, it is difficult to see why the personal 
rift should have been regarded with such dismay. 
The separation of Duffy from the radicals mu.st 
have added to the complexity of Irish emotions. 
2he McCulloch Ministry no doubt attracted much 
democratic Irish support, especially once Duffy 
had left for Eu.rope, but once more radicalism 
conflicted with resentment against the Anglo-Scots 
Ministry which had defeated O'Shanassy and was 
supported by the Orangemen. Now with Higinbotham's 
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Education Bill, the democratic Ministry had affronted 
their religion. 
To the Catholic clergy, all other political 
issues mu.st give way to the education question. Many 
Protestant ministers agreed, but their laity clearly 
did not. The Age and the radicals claimed that this 
was also tru.e of Catholics, but tha:t:clerical pressure 
forced a large minority to support the constitutionalists 
because thes&supported denominational edueation. 20 
20. V.P.D., Vol.29, p. 1489; Age, 11 Feb 66. 
- - - - l 
"Roman Catholic", understood to be Jeremiah Dwyer, 21 
an Irish McCullochite defeated at Villiers, wrote 
a series of letters to ~he Age, giving a detailed 
and plausible account of the priesthood's activities 
during the 1868 election. 22 Dwyer had been 
fighting M'Donnell for the second seat, the other 
constitutionalist being safe for the first. He 
alleged that certain priests had canvassed for his 
opponent, heckled at his meetings, urged M'Donnell's 
return from the altar and allowed him to make a 
political speech to the congregation. One priest 
had turned several votes by informing Catholics 
that the Church was against Dwyer, and that to 
oppose it was a sin. Some, however, were not 
intimidated. One young Irishman cut short Father 
Parle's interruptions at a Dwyer meeting by quietly 
threatening to throw him out, and standing behind 
his chair for the rest of the meeting. When one 
old farmer remained adamant for Dwyer, however, his 
sons were alleged to have tied him to his bed during 
polling day so that his vote should not imperil his 
soul. 
21. Advocate, 8 Feb 68. 
22. Age, 28 Jan 68 to 8 Feb 68. 
Although the priests concerned denied the 
threat of spiritual sanctions, and interpreted 
differently some of the events to which Dwyer re-
ferred, they admitted having worked in M'Donnell's 
interest. 23 More interesting is their account of 
the attempts made by Dwyer and his father to give 
the impression that they were well regarded by the 
priests. Dwyer tried to hold a political meeting 
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in the Tower Hill churchyard, with his father giving 
translation in Erse; old Dwyer tried to be seen 
after Mass talking with Father Parle and shaking 
his hand. nr had fortunately heard of the inten-
tion ___ ,,- wrote the priest, 
and sufficiently near for my people to hear me, 
I told him candidly that I would not shake hands 
with him; that I would not show any mark of re-
cognition, as I understood my doing so would be 
used to deceive my people, and thereby secure 
their support for his son under false appearances."24 
Similar stories might be multiplied from dif-
ferent times and places. Few lacked some element of 
doubt or exaggeration, but enough were admitted to show 
23. Argus, 7 Feb 68. 
24. Advocate, 15 Feb 68. (Letter signed "J.P. n, 
clearly from the text, Fr. Parle.) 
that such behaviour was fairly common. At no time, 
however, could enough cases be found to suggest that 
it was anythirglike universal; mu.ch depended on 
the strength of the local Catholic population, the 
views of the candidates and the political zeal of the 
priest and his superiors. The Archbishop, for 
example, took little interest in electioneering, 
while Michael O'Connor, Bishop of Ballarat from the 
see•s creation in 1874, was an ardent politician and 
exhorted his priests to join in. 
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For the moment, however, it was not the priests 
who took the lead, but Duffy. After the Education 
Bill's defeat, he contested the Dalhousie by-election, 
was elected for the second safest Catholic seat in 
Victoria, and retained it easily during the general 
election which soon followed. Although brief his 
first tenure of the seat had important consequences. 
O'Shanassy returned in time to contest the election, 
but Duffy had acquired a strong lead by following 
his work in tbt~agitation against the Education Bill 
by becoming the Catholics' leading spokesman in 
Parliament; O'Shanassy would be led by nobody, 
least of all by Duffy. As Fellows had resigned 
from the Council to lead the Constitutionalists in 
the Assembly, O'Shanassy took his place in the 
Council, where experience and determination soon 
gave him the lead. 
appear later. 
The full consequences will 
2JO 
The election had strong anti-Catholic undertones. 
When a lunatic Fenian shot Prince Alfred in Sydney, 
the Government's supporters seized on it to relieve 
them of their earlier embarrassment over an affray 
at Protestant Hall in November, 25 and to imply that 
fw·all the Constitutionalists mightt say about 
Higinbotha.m's views on Downing Street, it was not 
the Government which had commerce with the seditious 
and murdering Irish. In Grenville, where one of 
the Opposition candidates, an English Protestant, was 
unfortunate enough to be called Pope, his running-
mate was a loeally well-known Presbyterian Scot. The 
leading Orangemen (including Presbyterian ministers) in 
Scarsdale, Piggoreet, Durham and Napoleon's, put it 
about that he was a Catholic, out to replace McCulloch 
with O'Shanassy; lay preachers spread the tale 
throughout the electorate; at Liston, a Northern 
Irelander declared that he had seen Montgomery 
25. Argus, 28 Nov 67. The Orange contribution to 
welcoming Prince Alfred was an illuminated sign of 
William III; some Orangemen defended it against 
catholic mockery by shooting three moekers. 
canvassing Catholic electors arm-in-arm with a 
. t 26 pries • 
Th A d t . tl t' •t• 27 e ge nose ou pEies y ac 1v1 ies; 
Dwyer's letters, its main case, appeared just after 
the first batch of elections. It produced no 
evidence, however, of priestly central direction, 
?.1' At .•
... j. 
beyond Dwyer's assertion that Father Parle had told 
his congregation that he had been instructed to oppose 
Dwyer by the Vioar-General; 28 Father Parle, who 
considering what he was prepared to admit openly, 
had no reason to lie, denied it, conceding only that 
he knew of the Vicar-General's views from the:Press. 29 
Duffy's activities were not confined to Dalhousie. 
Nor, apparently, were they entirely in favour of the 
Opposition, since he used his influence in Kilmore 
and Normanby to eject his old enemies Ireland and 
Levey, the Attorney-General and whip of the last 
O'Shanassy Government, although at Kilmore he was 
obliged to accept Larry Burke, an ignorant 
O'Shanassite farmer. As Dwyer, after his defeat 
26. Advocate, 15 Feb 68. 
27. Age, 23, 25, 27, 28 and 30 Jan 68; 
14, 17, 21, 27-9 Feb 68. 
28. Age, 28 Jan 68. 
29. Advocate, 15 Feb 68. 
at Villiers, was standing for Kilmore in the 
third batch, Duffy took the opportunity to assail 
him for his famous letters. At Richmond, a little 
later, Duffy and the priests were nm.ch in evidence 
on the side of Harcourt, a prominent Wesleyan but 
a denominationalist.30 
?. • 0 
... l" 
Just before the third batch voted, according to 
a letter to The Age31 Du.ffy addressed Habout 150 low 
Hibernians", apparently electors of North Melbourne, 
pointing out that the Ministry was supported by the 
Orangemen and blaming the Protestant Hall shootings 
upon the feelings aroused by Higinbotham. and Dr. 
Cairns, the keeper of McCUlloch's conscience at 
Scots Chureh. Several priests and laymen spoke 
in support, Father England of North Melbourne pointing 
out"that it would be the worse for them if they did 
not consult him before voting." Duffy denied the 
construction put upon some of his words but tacitly 
accepted the general account. 32 He is also known 
to have had electoral dealings with Father England 
in 1877, and to have made a practice of using 
whatever electoral influence he possessed in the 
30. Age, 25 Jan 68, 21 Feb 68; Geelong Advertiser 
20 Feb 68. 
31. Age, 12 Feb G8. 
32. Age, 18 Feb 68. 
interest of his friends; 33 he is therefore likely 
to have made the most of that influence in 1868, 
when he identified McCulloch with the squatters and 
Higinbotham with anti-Catholicism. 
2.13 
Of eighteen Constitutionalists elected seven 
were Catholics. 34 The exploitation of prejudice con-
tinued. Just before St. Patrick's :Day, placards ap-
peared all over Melbourne, inviting Irishmen to a 
11Fenian Funeral" in memory of those lately executed 
by the English. The Government called out the police 
and the military on the day, but otherwise nothing 
unusual happened.35 Nobody ever demonstrated who was 
behind the hoax, but :Duffy was probably right that it 
was the work of his squatting opponents.36 The 
posters had been put up by one Eugene :Ducrow, lately 
a house-servant of Ettershank, a leading political 
squatter, when the succession to McCulloch had not 
33. Age, 16 May 77; Pearson Papers. :Duffy to Pearson, 
12 March 77. 
34. :Duffy, 0 1 Grady, Bourke, M'Kenna, Walsh, ffanna, 
M':Donnell. 
35. Advocate, 4 April 68. 
36. Duffy, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 298-99. 
-been settled, but Duf'fy, than whom there was nobody 
the squatters more feared and detested,37 was a 
likely candidate for a Ministry, perhaps the 
Chief Secretaryship. 
Once the Sladen Ministry had been formed, 
close-fought ministerial elections were certain, 
and another dissolution was possible; moreover, 
although Duffy had been excluded from the Government, 
the number of safe Constitutionalist seats was so 
small that Sladen had included O'Grady of South 
Bourke and M'Donnell and Bayles, both of Villiers. 
Gillies, the Minister of Lands, was contesting that 
fruitful Orangery Ballarat West, against C.E. Jones, 
the Orange representative and a muckraker of genius. 
Jones• speeches were full of anti-Catholic asides 
2 'A l:r 
and innuendoes; a series of pamphlets in Welsh, and 
a swarm of local preachers, swore the Presbyterian 
Gillies a papist.38 In South Bourke, Crews, another 
Orangeman, stood against O'Grady, who was placarded 
as a secret Fenian leader.39 Like Jones, Crews 
37. Black Papers, Niel Black to Gladstone, 24 Aug 67. 
38. Ballarat Star, 19 May 68 (Jones' speech, and 
correspondence); Advocate, 30 May 68. 
39. Ballarat Star, 28 May 68 (Citing Herald) 
was victorious. During the rest of the Ministry's 
brief career, Jones and the Orangemen in particular 
lost no opportunity of making loud and, apparently, 
u.n.founded accusations that Gillies and O'Grady were 
favouring Catholics unduly in the administration 
of their Departments.40 
After McCulloch's return to office the ery had 
served its turn; with the increasing isolation of 
Higinbotham, and a Chief Secretary who had a quiet 
way with sleeping dogs, the education question 
dropped out of sight. Duffy had now moved away 
from the Constitutionalists because of the 
unconstitutionality of Sladen's retaining office 
against a hostile majority.41 He remained opposed 
to McCUlloch, however, particularly over his Land 
Bill, and was therefore able to move closer to 
the new radical opposition, with which his sympathies 
lay on practically everything except education. 
When McCulloch had made the appointments which 
led to his defeat in 1869, therefore, Duffy was in 
a position to benefit. He helped Byrne frame 
his motion of no confidence; Byrne then sought 
40. Advocate, 13 and 27 June 68. 
41. Duffy, op.cit., Vol.2, p. 297. Duffy is 
citing his diary; one also suspects personal and 
sectional pique at being omitted from the Ministry. 
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his help in forming the new Government, and asked 
him to be Chief Secretary, but as a working majority 
was possible only if concessions were made to the 
McCullochites, it was agreed that the Ministry should 
be made up from the rebels only. The price of 
Duffy's support for a Government led by a squatter 
was that the ten year renewal of the squatting 
tenure which McCUlloch's Land Bill proposed and 
which many radicals and Duffy himself had opposed, 
should be deleted. Five Ministers, according to 
Duffy, guaranteed this; two were defeated at the 
ministerial elections, two broke their words. 42 
When the vote ~·no confidence in Macpherson was 
moved on March 1870, the abstentions of Duffy and 
all the Constitutionalist Catholics except Larry 
~ke, the O'Shanassite, and Hanna, the semi-
independent, felled the Government. Having attacked 
McCulloch from the start, broken with the 
Constitutionalists, and now helped destroy a 
Government which marked the re-emergence of the 
radicals from the McCullochite fold, Duffy had again 
isolated himself from all but his handful of Catholics. 
42. Duffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 300-303. 
2il 
III. ~he Education Act and After (1870-1875) 
Throughout 1870, as McCulloch replaced Macpherson 
and sat out the Parliament, the education question 
might be heard ticking, but it was not due to explode 
yet. Under Macpherson, Higinbotham's demand for 
secular education, in the Debate on the Address, had 
been defeated easily. 1 MeCulloch's address at the 
ministerial elections2 alluded to the question in 
terms which, like many of his statements, gave hope 
to either side but anxiety to neither. Bishop 
Goold's lenten pastoral for 1870 hardly mentioned 
the subject. When he returned from Rome at the end 
ofJanuary 1871, however, the welcoming address and 
his reply were a call to arms.3 McCulloch had made 
a secular Education Bill his main election plank. 
It is not strange therefore to find some 
allusions to local Catholic activity at the elections; 
it is strange to find so few. Least of all is there 
any sign of a centrally directed campaign. Having 
1. V.P.D., Vol. 10, P• 73. 
2. Argas, 12 April 70; Advocate, 16 April 70. 
3. Advocate, 5 March 70; 28 Jan 71. 
called for vigorous opposition to the Bill, Goold, 
as usual, took no further part in politics. The 
Advocate called half-heartedly for organisation, 
in alliance with Protestant denominationalists, but 
nothing seems to have been done. 4 Very likely, as 
Gaunson said, 5 Duffy was obliged to work quietly, 
for fear of a sectarian cry, "Which will ye have? 
McCulloch or Duffy?" Electors then, as now, were 
not greatly concerned with education and as there 
was nothing like the former Fenian scare against 
the Catholics, McCulloch needed to discover some 
kind of Catholic plot to make education a vital 
issue. The Catholics had only to lie low. It is 
also likely that they did not feel their education 
system to be in danger, since the election did not 
conglomerate sound education, but disintegr,atea 
into a series of half-hearted dog-fights over a 
variety of issues, mirroring the disintegration of 
parties in Parliament. 
McCUlloch retained power for a time, in an 
2tB 
amorphous Assembly. Duffy, still isolated, thought 
of the Speakership. From that political sterilisation 
4. Advocate, 25 Feb 71. 
5. Ararat Advertiser, 28 Feb 71. 
he was saved for a season by a riding accident. 6 -
Then a political accident thrust the Premiership 
upon him. Now the radicals had shelved their 
zeal for education, and, since they adhered to 
their demand that the revenue deficit should be 
met entirely by increased duties, now that Duffy 
had the authority of Mill, Bright and Carlyle to 
abandon free trade7 and follow his radical heart, 
he revived the former unity of his two peoples, the 
Southern Irish and the radicals. 
Seeing the :future in a bright glow, he mistook 
the final sunset of his career for its second dawn, 
and proclaimed a.vision of Victoria as the Garden of 
the Hesperides, to be realised by the great party 
he imagined he l·ed. 8 Seeing from the Upper House 
2i9 
the enemy whom he had helped to raise standing higher 
than he, O'Shanassy was possessed by a blind jealousy, 
and determined to use his ascendancy in the Council 
to break Duffy's projects one by one. Seeing 
Duffy and Grant at the head of affairs, 9 the 
6. Advocate, 29 April 71. 
7. Duffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 317-20. 
8. Argus, 27 June 71. 
9. Black Papers, Niel Black to Gladstone, 4 Aug 71; 
Advocate, 1 Aug 71 (citing Kyn.eton Guardian) 
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thiek-sku.lled aristocracy of Victoria lent O'Shanassy 
itS aid. 
By his success in p:i.ssing the new tariff, and 
his failure to pass anything else or effectively to 
lead the Assembly, Duffy gradually lost his 
parliamentary following. ~hrough the alliance of 
the McCullochite rump with the Constitutionalists, he 
speedily lost office. As his triumphal tour during 
the reeess had suggested that his support had grown 
in the country while it diminished in the Assembly, 
they determined to use Duffy the papist to deface 
the image of Thxffy the radical. Nor was this entirely 
a cynical exploitation of popular irejudice: many of 
his opponents had a genuine zeal for education, and 
probably most of them shared the J;rejudice they sought 
to exploit. 
The first motion of no confidence was moved on 
the grounds that the Governor's Speech ignored 
education; when it failed by two votes, a seeond 
declared that Duffy had shown undue partiality to 
friends and fellow countrymen in the use of patronage. 
This was passed by five.::votes; one of those who 
defected, Thomas Bent, later became the patronage 
manipulator for Sir Bryan O'Loghlen, Thxffy's 
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successor as leader of the radical Irish. .Another 
was Larry Bcurke, betraying his Church and his nation 
at the behest ofJohn O'Shanassy. 10 
It is unlikely that O'Shanassy forsaw the 
consequences. Previous Parliaments ~ad disagreed 
on education for ten years; this had rejected the 
Chief Secretary who had sought to win an election 
on it, and easily defeated Casey's:motion to deny 
aid to new denominational schools. 11 ~he 
Constitutionalists and many of the new ML.As, on 
whom Francis depended, opposed secular education; 
denominationalists were still stronger in the 
Upper House. If the Ministry produced its 
promised Education Bill, there was reason to hope 
that the Church would not suffer, might even benefit; 
the Attorney-General, who was to introduce the Bill, 
announced himself willing to consider subsidising 
denominational schools. 12 Further reassurance 
came from the Du:ffyites, who alleged that Francis 
and Langton, representing the conservative rich, 
10. Such, at least, was Duffy's belief; Duffy, 
op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 340. 
and 435. 
V.P.D., Vol. 14, pp.252 
11. V.P.D., Vol. 13, p.1369. 
12. Argu.s, 24 June 72. 
cared more for office than education, and were as 
divided on this as all previous governments. 13 
222. 
The elections promised to be close. So slender 
had been Francis' majority that the defeat of a 
couple of ministers would have toppled the Ministry; 
so encouraging had been the demonstrations of 
popular support14 for Duffy that it seemed possible. 
If the Ministry could be defeated, there was ever,; 
chance of obtaining the elections which Duffy had 
been denied, and which he seemed likely to win. 
Then Goold issued a pastoral admonition, saying 
"He who commits himself by his vote to such a scheme 
(of secular education) places himself at once in 
opposition to the Church and eonscienee." 15 
~here was an immediate outcry against "endeavouring 
to control the hustings from the altar". 16 
~ad Goold been a political bishop he would have 
expected this; being a quiet, industrious priest 
he had laid himself open to denunciation as a 
13. Y.P.D., Vol. 14, pp. 38-9, 46-7. 
14. Above, p. 42. 
15. Arga.s, 24 June 72. 
16. Argu.s, 26 June 72. 
scheming prelate. Expecting a close game, the -
Government, supported by the Orangemen, 17 played 
it hard. Duffy lost the elections, his chance 
of defeating the Government, his leadership of the 
radicals, and the hope of realising his visions. 
Worst of all, no two individuals were so much to 
blame as the leading Catholic layman and the head 
of the Catholic Church in Vietoria. 
O'Shanassy incurred the priee for his rancour, 
the Bishop for his error, and the Catholics of 
Victoria were shortly obliged to meet the bill. 
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!he 1872 Education Act, for all the Attorney-General's 
election speech, denied all assistance to new 
denominational schools. 'fhe subsidy to existing 
ones was to cease on New Year's Day 1874, except 
when there was no State school, in which case the 
Minister might continue the subsidy until there 
r . 18 
was, but not beyond January 1878. The 
Constitutionalists in the Assembly had abandoned 
denominational education; The Council, fearing 
Duffy and scorning the Irish, followed their 
lead, and notO'Shanassy's. So Victoria began 
to construct one of the essentials of mcdern life 
17. Argu.s, 21 June 72. 
18. V.P.D., Vol. 15, pp. 1343 ff. 
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-
and social justice, founded upon :W.ealism, prudent 
statementship, political necessity, bigotry and 
racial prejudice, an egalitarian system effectively 
denying the equality of one fifth of the population. 
Not for three years, however, was there any 
determined Catholic attempt to altar the new system. 
While the Bill was before Parliament, the Church 
organised petitions and deputations; 19 seemingly 
adequate in 1867, they were now ineffectual. Not 
that the secularists were much more active: 
Education Leagu.es, with strong Orange connections, 
appeared in some radical centres, but apart from a 
few public meetings, petitions, deputations and 
pamphlets they did little, and soon disappeared. 20 
Apart from occasional local rumblings, the education 
question then slept quietly through three years and 
a general election. 
Whether the Church had hoped to def eat the 
Bill in tl:EAssembly is not certain. In the second 
reading, once Duffy had declared their objections21 
19. V.P.D., Vol. 15, P• 1469. 
20. Argu.s, 19 and 27 July 72, 5, 9 and 24 Aug 72, 
17 and 27 Sept 72. 
21. V.P.D., Vol. 15, pp. 1471-7 
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the Catholics took little part. At the start of 
the committee stage, Duffy briefly stated22 that the 
second reading majority made amendments pointless. 
According to The Age, the clergy had held a meeting 
with its MLA.s just after the second reading which so 
decided because the Bill's nature was so pitchy that 
nothing but defilement could come from further 
contact. 23 In the Upper House, O'Shanassy's 
determined attack was unsuccessful. Clearly, 
amendment was impossible during that Parliament. 
For three years, the Coalition's majority 
remained unshakeable; even after the revolt over the 
1874 Reform Bill, and the retirement of the leaders, 
the party insisted on the Government's reconstruction 
and retention of office. Meanwhile, the Catholics 
had lost their spokesman. Powerless, Duffy had 
left for Europe before the general election. 24 
O'Shanassy, now able to enter the Assembly without 
indignity, tried to persuade his faithful Larry 
Burke t.o relinquish Kilmer e. His refusal did not 
22. V.P.D., Vol. 15, p. 1776. 
23. ~' 17 Oct 72. 
24. In Ireland, too, he now found himself politically out 
of place, and declined strong offers to support him for 
Parliament. Duffy, op.cit., pp. 347-351, 359-60. 
prevent O'Shan.assy's candidature. Duffy's 
vengeful supporters ran one of their number, 
Thomas Hunt, and lost no chance to inform local 
farmers of O'Shanassy•s lawsuit against a family 
of selectors he had tried to keep off one of his 
Riverina stations. 25 H1lllt was elected, 
O'Shanassy defeated, by the one constituency with 
an Irish majority. As for the clergy, the 
continuation of State aid allow ed them to bide 
their time. Goold, busily extending the Catholic 
education system, showed no interest in political 
agitation. The clergy may also have shared the 
view which O'Shanassy condemned in 1877, 26 that if 
the State system were let alone, its cost and other 
defects would discredit it. He seems, however, to 
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have been referring to laymen, about whose attitudes 
much of:the argument hinged between 1877 and 1881. 
Berry's Minister of Education pointed out 
during the 1877 Education debate27 that if Catholic 
25. Argu.s, 16 July 74 (O'Shanassy's speech); 
Duffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 340. 
26. V.P.D., Vol. 26, p. 1093. 
27. Ibid., P• 1094. 
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children were one fifth of those of school age, they 
numbered 65,000, of whom only 13,500 attended 
Catholic schools. This demonstrated that the 
Church could not maintain its schools and the 
laity did not Bl.pport them; it therefore suggested 
that when all grants to denominational schools 
ceased at the end of 1877, practically all Catholic 
children would enter State schools and the clerical 
agi ta ti on wouldtdisappear. As for the 18, 626 who 
signed 53 Catholic petitions before the House, 28 
it was clear that considering how well-organised 
the Church was and how:mfluential the priests were, 
very few Catholics cared about denominational 
education. As in all other churches only priests 
and fanatics really wanted it; only the hold of 
priestcraft made that Church appear exceptional. 
O'Shanassy and John Gavan Duffy replied that 
although some eight or ten thousand Catholic children29-
no more - attended State schools in country areas 
where no Catholic schools was available, the Church's 
expanding system should soon absorb all its children. 
28. Ibid., p. 1087. 
29. Ibid., P• 1229. 
New Catholic schools reduced attendances at . 
State schools, sometimes so drastically that the 
latter closed. The Catholic system would not 
collapse if deprived of State assistance, but 
justice demanded that those whose consciences 
forbade them to use the State system should have 
part of their taxes devoted to their system of 
education. 30 
On at least one point the anti-clericals were 
wrong: the Catholic system survived and expanded. 
Whether they were right that it wouJd'not have done 
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so but for the priests, is pointless to inquire; the 
priests existed, and large numbers of Catholics 
followed them. It is incredible that so many should 
have done so unwillingly, and under spiritual 
coercion, without this becominguobvious. A 
priesthood which has to use such means to get its 
way has clearly lost its authority, which was not 
the case in Victoria. The Church contained many 
ttbad Catholics", some in high places, like Casey, a 
Cabinet Minister in 1872. No attempt to coerce 
such men was made, and they would readily have 
30. Ibid.,pp. 1105 ff. 
publicised attempts to coerce others. Not even 
The Age could find more than the occasional doubtful 
case. 
Probably most Irish, like the poor and ignorant 
of whatever religion, cared little for education 
at whoever's hands, and resented its being 
compulsory. Nor are they likely to have weighed 
well the arguments on either side. If their 
priests and lay leaders, respected men who knew 
about education, said the State system should be 
boycotted, what more natural than for all but 
nominal Catholics to obey wherever possible? 
Even if they doubted the priests' case, or could 
not afford the fees at Church schools, one thing 
was plain: their nation and its religion were one~ 
more under attack. 
It does not follow, however, that all Catholics 
who opposed the Act would vote as the Church 
directed. Rarely was there a clear choice between 
a candidateor party supporting their case and 
one opposing it; although there was some disagreement 
in all parties, none dared promise redress. The 
most politic way for a Catholic to vote in the 
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interest of his Church.was therefore something 
over which there could be a legitimate difference 
of opinion with the priest; at Creswick in 1880 
lay pressure actually forced the priests to switch 
support from the Radical to the Corner candidates.31 
Any attempt to exert spiritual pressure was therefore 
likely to be resisted by Catholics, as well as 
incensing Protestants. 
During 1875, the situation suddenly changed. 
The next five years saw a determined effort to 
ob~ain redress, and by 1880 the Catholics vote 
was one of the most frequently discussed of all 
political forces. 
31. v. and P. (L.A.) Session 1880-81, Vol. 2, 
C. 19; Evidence of William Cahill, p. 17. 
IT. The Campaign of 1875-80. 
In December 1874, Goold returned from another 
stay in Europe. Since his last visit, anti-
clericalism had not abated in Italy, but had taken 
control in the France of the radical republic and 
the Germany of the Kulturkampf. The world-wide 
Church was engaged in a world-wide struggle. With 
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him, Goold, now Archbishop, had brought bishops from 
Ireland for the two new dioceses of Sandhurst and 
Ballarat. In Michael O'Connor, destined for the 
latter, the Church obtained at last a vigorous 
politician in high clerical office. 
In February, the clergy began their attack. 
Dean Slattery preached a fiery political sermon at 
Geelong. 1 O'Connor's first pastoral2 called on his 
diocese to organise for political action. Goold 
busied himself with teacher training, and a 
subscription drive was begun in Melbourne; some 
suburban schools were soon able to abolish fees, and 
rapidly to increase their intake of pupils.3 Later 
in the month The Argu,~ reported that an agitation 
1. ~' 16 Feb 75. 
2. Age, 17 Feb 75. 
3. A5e, 28 Jan 75, 16 Feb 75. 
was beiEg prepared, and great efforts were being 
made to withdraw Catholic children from State. 
schools. 4 
Electoral action soon followed. In the April 
by-election for the Southwest Province, Belcher, 
a Protestant denominationalist, a friend of 
O'Shanassy and well-regarded by Slattery, 5 owed 
victory at least partly to the Catholic vote. 6 
O'Connor told his congregation the following Sun-
day, 
"---every seat in future will be contested by 
the Church in favour of a change in the Edu-
cation Act. Every Catholic has to get on the 
roll, and an organisation would be formed 
throughout the colony to achieve the object 
of the Church---" 7 
The following month he could claim another success8 
when Catholic votes helped Graunson win the Ararat by-
election. As usual, increased Catholic activity pro-
voked a Protestant reaction. In Ballarat, an Education 
Leagae was set up, spreading rapidly in the vicinity 
4. Argus, 24 Feb 75. 
5. Djarv of G.F. Belcher, Victoria State Library, 
Private Uollection; 28 October 73, 2 December 73. 
6. Belcher, Diarv, 11 August 75. And see the 
Warrenheip polLing·' figures, Argus, 10 April 75. 
7. Argus, 13 April 75. 
8. Argus, 20 April 75, 20 May 75. 
to Ararat and Sandhu.rst.9 The new Liberal League 
in Geelong put defence of the Act at the head of 
. t 10 i s programme. In Goold's area things were differ-
ent. He let the Catholic Education Committee call a 
meeting of delegates from all parts of the arch-
diocese, which adopted a petition calling for payment 
by results to Catholic schools to be put on the 
Estimates. He left the lead to laymen, however, and 
stayed outside the meeting until the petition had 
been adopted. Lay and clerical speakers emphasised 
that the movement was begun by laymen. When Goold 
did enter the room, he said frankly that he expected 
the petition to achieve nothing. 11 
Within a month, however, the political situ-
ation had changed. On August 7tt Berry replaced 
Kerferd. Although the Ministry was largely 
secularist, and the Minister of Education, Munro, 
was an Orangeman, 12 Berry himself had been Duffy's 
9. Argus, 24 April 75; 6, 7 and 31 May 75; 
9, 10 and 22 June 75; 13 and 20 July 75. 
10. Age, 18 May 75. 
11. Age, 9 July 75. 
12. James Munro (1832- 1908). B. Scotland. Arrived 
Victoria 1858, continuing trade of printer, until 
formed Victoria Permanent Building Society, 1865. 
Manufacturing and mining interests in '70s, banking 
in '80s. Presbyterian; temperance advocate. 
M.L.A. 1874. Premier 1890-92. 
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Treasurer and had opposed the second reading of the 
Education Act, whose authors were now in Opposition. 
His Government left education on an open question. 13 
Perhaps because his hopes were rising, O'Connor, 
after some months of inactivity, suddenly held a 
large public meeting at Ballarat, addressed by 
O'Grady and John Duffy, two of Berry's supporters 
and the organisers of the Melbourne petition. 
The Ballarat Catholic Education Committee now 
decided to set up a standing organisation, with 
Committees throughout the diocese, to agitate for 
a Government grant and collect subscriptions for 
Catholic schools. 14 
Any hopes were soon deceived. Berry's 
Government fell in mid-Oc~ober, and the men of 
1872 returned to power, led by the patron of the 
1870 Education Bill. Not until Berry's electoral 
triumph in 1877 could the Catholics hope for 
concessions. It was then alleged by The Argµs 15 
that one reason for the landslide was the Catholic 
vote. The radical legend of 1868 was now furthered 
13. Argus, 10 Feb 76. 
14. Argus, 21 and23 Sept 75; 6 Oct 75. 
15 • .A):gus,, io.-19 I\1Iay .1877, produced a number of such 
allegations. 
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by their opponents. By 1880, it was alleged that 
the Catholic vote had much to do with Berry's defeat 
in February and Service's in July, and that 
O'Shanassy and the clergy intended to fell every 
Government unti 1 the Church had its way. Some 
general doubts about the cohesion of this vote have 
been expressed already; it remains to consider its 
behaviour and nature during 1877-80. 
Berry~;relationship with the Church during the 
last McCulloch Ministry was not close. Shortly 
after his defeat, apparently seeking Higinbotham 
support, he announced his adhesion to the Act, and 
denied any compact with the Catholics. The AdvciJ(late 
turned against him. During his stonewall for a 
dissolution, an Argus correspondent alleged, Catholic 
"wire-pullers" were inciting their countrymen to 
support his demand, while priests urged Catholics 
to register, and set up committees everywhere. 16 
However, as Catholic electoral preparations had began 
well before Kerferd resigned, and as the Melbourne 
radicals always included a number of Catholics, 
this looks like nothing more than Argu.s propaganda. 
16. Argu.s, 10 and 26 Feb 76. 
No doubt Slattery supported Berry's man at 
Warrnambool against McCulloch in the Ministerial 
elections; 17 but as The Argus itself reported the 
Catholic vote in the Ballarat West election went 
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to Joseph Jones, the Minister of Railways and a Welsh 
denominationalist, the successful Berryite candidate 
being a leader of the local Education Leagu.e. 18 
During the next by-election, at Geelong, Slattery 
told the congregation to support Hoare, the 
McCullochite, because he was a Catholic and supported 
the cause. 19 In January, Jones was handsomely re-elected 
at Villiers, the Kordit polling figures suggest that 
the Catholic vote went to his opponent, O'Shanassy. 20 
Up to the 1877 election campaign, therefore, 
Catholic votes were apparently still going to 
candidates, not parties. During the el~ction, 
there was no Catholic organisation and no centrally 
directed campaign. The :few:'.l:eferences to Catholic 
17. Argus, 10 Feb 76. 
18. Argu.s, 26 Oct 75; G.R. Fincham., President, 
V.E.L., Argu.s, 24 April 75. 
19. Age, 28 March 76. 
20. Daily Telegraph, 28 Jan 76. Villiers was not 
safe for the Catholics in a by-election for one seat; 
O'Shanassy may also have met some Duffyite opposition, 
since that had been Duffy's first constituency. 
activity concern only the efforts of O'Connor 
and his Dean to ensure O'Shanassy's election for 
the new safe Catholic seat of Belfast. The 
Advocate's sympathies lay with the Opposition 
Corner. The Bishops' lenten pastorals gave 
education surprisingly little space: their only 
mention of politics came in O'Connor's brief 
exhortation to bombard the new legislature with 
petitions. After the election, The Advocate 
actually complained2df the lack of Catholic 
organisation. 
Nor is there any sign of alliance between 
Berry's organisation or party and the Catholics. 
Of Berryite M.L.A.'s, only Brophy, Dwyer and 
J.T. Smith supported the Church's claims. 22 
Smith who virtually owned one of the seats for 
West Bourke, had always been a denominationalist, 
and the other two were Catholics elected for 
Catholic strongholds. Brophy, in fact, was 
elected against an official radical candidate. 23 
21. Hamilton Spectator, 22 Feb 77; Advocate, 
17 and 24 Feb 77, 2 June 77. 
22. Ararat Advertiser, 8 Oct 780 
23. Ballarat Courier, 12 April 77. 
23f 
For the N.R.P.L. to have made an alliance would 
have been impossible, since, as The Advocate 
had previously pointed out, 24 maintenance of the 
Act was one of its aims, and its leadership was 
largely secularist. The Advocate agreed, 25 
however, that Catholics generally had opposed 
McCulloch. This is intrinsically likely, since 
Catholics generally were of low status, and since 
it meant a vote against the party of the Act. 
After the election, Du.ffy, who had begun the 
postscript to his political life by being re-
elected for North Gippsland in 1876, became 
Speaker. McCulloch had offered his support, 
doubtless to reduce the power of his opponents; 
when Berry offered Duffy the pick of offices except 
the highest, he said he preferred the Chair to being 
second after having been first. Berry gladly 
agreed. 26 O'Shanassy therefore became once more 
the lay ieader of Catholicism, and led its attempt 
24. Advocate, 14 April 77. 
25. Advocate, 2 June 77. 
26. j.)u.ffy, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 371. 
to seize the last chance of'continuing State aid 
beyond January 1878. Petitions poured in. 
The Vicar-General of Ballarat wrote to country 
1\11' -L A ' 27 1 . f th t. t. d m. • • s enc osing a copy o e pe i ion, an 
stating that the Catholics who had supported them 
now expected their support during the Estimates 
debate. When O'Shanassy introduced the petitions, 
however, it was made clear that Catholics had 
nothing to hope from either side. 28 O'Shanassy 
might manoeuvre, O'Connor try to organise votes; 
profited nothing. 
During the constitutional crisis O'Shanassy 
supported the Council. At the West Melbourne 
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by-elections he used his influence among his 
fellow-countrymen in favour of Francis, one of the 
fathers of the Act, against his co-religionist 
O'Loghlen. 29 The result demonstrated that O'Shanassy 
could not;command the allegiance of the urban Irish. 30 
27. Argu.s, 13 Sept 77. 
28. V.P.D., Vol 26, pp. 1094-1101 and pp. 1101-5. 
(Major Smith, Minister of Education, and Ramsay, 
Opposition spokesman on education.) 
29. V.P.D., Vol. 29, pp. 2001-3. 
30. Arga.s, 5 Feb 78. 
Nor did he succeed in his attempt to gain 
advantages for his Church from his political 
actions. Although he reached some sort o:f 
understanding with an of:ficial o:f the National 
Registration Society, this was denounced by 
James Service,31 a bitter anti-clerical and now 
leader of the Opposition. 
At the same time, O'Shanassy had diminished 
his chances o:f concessions :from the Government. 
When he introduced a Bill to amend the Education 
Act in September 1878, the Government accused him 
o:f introducing it during the Re:form Bill debates 
simply to embarrass them. Major Smith said 
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outright that "---no political party which attempts 
to touch the foundations Education Act can expect 
to live long afterwards",32 The other side was no 
less adamant; Service in a remark long to be 
recalled against him stigmatised the Catholic 
grievance as n ___ not,,a question of conscience, 
but a q_uestion of cash, and of cash only.tt33 
31. V.P.D., Vol. 33, P• 190. 
32. V.P.D., Vol. 29, Po 1490 
33. Ibid., p. 1966. 
The Bill, postponed daily and given virtually 
no time by the Government, failed to reach a 
division on the second reading. 
For the following six months, the Catholics 
were as quiet as an:y other political group, while 
Berry was in England and Parliament in recess. 
F.br the rest of the yea:r they prepa:red for the 
general election. When it came, a constitutionalist 
supporter sent a telegram. to the Opposition's Central 
committee, 34 asking if the Archbishop was on their 
, side. nGod knows", was the reply, "we don•t. 11 
The evidence suggests, in fact, that the Catholic 
vote did not go uniformly to either side. At 
Geelong the local Catholic Association voted to 
support the three Constitutionalists; Andrews, 
the most popular of these ran Berry a.close second. 35 
At West Bourke,36 the Catholics helped win both 
seats for the Constitutionalists. On the other 
hand, Service was faced with Catholic opposition 
at Maldon. 37 The two heads of the Corner, Munro 
34. Mount Alexander Mail, 4 March 80. 
35. Age, 8 and 9 Ma:rch 80. 
36. A. Deakin, The Crisis in Victorian Politics, p. 54. 
37. Argu.s, 3 March 80. 
and Casey, were both opposed by the Catholics, 
presumably because they had put maintenance of the 
Education Act second only to reform in their 
. t• • 38 organisa ion s programme. How far this was 
responsible for Munro's unexpected defeat is not 
known, but the local priest, The Age and The Argus 
all agreed that Catholic opposition had been a 
major cause of Casey's defeat.39 In East 
Melbourne, the Catholic Association selected one 
from either side; at Ararat, it supported the 
Radical Mayor, Tobin; in both cases, the Radicals 
selected were Catholics.40 
It seems, therefore, that O'Connor was right 
and the Catholic Education Defence Association, a 
series of unconnected branches, which he had 
begun in 1879 mostly in his diocese but also in 
Melbourne, had no party affiliations.41 The 
meeting which founded branches to cover East and 
West Melbourne and Carlton believed this, 
38. Argu.s, 1 Jan 80. 
39. Age, 1 March 80, Argu.s, 3 March 80, Mount 
Alexander Mail, 16 March 80. 
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40. Argu.s, 21 Feb 80; Ararat Advertiser, 27 Feb 80. 
41. Argu.s, 21 July 79. 
determining to pledge candidates on the education 
Question and to ignore all other issues, electing 
men who would support Sir John 0' Shanassy, ''the 
great champion of the faith", in his efforts to 
obtain redress of their grievances. 42 As 
O'Shanassy was now opposed to Berry, this may, of 
course, have meant that the general tendency was 
against the Radical Party. Certainly some 
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Catholics believed that Berry had owed them something 
for their support in 1877, and now wanted their 
revenge upon them.43 
Both O'Shanassy and O'Connor claimed that the 
Catholic vote had felled the Governmmt; O'Connor 
threatened that it would go on felling Governments 
until justice was ~btained. 44 When Service was 
beaten in July, their claims became more credible; 
for once, all leaders were unanimous that the 
Catholic vote had gone to Berry. Service alleged 
that he had counted on a majority of seven to nine, 
assuming Catholic support; Berry claimed that he 
42. Argus, 22 July 79. 
43. Ibid. 
44. V.P.D., Vol. 37, P• 25; Age, 17 March 80. 
At Ballarat East, Brophy received the Catholic 
vote as he had done since 1877. In Villiers 
and Heytesbury, the safe Protestant conservative 
seat was retained by William Anderson with virtually 
the same number of votes as in February; Joseph 
Jones, who on that occasion had defeated the un-
popular Melbourne Catholic Jeremiah Dwyer by 90 
votes, now lost to Jam.es Toohey, a popular local 
Catholic, by 18. 48 
In the few seats which Service lost, the mar-
gins were generally so small in relation to the 
total of votes cast that any number of factors might 
be blamed. 49 Only at Geelong, where Service lost 
three seats altogether, is it certain that Catholics 
changed sides. There is no reason, however, to 
sup1Jose that anything more than local influences 
were at work. In West Bourke, Cameron, Deakin's 
running-mate of February, was replaced by O'Loghlen, 
48. Polling figures for 1877-80 appeared on 12 May 
77, 29 February 80, and 24 July 80, and for a few days 
afterwards. 
49. As all are multiple constituencies, the first 
figures in each case show the number of votes by 
which the highest Constitutionalist was defeated. 
Figures in brackets indicate the sum of the highest 
votes on each side. Villiers, 18 (2,735); Fitzroy, 50 
(2,691); Richmond, 57 (4,479); West Bourke, 101 (3,648); 
Geelong, 136 (3,106); Mandurang, 246 (5,450). 
who probably attracted many Catholic votes.50 
In Geelong where the only surviving Catholic 
Association was kept alive by Slattery, comparison 
of the voting figures for February and the Augu.st 
ministerial election, when the Association is 
known to have opposed Berry,51 with the figures 
for July, when he is believed to have had its 
support, suggests that Slattery could control 
perhaps 120 votes, out of a total poll of around 
3,250, and that these had been enough to decide 
whether a popular Constitutionalist should run 
Berry a close second, or should be relegated to 
fourth place. 
Whereas some Catholic revulsion from Berry in 
February can be explained, it is difficult to see 
why Service should have met a similar fate in July. 
It was equally clear on both occasions that if the 
Constitutionalists won he would be Premier, and that 
he and his leading colleagues would concede nothing. 
During his brief Ministry, the question had not 
even arisen. The only possible explanations 
50. A. Deakin, op.cit., Po 57. 
51. Argu.s, 14-18 Aug 80. Results. 
246 
therefore would beihat the Catholic vote followed 
O'Shanassy when, out of political pique, he switched 
to Berry in July, or that as O'Connor had claimed, 
the Catholic vote was to change sides continually 
until justice was done. It is unlikely that 
O'Connor was advancing this as deliberate policy, 
nor did he ever repeat the suggestion; moreover, 
when he said it he had no reason to expect the 
sudden July dissolution. It is more likely that, 
like O'Shanassy, he meant that the Catholic vote 
would swing of its own accord. O'Shanassy, ignored 
by the Constitutionalists after February, presumably 
changed sides for his own sake and that of his 
Church. That O'Connor should have changed sides 
when his political expert did so is perfectly 
understandable. 
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During July, the Bishop did what he could without 
organisation and at short notice. Father Fennelly 
of Creswick and Dean Geoghegan, supporting opponents 
of Berry, had to visit him during the election, and 
at least the former to discuss the election.52 
52. Age, 10 July 80, 5 Aug 80. 
The Argu.s correspondent in Beau:fort alleged53 
that a leading local Catholic had assured him that 
a telegram had been read to the congregation there, 
urging it to support Longmore. A correspondent 
f'rom Avoca54 wrote that Father Meade ha4:1Dld him 
the Catholic vote in Kara Kara could not be given 
to Anderson because a telegram from Dean Moore of' 
Ballarat had informed him of a compact between 
Berry and O'Shanassy. Father Meade replied55 
that he had said nothing about any high level 
agreement, but had said simply that he could not 
support Anderson because the Education Act was 
more important. He did not deny the telegram, 
and as neither candidate offered concessions, it 
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is difficult to see why he should have supported 
one rather than the other unless under instructions. 
However important the Catholic vote was, it 
did not advance the Catholic cause. Although 
badly needing extra support in the Assembly, Berry 
dared not agree to O'Shanassy~s minimum. terms, 
5 3. Argus' 23 July 80. 
54. Argu.s, 17 July 80. 
55. Argu.s, 27 July 80. 
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on which apparently the hierarchy were happy to 
let him negotiate as plenipotentiary.56 He and 
his allies could only manoeuvre for a toehold in 
authority and wait for something to turn up,, 
without much hope that it would. Now 0' Shanas sy 
had failed to obtain even that toehold. 
56. Argu.s, 23 July 80 - 3 August 80. 
v. O'Loghlen and Nationalism: the Final 
Defeat. (1880-1883). 
During the Reform struggles in Victoria, 
renewed distress had led to agitation, terrorism 
and coercion in Ireland, and systematic obstruction 
2§0 
in Westminster. This tempest now rustled the leaves 
in Victoria. 
In January 1881, a meeting to acclaim Parnell 
and open subscriptions for his Land Leagu.e was held 
in Melbourne. 1 It was addressed by a number of 
radicals and Irish, representatives of two minorities 
which, as their power declined, now huddled together. 
The situation in Ireland reminded the former of 
their heroic period; they saw in the struggles of the 
peasantry their own fight against the great estates, 
and in Parnell's obstruction the stonewall they had 
erected against McCulloch. To the latter, conscious 
of being second-class citizens, the events in Ireland 
were a reminder of the power and determination of 
their people. Most of the speakers pointed to 
parallels between Ireland and Victoria. Longmore, 
described by another as "the Parnell of the South", 
reminded his listeners that "Had this continent not 
1 • Age , 1 9 Jan 81 • 
been so large the people of Victoria would now be 
in the same position as Irishmen." In the 1860s, 
memories of Ireland had been appealed to in the 
interests of Victoria; now Victorian experience 
was appealed to in the interests ofireland. Another 
change was mentioned by a speaker who 11 regretted 
that the Duffys and O'Shanassys, who professed so 
much for Irishmen, did nat.;attend the meeting. These 
men professed a great deal, but they were not worthy 
of being called Irishmen. (Cheers.)" Duffy, the 
nationalist of the fifties, had already returned to 
Eu.rope for the last time; his son,although able, 
lacked his father's prestige. Duffy's old enemy, 
the nationalist of an earlier period still, was 
soon to be brought in sorrow and defeat to his 
grave, by his own people. 
Other meetings, with the same overtones, were 
held up country. In some places, branches of the 
Irish Land League were formed. In the middle of 
the year, an emissary of Parnell arrived; attended 
around the country by Irish M.L.A.'s, he addressed 
meetings of Irish organisations and of the general 
public, and collected funds. 2 Warned of his 
coming sometime before, Orangemen were appalled. 
The Grand Lodge decided to found a newspaper, 3 
the Victorian Banner, which appeared in April. 
A public meeting, addressed mostly by the Orange 
clergy, was held late in May to sympathise with 
the suffering Irish and to subscribe towards the 
relief of the Land League's victims. The first 
meeting was howled down by Catholics; the second 
was more successful.4 The Banner querulously 
demanded to know what politicians who courted the 
Orange vote intended to do about the flaunting of 
popery and sedition.5 
A week later, its sorrow was changed to 
rejoicing. The Reform Bill had been passed, and 
political peace and practical legislation must 
ensue. Best of all "There will be no more 
2. Argu.s, 15 Feb 81, 13 June 81, 2 Aug 81. 
3. Victorian Banner, 2 April 81, 3 Sept 81. 
4. Argu.s, 31 May 81, 7 June 81. 
5. Victorian Banner, 11 June 81. 
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secret intrigues between the leaders of the Roman -
'1 r:3 ~;.) . . 
Catholic party and the leaders of the popular 
parties, based on the barter of political support 
for a surrender of the people's most precious 
possession. 116 The Banner was right, but a week 
later its leader-writer must have despaired. 
O'Loghlen had become Premier; his programme 
included a Royal Commission to examine defects 
in the education system and consider the 11 alleged 
grievances 11 of the Catholics. 
There was one consolation; O'Shanassy had been 
excluded from the Government. Once more, the leading 
liberal Catholic was at odds with his leading 
conservative compatriot. O'Loghlen's motives 
can only be guessed at. He dared not give his 
Cabinet too Catholic an air. On questions other 
than education, he had little in common with 
O'Shanassy and may have disliked him for helping 
destroy Duffy, a family friend, a fellow-radical 
and probably his political patron. 7 O'Shanassy, 
6. Victorian Banner, 18 June 1881. 
7. Duffy, op.cit., p. 306; Age, 16 May 1877 (Advts.) 
having returned to the centre of polities 
and helped destroy four Governments, playing a 
part which had been considerable and appeared 
greater than it was, had seen O'Loghlen, with 
no following in the Assembly, the electorate or 
the Church, having been in politics for only 
three years, snatch the fruits from his hand. 
Alfred Deakin, meeting O'Shanassy a little 
afterwards, had a railway station meal spiced 
by O'Shanassy•s account of the Government's . 
formation. 
"O'Loghlen sent for me", he said, his great 
form shaking and his deep voice rolling around 
the refreshment room to the amazement of the 
passengers: "He sent for me as he was obliged 
to and offered me ••• offered me ••• 11 - this 
almost in a roar as he flung himself round in 
his chair, turning his back upon me as he 
concluded speechless with indignation, 
mortification and despair yet with a fine 
ring of contemptuous satire under all - 8 HHe offered me - a seat directly behind him:" 
In setting up the Education Commission, Sir 
Bryan succeeded when S:ir:John had failed. During 
his negotiations with Berry in July, this had been 
one of the concessions which would have,allowed 
O'Shanassy to join the Government, when it was 
8. Deakin, op.cit., p. 810 
25! 
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clear that State aid was too much to ask. 
According to both Irish leaders, Berry had 
promised the Commission, and then backed down, 
which was why he had been opposed at the 
ministerial elections, and why, once the Reform 
Bill was passed, O'Loghlen had moved the successful 
motion of no confidence. 9 Berry had denied 
any compact, although he had referred the proposal 
10 to caucus. It had been rejected, but not all 
radicals opposed it. Miram.s, dissatisfied with 
other aspects of the education system, 11 had tried 
to use it, while still Secretary of the N.R.P.L., 
to detach Catholics from Sir John. At the East 
Melbourne by-election, where Catholics formed about 
a third of the population and the Opposition candidate 
was a Catholic, he had tried to exploit the incipient 
sympathy between Irish and Radicals, and Irish 
annoyance at O'Shanassy's absence from the Parnellite 
agitation, by emphasising the parallels between 
9. V.P.D., Vol. 37,pp. 26 and 540. 
10. Argus, 3 A~gust 80. 
11· V.P.D., Vol. 26, p. 1214 ff. 
Victoria and Ireland, and suggesting that had 
not O'Shanassy's ambition made him demand high 
office as well, an education commission would 
have been agreed to by the Government. 12 In the 
next by-election, at North Melbourne, The Age 
took a similar line. 13 
During the Reform negotiations, however, 
Berry's party had lost its left wing. Now 
O'Loghlen was Premier, its only hope of office lay 
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in coalition with the more liberal Constitutionalists. 
The lack of significant policy differences, although 
making this possible, also made it difficult for 
Berry to show his recent opponents, who still 
regarded him as an unprincipled agitator, why they 
should cease to maintain the Government. When 
Ramsay moved to impose safegu.ards on the proposed 
Royal Commission, therefore, Berry promptly sought 
alliance in defence of the Education Act. 14 The 
attempt failed, but gradually an anti-Catholic 
coalition appeared more likely. O'Shanassy•s 
bragging about the Catholic vote15 helped. Soon 
12. Age, 4 February 81. 
13. Age, 4 April 81. 
14. V.P.D., Vol. 37, pp 485, and 535 ff. 
15. V.P.D., Vol. 37, pp. 23-7, 531-2. 
three of Berry's lieutenants, Munro, Pearson aYJ.a -
Patterson, were denouncing Catholic intrigues. 16 
Some remarks in the party room by Patterson, aft~r 
several speeches calling for a Protestant Party, 
induced the Berryite Catholics to help save the 
Government from defeat on its tariff policy. They 
were expelled from the party. 17 
The Orange Institution and the Banner supported 
Patterson. Education Act Defence Leagues appeared 
once again. 18 Parliament was drifting their way; 
Constitutionalists grew more discontented with 
O'Loghlen. At the same time, three groups of 
Iri~hmen, in Sydney, Dublin and Melbourne, thrust 
propaganda advantages on them. At the end of 1881, 
Michael Fitzpatrick, formerly Colonial Secretary of 
New South Wales, was refused Catholic burial 
because he had supported secular education. 19 
Early the following May, news of the Phoenix Park 
murders reached Melbourne. The effects of this 
crime on public and parliamentary opinion, despite 
16. V.P.D., Vol. 34, pp.28-31, 32-34, 610. 
17. Argus, 9 December 81, 22 May 82. 
18. Victorian Banner, 18 March 82. 
19. Victorian Banner, 17 December 81. 
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expressions of horror by O'Loghlen and the Land 
· v· t · 20 d h f. v· t · League in ic oria, appeare w en ive ic orian 
M.L.A.s signed an address to the Lord Mayor of 
Dublin on the Grattan Centenary. 21 Normally its 
sentiments would have:aroused little interest. 
Prejudice and politics, however, produced an outcry. 
As the signatories, all Catholics except Longmore, 
were all Constitutionalists or left wingers, 
Berry's party could clamour against the Catholics 
and appeal to that loyalty on which Constitutionalists 
had always prided themselves. At Ballarat, Major 
Smith and other local M.L.A.s, with the leaders of 
the latest Education League, preached up their 
national and religious prejudices before three 
thousand people22- by then an unusually large number 
for a political meeting - who needed little persuading. 
Smith championed one of the Orangemen's favourite 
little grievances, announeing, 23 shortly before 
the recess, that he would seek amendment of the 
Illegal Assemblies and Party Processions Act, to 
allow the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne 
20. Argu.s, 9 May 82. The news arrived 5 M~ 82. 
21. Argus, 1 June 82. 
22. Argu.s, 17 June 82. 
23. Argu.s, 28 November 82. 
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to be celebrated as well as St. Patrick's Day. 
The sudden dissolution of 1883 deprived him 
of the opportunity. The Berryites and the 
Constitutionalists, who had promptly deserted the 
Chief Secretary, were not alone in setting up 
electoral organisations. A sub-committee of the 
Loyal Institution drew up the Orange platform, 
contacted candidates to ascertain their views, 
published a list of authorised candidates, and 
wrote to all members and other loyal electors. 24 
Practically no Catholic activity was reported. 
It was hopeless to seek concessions while bigotry 
was rampant, and impolitic while the Education 
Commission was still sitting. The Ministry 
was doomed, yet how could Catholics desert it for 
either maj·o;r party, and what would be gained? 
If O'Connor had intended to overthrow Governments 
until his Church had its way, he could no longer 
do so once O'Loghlen was in power. Finally, 
Catholics were once more divided. O'Shanassy 
seems to have retained clerical support in Belfast, 25 
but he was objectionable to O'Loghlenites and 
24. Argu.s, 6 and 17 February 83; 
Victorian Banner, 3 March 83. 
25. Argus, 22 February 83. 
Nationalists - especially, perhaps, to the yollllg. 
He was defeated by a younger Catholic, in the most 
Catholic constituency of Victoria. 
he was dead. 
Within a year 
Elsewhere, the Irish were crushed. Three 
signatories of the Grattan Address, Brophy, 
O'Callaghan and Longmore, were defeated, Brophy in 
what was normally a Catholic seat, Longmore in a 
constituency where he had been unassailable for 
twenty years. The other two, Toohey and John 
Duffy, only narrowly retained what had always 
been safe Catholic seats. The Ministry was 
defeated; O'Loghlen's personal defeat deprived 
the Irish of their new leader at the same time 
as they rejected the old. The Service-Berry 
Coalition then made it impossible for the Catholic 
vote to balance between the parties. The campaign 
for State aid, hopeless from the start and fed on 
shadows for eleven years, now lost all excuse for 
hope. 
2fi0 
C H A_ P T E R 4 
COUNTRY:: POLITICS 
I. The Rural Situation. 
There was little disagreement at this time 
about broad principles of land legislation. Few 
but pastoralists defended the creation of large 
estates and a social system based upon them; even 
they had no objection in principle to small, 
independent settlement, provided it was on somebody 
else's run. The last attempt to make auction the 
basis of land alienation, after the fiasco of 
Duffy's Land Act, was the Council's resolution, 1 
after rejecting the 1864 Land Bill, 
That this House is of opinion that the state 
is entitled to the best price for the sale or 
use of all public lands, and that such price 
can only be ascertained by public auction. 
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This attempt failed when the elections of that year, 
to Council as well as to Assembly, went overwhelmingly 
against them. Settlement, it was finally decided, 
was more important than immediate income from land, 
although it was reasonably argued that settlement 
would bring the Treasury the greater long term profit. 2 
1. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 10, p. 312. Although 
these sentiments appealed to reactionaries, their 
proposer, T.T. A'Beckett, a liberal lawyer, was more 
concerned to avoid a repetition of the disasters of 
the 1862 Land Act; to assist settlement, he proposed 
that payment should be on terms. (Ibid., PPo 267-70.) 
2. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11, pp. 53-4. 
Great disagreement, remained, however, about 
terms of settlement - areas, prices, terms of 
payment, tenures, safeguards against dummying - let 
alone about the degree to which concessions should 
be made to pastoralists to obtain the argument of 
the Council. The end, however, was generally 
agreed; a host of small freeholders. There had 
been some support for "the leasing system", in which 
the Crown retained the freehold and therefore a 
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permanent source of revenue and control over la..~d-use, 
but very little. The idea survived among urban 
intellectuals, and gained ground during the 'seventies, 
but its advocates were few, and not in power.3 Graham 
Berry, who dominated Victorian radicalism for the 
decade after 1875, expressed the general view when he 
said that Englishmen4 had an inherent desire for 
3. Below,pp. 415 and 478ff. 
4. V.P.D., Vol. 17, p. 2062. Nor were 
intellectuals necessarily leasers; e.g. Wrixon 
(V.P.D., Vol. 17, p. 1774) - "There is a magic 
about the ownership of property which turns lazy 
men into industrious men--- 11 
freehold. The onus of persuasion lay on the 
leasers.5 By that time, moreover, the land system 
evolved during the 'sixties was rapidly covering the 
northern plains and filling Gippsland forests with 
settlers. 6 By the time leasehold ideas had 
obtained greater currency in colonies like New South 
Wales, where there was more land, and earlier legis-
lation had been less successful, very little leasable 
Crown land remained in Victoria, except in the 
northwestern mallee scrub, which nobody wanted as 
freehold and where the leasing system was therefore 
applied in 1884. 
There.was surprisingly little romanticising 
of the small freehold. For large numbers in the 
'sixties, indeed, farming was not an ideal but the 
only alternative to unemployment. For others, it 
was probably little more than a speculation from 
5. There was even some objection to the system 
of probationary leases or licences on the grounds 
that it would provide incentives to exhaust the soil 
and then abandon it, and that it would produce a 
steady pressure for the remission of rents. Vic. 
Hansard, Vol. 11, pp. 63-4. And see the deba-re-on 
Higinbotham's amendment to the Land Bill, V.P.D., 
Vol. 17, pp. 2049-66. 
6. Parnaby, 'Economic and Poli ti cal Developments 
in Victoria. 1877-81! d.4. (Jllfelo Ph.D. thesis~ 1951) 
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the beginning. 7 No doubt some thought in terms 
of continuing the independence of the diggings, bu_t 
it was not the poetic, but the stern and commercial 
d f h t 1 Ky t t •t• 8 indepen ence o w_a an ear y neon pe i ion 
c!alled "an enterprising and hardy yeomanryn. 
It was also a subtly different independence 
from the digger's, even where successful. It 
offered little prospect of a fortune followed by 
idleness: it fled the domination of men for the 
tyranny of bea9:;s and fields and the market, it 
fled the company of men for the waste places. 
Had those who clamoured for land known how hard 
it would be for the successful, how many would fail, 
they might have been less eager. Even in the well-
watered areas, relatively close to markets, which 
were first settled, life was hard enough. But 
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these areas were the SQUatters' strongholds; although 
farming areas.survived and even flourished there, 
particularly in the midwest coastal areas9 and near 
7. JUl=lck paper~. Black to Gladstone, 23 May 1865, 
18 June 1867. And cf. R. Hofstadter, The Age of 
Reform , C.1, on the American farmer as businessman 
rather than sturdy pioneer. 
8. V. and P. (L.A.) Session 1856-7, Vol. 3. 
(Cited in Gollan, Radical and Working Cl~ss Politics p.39.: 
9o A good deal of the Western District settlement 
was by private tenants, M. Kiddle, Men of Yesterday , 
pp. 412-4. 
major towns, the great agricultural expansion, 
during the 'seventies, took place in remote areas 
with either too little rain and timber, or too much. 
Long after settlement, isolation and hardship 
distinguished the lives of farmers. In the major 
tovms where civic necessities were early provided 
for, large sums were spent on embellishments, while 
the country went short of schools, churches, water, 
communications, welfare facilities,and in the 
private sector, housing and the bright lights which 
enabled all but the destitute to feel occasionalJ.y 
that they were men of the world and stood at its 
centre~ The country was a hard place, and farming 
a hard trade even for those on good land. Many 
vvere ignorant of agriculture, or had experience 
unsuited to their surroundings; most lacked capital. 
Even those with money and experience might be 
destroyed by low prices, bad seasons, disease in 
crops or animals, or having too many small children 
during the crucial first years of settlement. 10 
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10. Vic. Parliamentary Papers (J.J.A.) Session 1879-80, 
Vol. 3, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal 
Commission appointed to enquire into the progress 
of settlement under the Land Act of 1869. (Hereafter 
referred to as 'Evidence before Lands Commission of 1878'.) 
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The natural source of help was the Government. 
It was Government policy to encourage settlement, and 
the provision of many facilities was a Government 
responsibility; as landlord the government decided 
conditions of tenure and acquisition, and as 
transport authority it decided not only what 
facilities should be provided, but also what prices 
should be charged. First necessity, then habit, 
forced farmers and other rural gToups to organise 
to put pressure on the Government. 
Rarely at this time did farmers regard 
independence as their prime virtue. Industry and 
usefulness were what gave them claims upon the rest 
of the community. Emphasis on the independ"enc e 
of the farmer came later , as an expression of anti-
metropolitan sentiment. Melbourne was the home of 
the ignorant legislator, the remote and supercilous 
public servant; it was the great wen where the 
tax-eaters lived. During the drought of 1878-80, 
the new Exhibition Building in Melbourne became the 
symbol of metropolitan lavishness and self-indulgence. 11 
11. V.P.D., Vol. 30, p. 543; Argus, 9 October 1879. 
"2G7 Resentment of the rich never disappeared from 
these antipathies, but towards 1880 ar1 anti-worker 
component was added. Exploitation of farmers by 
harvest workers early became a legend in the country, 
and a feeling developed that tow.asmen generally 
despised farmers. Farmers' Unions were needed, urged 
J. M. Chanter in 1879 nthat it may be the mea11s in 
future that the farmers of Victoria are not the 
clodhoppers they are supposed to be 11 • 12 Yet it 
was the townsman who had all things given to him. 
"The farmer who didn't believe in the eight hours 
system, worked ten, or twelve, or fourteen, and 
was glad to rest afterwards. If he went to see a 
neighbour his road lay through the bush, over logs 
and ditches, and his visits were like those of the 
angels, few and far between~"l3 
Yet the farmers were not only underprivileged, 
they were also particularly valuable citizens. 
12. Rochester Express, 27 June 1879. 
13. Hamilton Spectator, 4 October 1879. 
"Farmers were fighting for themselves but they 
were also fighting for the whole community, for 
they supplied the public with the necessaries of 
life and were the bone and sinew of the whole 
community." 14 Further expenditure in the country 
was essential; Melbourne was parasitic on the 
countryside, and the Melbourne workers, favoured by 
a fiscal policy increasingly regarded as imposed on 
the country to suit Melbourne interests, were 
parasitic on the rest of the nation. Government 
action to assist them, like the relief-works 
undertaken in 1878-80, was simply a form of handout 
to idlers and extortioners for whom there was ample 
work up-country. 15 That the work should be 
provided by the Government, in a colony where 11 the 
Government stroke" was synonymous with well-paid 
unemployment, made it all the worse. 
Urban workers, therefore, were pauperised, and 
had lost that self-reliant industry which was, to 
the farmer, one of the most obvious characteristics 
of his daily life, a hardship which he came to wear 
as a badge of honour. The public investment in 
14. ~·· Note that these two quotations, from 
a meeting in Villiers and Heytesbury, came from a 
long-established farming area, much better provided 
for by Nature and man than the northern wheatbelt. 
15. Argus, 29 September 1880; 9 October 1879; 
Rochester Express, 28 May 1880. 
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rural areas for which he clamoured was not a handout, 
not an extravagance; it was essential for the 
development of the industry on which Victoria's 
16 future depended, essential to supply her most 
productive citizens not with the life of ease enjoyed 
by the Melbourne mob, but with those aids to a 
reasonably civilised existence which were generally 
acknowledged to lie within the province of the 
Government, and with which the towns had long been 
q,dequately supplied. 17 
The idea of the independence of the farmer in 
Victoria, therefore, came from the circumstances of 
his daily life and from the just contrast which he 
drew between the relative hardships of urba..~ and 
rural life, rather than from some Jeffersonian or 
Marie Antoinettish myth. Least of all did it 
derive from his becoming 'bourgeois', an.y more 
than his demands for government can be called 
socialistic, with or without doctrines. The 
farmer cannot be assimilated to categories derived 
16. Argus, 15 July 1879; Ararat Advertiser, 26 
September 1879; Hamilton Spectator, 4 October 1879. 
17. Hamilton Spectator, 6 March 1867. "It was 
said that Government railways did not pay. Well, 
supposing they did not? --- Did anyone enquire 
whether the post-offices paid? (Cheers.) Post-
offices were established for the public convenience 
and for facilitating the operations of commerce." 
Another speaker expressed the common claim that the 
Government received more from the area in taxation 
than it spent there, and that the country was sub-
sidising the mining towns 0 
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from urban experience and urban myths. The twentieth 
century developments of the Vvelfare State and the 
rapidly incree,sing i·rr)ortan.ce of wheat exports to 
the economy added new standard arguments, but the 
basis of the farmers claim to special consideration 
remained his economic importance and the feeling 
that he was undervalued and underprivileged - as, 
indeed, he was. 
These sentiments, however, were only beginning 
to affect politics towards 1880, and even then were 
still modified by attitudes left over from the 
earlier period, when the problem was to establish 
a farming population against natural and human 
oppositiono In this earlier period, the Government's 
aspect as landlord tended to overshadow its function 
as development authority, while their experience as 
townsmen or diggers tended to overshadow in the minds 
of settlers their new needs as farmers. Unfortunately, 
for all the Government's willingness to assist 
settlement, its actions suffered from three grave 
shortcomings. The first was legislative delayo 
The crisis of 1865-8 delayed amendment of the Land 
Act until 1869; those of 1877-81 limited further 
amendment of that Act to the interim legislation 
of 1878. Even at other times, it was not easy 
to produce Land Bills which would pass both Houses. 
In the early 'seventies the rejection of further 
amendments became an annual event. Rejected Bills 
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on fencing, impounding and mining on private property, 
lay strewn in the wake of Jegislation. 
The second shortcoming was legislative ignorance. 
Not until 1877 had an:y Minister of Lands had full-time 
experience of farming, 18 even then Longmore's experience 
was a distant memory largely irrelevant to the problems 
of the new areas. The Assembly never contained more 
than a handful of :farmers. 19 Matters vit.ally 
affecting a farmer's prosperity or survival were 
therefore the work of townsmen whose goodwill was 
no substitute for knowledge. 
The third shortcoming was administrative. 
The conversion of large areas of unsurveyed sheepruns 
into a mass of small farms in face of great natural 
18. Grant and Casey were lawyers, Macpherson was 
a squatter-]awyer, Gillies an ex-digger of independent 
means. Before 1864, there had been a military 
engineer, a lawyer-journalist-politician, (Duffy), 
a merchant, a doctor, a journalist and a coachbuilder. 
19. J.E. Mills, 'The Comnosition of the Victorian 
Pa.rliament 1856-81', Hist. :3tud1es, Vol. 2, No. 3·. 
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difficulties and determined opposition from men 
commanding money and influence, needed large numbers 
of skilful and honest men, skilfully organised and 
led. Such were in heavy demand and short supply. 
A parliamentary and public opinion which regarded 
civil servants as loafers made it difficult to obtain 
adequate establishments; its insistence on the 
patronage system limited the value of supernumerary 
appointments. Nor was proper advantage taken of 
the limited experience of large-scale orga_nisation 
then available. The speed at which the Lands Office 
expanded during the 'sixties left little time to adapt 
a structure designed to handle survey and auction 
to functions entirely different and extremely 
complicated. 20 Nor was Grant, under whom the 
expansion took place, suited to handle such problems; 
not until the Departn:ent fell to 'King' Casey was it 
remodelled. Even thereafter complaints of official 
errors and delays never ceased. 
20. Argus, 25 March 1874. And cf. M. Kiddle, 
op.cit., p. 267. 
Although the dispersal of settlement, poor 
communications and lack of leisure, therefore, made 
rural political action particularly difficult, these 
shortcomings and the extent of rural needs provided 
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a special stimulus lacking in the towns. Many 
demands could be successfully presented by deputations 
or through M.P.s, but if the groups concerned were 
large enough or if their demands were especially 
urgent, or opposed by the Minister or other groups, 
they could lead to organisations which, although 
short-lived, often compared well with metropolitan 
associations. 
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II. Development and Organisation: Railway Leagu.es. 
Most development demands were small and local, 
and could be handled by statutory local authorities 
or, on a smaller scale, by Farmers', Selectors' or 
Progress Associations. There was, however, one 
great exception. The most important aspect of 
national development for which the Government took 
responsibility was communications, and above all, 
railways, the fastest, most reliable, most up-to-date 
method of moving men and goods then available. 
During the development of the main system, each 
region not yet connected to it fought for priority; 
each area within the region fought to be on the 
route. In Parliament, railway bills were among 
the most contentious, while railway concessions 
provided one of the most useful routine methods of 
influencing votes in the House and the electorate. 
In the constituencies, the Railway Leagues were 
among the most extensive and active political 
organisations. In national and metropolitan 
politics they had few rivals until 1877; until 1879, 
they provided country areas and conservative groups 
with their most valuable organisational experience. 
2 ,..,~ I u 
The agitations for the Western Railway between 
1867 and 1871, while not covering the whole:history 
of even one set of leagues, illustrate the methods 
and problems of this form of organisation, the 
strength of local and regional feeling, and the 
relationship of railway and national politics. 
Railway Leagues began, usually after hopes had 
been raised by Ministerial changes or imminent 
Railway Bills, with meetings of citizens or 
Councillors of a substantial country town; either 
way, the initiative came from commercial leaders 
and professionals, big farmers or squatters, the 
men who ran Councils, Agricultural Associations, 
Hospitals, Mechanics' Institutes and conservative 
politics. This had its advantages, not offset by 
the class suspicions which hampered these people in 
political organisation for conservative purposes. 
Money, obtained occasionally by subscription, 
usually by donation from committees, canvasses and 
those Councils which did not consider it ultra vireS;, 
was not normally a serious problem. 1 However, 
1. Hamilton Spectator, 7 March 1868, 9 April 1870. 
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difficulties could arise, as the Hamilton League 
found when only enforced inactivity during the 
Darling Grant crisis enabled it to stay solvent. 2 
As all political organisations found, initial income 
was difficult to sustain, and exp en di tu.re was heavy. 
Apart from publications, office-rent and expenses 
paid to deputations, the extent and poor communi-
cations of the areas to be covered and the esi:;ecial 
importance of personal contact among conservative 
groups, made the heavy expense of a paid secretary 
difficult to avoid. Hamilton's was paid £300 a 
year, and a local collector was given 5% commission 
and 6d. for every petition signature. Geelong 
paid its travelling secretary a guinea a day and 
a pound expenses, spending another pound a week 
on a correspondence secretary in Geelong.3 
The other advantage ar.:the nature of the 
leadership was the important contacts, social, 
commercial and local governmental, which it 
2. Hamilton Spectator, 5 and 12 October 1867, 
16 and 23 November 1867. 
3. Hamilton Spectator, 22 April 1867, 4 May 1867; 
Geelong Advertiser,12 and 21 April 1870. 
provided in the region and in Melbourne. 4 These 
were used to expand the organisation once the base 
had been established; branches were created in 
its sphere of influence after meetings called 
by delegates from the base, supported by1he most 
influential locals they could muster, and any 
locally-influential representatives of other 
branches they could induce to attend. Other 
centres were then contacted in the same way, and 
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if favourable, organised. The committees collected 
statistics, money, and petition signatures, and 
provided yet more contacts and influence in 
Parliament.5 
The organisation completed, a strong deputation 
visited the Ministry, with all the M.P.s it could 
command. The secretary commonly preceded it, to 
consult the Melbourne committee, lobby, augment the 
deputation, and even have private audience with the 
Minister; he might also remain afterwards, watching 
Parliament and other deputati. ons. 6 If time had 
4. Hamilton Spectator, 13 April 1867, 21 March 1868. 
5. Hamilton Spectator, 10 and 13 April 1867. 
6. Hamil-run Spectator, 24 August 1867, 
14 and 21 September 1867. 
permitted their assembly, the deputation presented 
statistics more remarkable for their quantity than 
for their impartiality, and addressed the Minister 
at unmerciful length. The position of this 
gentleman, naturally anxious to avoid offending 
the important electors and M.P.s now before him 
or waiting with a counter-deputation, was very 
difficult. The decision was hard technically, 
balancing population, development, trade with 
neighbouring colonies, cost and income. He was 
harassed in Parliament by petitions, motions for 
surveys, even Select Committees; politics dis-
tracted him, its influence fluctuating with the 
composition of Cabinet and party. The usual 
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reply to a deputation, therefore, was conciliatory 
but noncommittal; the oracle was examined anxiously 
by the League and if considered favourable, might 
be published with the statistics. 7 
Leagu.es also had their problems. Leaders were 
so busy in other fields, civic and personal, tha~ 
although their occupations might allow them flexible 
timetables, the time available for any single 
activity was limited. Geelong cut its committee 
from 22 to 7 because few attended regularly, and 
7. Ararat Advertiser, 15 March 1870. 
279 
time was wasted explaining to those who had missed 
previous meetings; even then only two or three 
were consistently active. 8 Sometimes deputations 
were difficult to muster; statistics were collected 
and marshalled very slowly. The burden on the 
secretary, busy with organisation, correspondence and 
travelling through areas without railways and often 
without good roads, was therefore increased; the 
tendency of conservative groups to overburden paid 
officials is also apparent. The secretary's 
calibre was therefore especially important, and 
his relations with the committee were delicate. 
Cameron, at Hamilton, had to resign because he was 
slipshod with correspondence and money. Geelong's 
corresponding secretary had to go for letting 
correspondence accumulate.9 Most illuminating 
of all, however, is the history of F.H. Nixon's 
period as Geelong's travelling secretary. 
A Hamilton editor in 1867, he was already 
practised in agitation, and one of the local league's 
most vigorous campaigners. 10 By 1870, having 
8. Geelong Advertiser, 29 June 1870. 
9. Hamilton Spectator, 6, 10 and 13 July 1867. 
10. Hamilton Spectator, 10 April 1867. 
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moved to Geelong, he was engaged by its league. 
J.H. Connor, M.L.A., accompanied him to provide 
introductions to eastern magnates; as he later 
vouched, 11 Nixon did excellent work. His subsequent 
performance at the Hamilton meeting, however, was 
lamentable; his speech, normally forceful and 
telling, shone only by comparison with those of 
delegates Prime and Rea. 12 Before the wealthy 
squatters of the Colao Committee, Rea bitterly 
attacked Nixon, suggesting he hafiE'been drunk before 
the meeting, and complaining of being ignoredo 
Moreover, Nixon had been a bad choice socially -
''We found he had been an editor there and was 
not respected.1' 13 
Nixon told Geelong Committee 14 that he had 
arrived at Hamilton exhausted but hopeful, knowing 
many of its citizens were careless of the exact 
route, and the leaders of the Hamilton Western 
Railway Extension League were away on a deputation. 
11. Geelong Advertiser, 1 July 1870. 
12. Hamilton Spectator, 18 June 1870. 
13. Geelong Advertiser, 23 June 1870. 
14. Geelong Advertiser, 1 July 1870. 
He expected a strong delegation from Geelong and 
other eastern committees; indeed, his whole 
strategy had been to convert Hamilton by the 
display of eastern strength and unity, and in 
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several reports he had emphasised the need for 
strong representation. He even postponed the 
meeting at the Mortlake Committee's request, so that 
its delegates could attend. They did not.appear, 
but the Hamilton W.R.E.L. delegation returned with 
encouraging accounts of their interview with the 
Chief Secretary, McCulloch. Then no Geelong 
delegates appeared, nor were Prime and Rea on the 
expected coach. In despair and exhaustion, Nixon 
locked himself in his room with instructions not 
to be disturbed, and worked on his speech. Prime 
and Rea then arrived, and hearing that Nixon was 
in no state to be disturbed, concluded charitably 
that he was drunk. When he emerged, he was too 
deep in misery and too busy canvassing suppat' t to 
see them; they went to the meeting ignorant of his 
intentions, unprepared to speak, and furious. 
Several of the committee found Nixon's 
explanation unsatisfactory; Buckland accused him 
of trying to blame the results of his own short-
comings on Prime and Rea, about whom he had expressed 
himself with impolitic bitterness. Rather than he 
dismissed, he resigned. The gentlemen of Geelong and 
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Colao had vindicated themselves in their own eyes, 
but as the Geelong Advertiser had for some time 
shown inadequate esteem for them, they resolved that 
the new Executive's meetings should be private. 
As the Advertiser rightly pointed out, what their 
cause needed was publicity. 15 They promised press 
handouts, and occasionally reported to the general 
committee, but the handouts did not appear, 16 and 
at general committee meetings the gentlemen of Geelong 
made self-congratulatory speeches, assuring their 
peers that all was well. The only reference to 
Nixon, who had been an editor and was not respected, 
was the brief statement that he had resigned 
following the investigation of his incompetence. 17 
Regional and national politics posed more 
serious problems. The area to be united must be 
the largest possible, to strengthen case and 
influence; outside the immediate area, however, 
conflicting localisms appeared. When the W.R.E.L. 
was trying to force the Government to accelerate 
its 1867 loan, it even allied with another region, 
represented by the Northeastern Railway Leagu.e, 
but this, once satisfied that the Bill would be 
introduced speedily and its line was the one 
15. Geelong Advertiser, 29 June 1870, 15 July 1870. 
16. Geelong Advertiser, 26 July 1870, 17 August 1870. 
17. Geelong Advertiser, 26 July 1870. 
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to be constructed, abandoned the deputation to 
which it had invited the w.R.E.L. 18 Similar problems 
occurred within the region. As Hamilton was 
almost certain to be the terminus, its first 
concern was to obtain agreement to the Western 
Railway in principle. The Borough Council 
therefore circulated a questionnaire to other Councils 
to discover their views; naturally, they supported 
different routes. 19 Nor was there any reply -
perhaps no questionnaires had been sent there - from 
the Geelong area, prospering in its agitation for 
the 'Black' line from Geelong to Hamilton via Colao, 
Mortlake and Penshurst, in favour of which the 
Select Committee obtained by J.H. Connor, M.L.A. 
had lately pronounced. 20 Hamilton, less certain 
of Geelong's success against the Northern Line and 
seeing no hope of uniting the region behind its 
proposal, set aside the question of the precise 
route, optimistically writing into the League's 
constitution21 that a conference should later decide 
18. Hamilton Spectator, 2 September 1868. 
19. Hamilton Spectator, 13 February 1868. 
20. V. and P. (L.A.), 1st Session, 1867, Vol.2, p.11. 
21. Hamilton Spectator, 20 April 1867. 
the route objectively. Organising the Hamilton 
area was not difficult, but organising the east 
was. Camperdown and Colao resolved for the black 
line; Connor then invited Hamilton's assistance, 
to ensure Parliament's endorsement of the Select 
Committee's report;. from parochialism or just 
calculation of his chances, they replied that he 
should join them, as their constitution forbade 
them to join him. 22 
The Hamilton League then turned to organising 
the north, hoping eastern opposition would there 
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by an advantage, but the crucial Ararat meeting, 23 
although an anti-railway party was defeated, resolved 
to support extension only through Ararat. Organisation 
of the area began, assuming Hamilton's agreenent; 
the Leagu.e's Executive now favoured the Ararat 
proposal, but the Committee refused by a narrow 
majority to alter its strategy. 24 This, the 
political turmoil over the Darling Grant, the social 
turmoil over Prince Alfred's visit, and lack of 
money, halted the League's efforts for some time. 
22. Hamilton Spectator, 12, 19 and 22 J'Wl.e 1867. 
23. Ha,milton Spectator, 17 August 1867. 
24. Hamilton Spectator, 7 September 1867. 
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Its initial failures should have made the 
line south from Hamilton to Portland, on the coast, 
the most attractive proposition. Not only was it 
short, but part of it had already been built in 
the 'fifties before the Government had abandoned it 
in favour of lines from Melbourne to the goldfields. 
Although therefore cheap to build, which should 
ha'W! improved its chances of an early start, and 
offering the cheapest route to Melbourne, it 
was never favoured in Hamil ton. Portland could 
muster only two M.L.A.s for a start, 25 but the 
political aspect was rarely mentioned or implied. 
Parochial considerations were more important. 
The time, effort and money which had gone into the 
League had created a psychological vested interest 
in its policies, as the decision against co-operation 
with Ararat had shown; Laidlaw now dismissed 
co-operation with Portland on the grounds that 
" ••• the functions of the League would cease because 
it was bound to advocate a line eastward from 
Hamilton or westward from Melbourne. 1126 Secondly, 
the frequency with which railways were advocated 
as modern and progressive, especially if any 
25. The second was for Normanby, Portland's 
hinterland constituency. 
26. Hamilton Spectator, 12 September 1867. 
opposition were encountered, 27 suggests that the 
trunk line to Melbourne had become a symbol of the 
importance of the town one had helped create and 
where one was a considerable citizen. Thirdly, 
Portland and Hamilton were rivals for the 
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leadership of the western end of the Western 
District, eyeing each other as if they were Geelong 
and Ballarat, if not England and France. 
In Portland, the directors of the company which, 
having failed to raise en'ough capital, now wanted 
the Government to complete the line, were willing 
to court Melbourne merchants, but refused to go 
'begging' to Hamilton. 28 Not until their 
position in Melbourne was established with merchants 
and Ministry did they approach their rivals. These, 
however, suspected them of plotting to destroy 
Hamilton by stopping short at Branxholme or by 
making Coleraine, to the west, their real terminus, 
with a mere branch line to Hamilton. The Portland 
proposal was therefore rejected by a public meeting, 29 
27. Hamilton Spectator, 31 July 1867 (Vale's letter), 
17 August 1867. 
28. Hamilton Spectator, 5 August 1868. 
29. Hamilton Spectator, 12 September 1868. 
and the Portland ambassadors began to CJr' ganise 
the Hamil ton area against Hamil ton. Merino 
agreed, and a meeting of W.R.E.L. pastoralists 
at Coleraine having decided against supporting 
Portland yet, a Coleraine farmers' meeting was 
organised to vote that the proposal suited it very 
well.30 Telegrams that a shipload of Ministers 
favourable to the line would visit the west, 
possibly helped. Next month C.E. Jones, Minister 
of Railways, inspected the line, and found it,good; 
the Hamilton League, although urging the direct 
line, admitted it was not bad.31 Then scandal 
forced Jones' resignation; later, it caused the 
House to expel him and the Member for Portland. 
The Portland line was dead. 
The League, encircled with frustration, 
disappeared. Then Macpherson, Hamilton's M.L.A., 
became Chief Secretary. The prospects for the 
Western Line therefore became more hopeful, although 
Longmore, representing Ripon and Hampden, in the 
Geelong sphere of influence, was Minister of 
Railways. Camperdown urged the black line on 
30. Hamilton Spectator, 2, 9 and 23 September 1868. 
31. Hamilton Spectator, 21 October 1868. 
Longmore, its M.L.A., and co-operation on 
Hamilton,32 but a month later the W.R.E.L., 
reorganised, opted for the line through Ararat, 
with which its business contacts were closer, and 
Wl.ich had been more co-operative in 1867. The 
Ararat Borough Council, to which it wrote, made 
no decision. Councillor Collings, coach agent, 
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••• hoped the Council would see through the designs 
of Hamilton which could only be injurious to this 
district"; Councillor Grano voiced a common fear 
of property-owners and tradesmen, pointing to the 
decline of property-values and trade in Geelong 
and Castlemaine after their railways arrived; both 
suggested that any railway to that area would by-pass 
declining Ararat for flourishing Stawell.33 
A public meeting,34 however, almost unanimously 
favoured the line, and organisation of the area 
began. A month later, Parliament voted for a 
survey of the line, 35 on the motion of.Wilson, an 
Ararat M.L.A. The next question was should the 
Ararat railway join the existing lines at Ballarat, 
following the 'pink' line, or at Castlemaine, 
32. Ararat Advertiser, 12 October1869. 
33. Ararat Advertiser, 12 November 1869; 
Hamilton Spectator, 17 Augu.st 1867. 
34. Ararat Advertiser, 26 November 1869. 
35. V.P.D., Vol. 9, p. 2741. 
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the 'blue'? Hamilton left this to Ararat; as 
the trade of Ararat and the mining and agricultural 
centres to its northwest went through Ballarat, 
the former route was selected. However, some 
in Ballarat feared losing its advantages as 
terminus for the western trade; letters were 
therefore sent to the Ballarat Councils suggesting 
that the pink line would bring Ballarat advantages, 
the blue line only disadvantages.36 
Before Ballarat could be won over, however, a 
deputation from the Ararat, Hamilton and Horsham 
areas visited Macpherson shortly before the new 
session was to begin, hoping to have their railway 
included in the Governor's Speech.37 The reply 
was considered encouraging, but left the route 
undecided. Ministerial changes, however, were 
increasing tension within the Cabinet. Reeves, 
the Minister for Public Works, and Byrne, the 
Treasurer, had been defeated at the ministerial 
by-elections. McLellan, Ararat's second M.L.A. 
replaced Reeves, but Byrne was replaced by Berry 
36. Ararat Advertiser, 18 January 1870. 
37. Hamilton Spectator, 5 February and 5 March 1870. 
Then the Ministry fell; although it lost 
the Chief Secretary, the W.R.E.L.'s position in the 
Goverrunent greatly improved. Macpherson became 
Minister of Lands, Ararat's Wilson became Minister 
of Railways, and Ballarat provided the Minister of 
Justice; Geelong and its area were unrepresented. 
All were re-elected; Wilson all but promised an 
Ararat deputation the line they wanted. 41 In 
Ballarat the Councils decided to support the League, 
objectors now feeling that a Western Line being 
inevitable, an:y benefits should accrue to Ballarat. 
A public meeting heard Hamilton and Ararat delegates 
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state the advantages to Ballarat, locals cry defiance 
to Geelong, and inaugurated a branch.42 
Geelong, meanwhile, had organised its area, 
and obtained Government assurances. that the ~uestion 
remained open; it had captured Butters, re-elected 
by Portland, and Attorney-General Wrixon, on whose 
votes the Hamilton Spectator had counted in assessing 
parliamentary chances. 43 Hamilton, however. 
410 Ararat Advertiser, 22 April 1870. 
42. Ballarat Courier, 23 March 1870, 13 June 1870. 
43. Geelong Advertiser, 19 May 1870, 2 June 1870, 
Hamilton Spectator, 11 May 1870. 
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remained unconverted by Nixon, and cashiering 
him, with other problems, hampered Geelong's 
activity. 
Then agitation for the blue line resumed; 
the Geelong Advertiser urged alliance with its 
advocates, to break Hamilton's 'unnatural' alliance 
with Ararat, which whould be connected with 
Castlemaine, Hamilton being served by the black 
line. An indignation meeting in Ballarat proposed 
a deputation to show Geelong that the blue line 
would be the worst for Geelong; the Advertiser 
replied, 
"These uneasy centres of the fluctuating 
interest of gold mining are constantly looking 
abroad for something to annex ••• The savings 
of Melbourne, Geelong, and other districts, 
have for years been devoted to the aggran-
dizement of Ballarat"; unscrupulous 
prospectuses had drained Geelong of capital.44 
Its statistics ready at last, Geelong sent a deputation 
to McCulloch to learn that he awaited 
the Engineer-in-Chief's report. 45 Made 
44. Geelong Advertiser, 23 and 27 August 1870; 
5 September 1870; Ballarat Courier, 2 September 1870. 
45. Geelong Advertiser, 20 September 1870. 
public late in December, 46 it pronounced for the 
pink line of grounds of cost and profitability. 
Meanwhile, however, the Government had agreed to 
Gillies' request for a survey of the blue, and it 
was too late to introduce a Railway Bill before 
the dissolution.47 
During the election several attempts were 
made to commit McCulloch. He told a blue line 
deputation48 that it was immaterial which way the 
Ararat line went. To a letter from J.B. Hughes, 
a prominent W.R.E.L. pastoralist, he replied49 
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that he adhered to his answer to the July deputation, 
interpreting it, to Geelong's consternation, that 
the first line should go to Hamilton via Ararat, 
although not choosing between Ballarat and Castlemaine. 
Macpherson, calling the railway 'the question of 
questions', told Hamilton50 that political con-
siderations alone prevented the Government from 
pronouncing for the pink; that he would not so 
46. Geelong Advertiser, 17 December 1870. 
V. and P. (L.A.), 2nd Session 1870, Vol. 1, C. 6. 
47. Hamilton Spectator, 18 January 1871; 
V.P.D., Vol. 11, pp. 721-2. 
48. Hamilton Spectator, 18 January 1871. 
49. Ararat Advertiser, 27 January 1871. 
50. Hamilton Spectator, 4 February 1871. 
cynically bribe the electors; and that this 
position as a Minister of the Crown was identical 
with their interests, and it was for their benefit 
to return a member of the Government . . . Hughes 
followed with an attack on the other candidate, 
who, on the same day, based his candidature on 
Macpherson's failure to serve the interests of 
Dlllldas and offered to retire if the Ministry would 
make the pink line a matter of confidence; he 
also alluded briefly to trivia like the Education 
Bill on which the Government fought the election. 
At Ararat, 51 Wilson said of 0 the one ouestion of 
paramount importance", that "· •. the Government 
were going to bring the railway to Ararat. If 
they rejected it, they rejected the scheme of 
railway co:mmunicati on, other places would be glad 
to receive it." He also offered some of the 
advantages of a terminus, proposing the normal 
broad gauge from Ballarat, with a narrow gauge 
extension to Hamiltono 
51. Ararat Advertiser, 21 February 1871. 
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After the election, the Government, otherwise 
engaged, said nothing. Despite some petitioning 
and attempts to talk opponents round, weary 
expectation marked the contestants.52 In this 
situation, the Ministry fell. Bipartisan Ararat 
exchanged Wilson for McLellan in the Cabinet, 
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Geelong regained Berry, proprietor of the Advertiser, 
as Treasurer, and Longmore resumed as Minister of 
Railways, remarking53 that Hamilton must wait, 
since he was not building lines for the benefit 
of squatters. 
So all was again uncertain. Another six 
years were to elapse before the railway reached 
Hamilton. 
52. Hamil ton Spectator, 18 March 1871. 
53. Hamilton Spectator, 1 July 1871. 
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III. Land Tenure and Organisation: Land Law Leagues. 
In representations to the Government as landlord 
the lead was taken by farmers, not magnates; townsmen 
involved came from the lower ranks, or were also 
farmers. This activity, however, produced no major 
organisations. The normal beginning was for a 
number of people to discover that their conditions 
of tenure were onerous, or to feel that as changes 
in law or administrative policy had given other 
groups more favourable terms, their conditions 
should be improved. Ministers were usually anxious 
to help, and not solely on political grounds. Grant 
and Casey, who held office for eight years altogether, 
were genuine.ly zealous for settleIIE nt. Even they, 
however, were not omnipotent. The revenue had to 
be considered. The law was not easy to change, and 
even the wide ministerial discretion it allowed was 
not infinitely elastic. Moreover, the conditions of 
tenure which the poor settler found most onerous were 
often those imposed to prevent dummying. 
Yet the farmers usually had their way 
eventually. The views of men as popular and 
formidable as Grant and Casey were difficult for 
Cabinets to ignore, and a large, increasing number 
of votes was involved. Moreover, settlement was 
eomething in which practically everyone in the 
Assembly believed. For constitutionalists, it 
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was only by outbidding their opponents on land reform 
that they could alter their image as the rich man's 
party. To land reformers who had supported O'Shanassy, 
or left McCulloch over the tariff crisis, the desire 
to savour popularity again reinforced political 
calculation. Their more conservative colleagues 
may have believed in a natural tendency among farmers 
towards free trade and conservatism. The Council 
presented a more formidable problem, but popular 
pressure and judicious concession over the ~astoral 
tenure allowed bargains to be struck in 18ij5 and 1869. 1 
The incentive to organise was therefore usually 
short-lived. Moreover, farmers were divided by the 
variety of tenures. In 18~7, when the most 
1. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11, pp. 56 and 75. 
persistent movement began, many were freeholders 
or private tenants. Some held under the 1862 Act. 
The 1865 Act, 2 as administered, provided two very 
different tenures. Grant intended selectors under 
clause12 to occupy 640 acre blocks under licence for 
three years, proving their bona fides by residence 
and specified improvements; the land was then to 
be auctioned, with a valuation for improvements added 
to the usual upset price of £1 per acre. Considerable 
amounts were selected under this clause, in the 
Western District and around mining centres.3 Despite 
all precautions however, numbers of dummies were 
successful. Soon other selectors were selling to 
the squatters, having taken up the land as a speculation 
or found the conditions too onerous in a hard seasona 4 
Grant therefore used his nowers to expand 
clause 42. This had been intended to allow the 
occupation under annual licence, and at a rent 
slightly above that of clause 12, of 20 acre plots 
2o 28.Vic. No. 237. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11, p. 52 ff. 
3. Vic. Parliamentary Papers,(L.A.), 2nd Session 
1866, Vol. 2, No. 17, Appendix A. 
4. Black Paners, Black to Gladstone, 18 June 1867. 
near goldfields. If not auriferous, they were 
eventually to be auctioned, the upset price varying 
with local land-values. As the Crown could allow, 
refuse or revoke such licenses, dummying became 
much more difficult. 1 As the plots were small and 
could be selected b~fore survey, and conditions were 
relatively easy, clause 42 selection became very 
popular when Grant decreed that four licenses could 
be held by one person. 5 This feature of the Act had 
been much criticised, particularly, but not entirely, 
by the radicals upon whom McCulloch came increasingly 
to depend during 1865. 6 It was, in fact, a regression 
from the 1862 Act which had allowed gradual purchase 
at a fixed price, as a reluctant compromise with the 
Council and the need for revenue. The 1865-6 
crisis engrossed parliamentary and public attention; 
the new farmers were busy with their farms, many 
doubtless believing7 that the Government of Grant 
and Higinbotham would never turn them off because 
5. Vic. Parliamentary Papers (L.A.) 1st Session 
1867, Vol. 4, No. 28. Report of the Proceedings 
taken under the Provisions of the Land Act 1862 and 
the Amending Land Act 1865. 
6. Vic. Hansard, Vol. 11, pp. 61, 71, 89. 
7. Black Papers, Black to Gladstone, 20 December 
-· 3 • 
1865, Ararat Advertiser, 1 May 1867. 
they could not fulfil the statutory conditions, 
nor allow them to be disp~ssessed at auction. By 
February 1867, however, the crisis had long been 
over; the lateness of the season when selection 
began in 1865 had allowed little return that year, 
and the 1866-7 harvest had been disappointing; 
rents and improvements had depleted resources. 
A meeting of clause 12 selectors was now held at 
O'Callaghan's Hotel, in Ararat, formed a committee, 
held a public meeting, and issued a circular urging 
11 1 t t d t th A t t •t• 8 f th a se ec ors o a op e rara pe i ion or e 
right of pre-emption and for rents to count towards 
purchase. There was some response, but meetings 
were few and small, and some proposed different 
remedies, or concessions for clause 42 selectors. 9 
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Early in May, representatives from·Ararat, Ballarat, 
Hamilton, the Leddon and Murray areas, held an 
ill-attended conference. Grant, although sympathetic, 
reminded them of revenue difficulties and that they 
were already obtaining the land cheaply. The 
conference therefore decided on a Land Reform 
8. Ararat Advertiser, 8 March 18670 
9. Ararat Advertiser, 15 and 29 March 1867. 
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Three months later, another small meeting11 
was held in Ararat to which clause 42 settlers were 
invited. O'Callaghan lamely explained that their 
co-operation had not been sought before to avoid 
embarrassing the Government, but as a new Land Bill 
was expected after the recess, all should make their 
views known. One speaker unkindly suggested that 
O'Callaghan was seeking to use clause 42 men as 
catspaws, knowing that Grant had lately announced that 
he was considering improvements in their tenure. 
Eventually, however, a clause 42 committee was 
appointed to confer with the existing committee. 
Unfortunately the news that Sir Charles Darling would 
quit the Colonial Service had reached Victoria shortly 
before the meeting; within three weeks, the Council 
had rejected the Budget and the Government had 
resigned. Despite McCulloch's return to office late 
in August, a general election seemed likely. From 
unpreparedness, impotence and its desire not to 
embarrass the Government, the Association did nothing 
10. Ararat Advertiser, 1 May 1867. 
11. Ararat Advertiser, 30 July 1867. 
until September, when it issued an address, 12 urging 
all farmers to organise branches, to register, quiz 
candidates and vote together. Its aim was nothing 
less than "to watch over the interests of the farming 
classes"; its immediate objects were specific 
changes in tenure especially to secure for all the 
right of pre-emption at £1 per acre, to be paid 
gradually by an annual rent after three years' 
probation. Clause 12 men, in short, sought the 
easier terms of 1862, and clause 42 men, their tenure 
having been applied to the purpose of clause 12, 
wanted terms no less advantageous. 
The manifesto apparently had some effect. 
Several meetings were held; some set up branches, 
others their own independent organisations0 13 Grant 
still held out on the main points. 14 During the 
election campaign, however, the Opposition, especially 
Duffy, stressed the land question, promising the 
reforms lately demanded, and seizing on evidence 
that the squatters' fear of Duffy was leading them 
to support the governmento 15 In January, therefore, 
12. Ararat Advertiser, 10 September 1867. 
13. E.g. Age, 19 September 1867, 10 October 1867. 
14. Age, 21 December 1867. 
1 5 • Above, p. 1 04 • 
Grant promised legislation to give them the right 
of pre-emption and to provide that rents paid after 
the probationary period would be allowed towards 
purchase. 16 This emasculated the agitation, and 
put the Association, and especially O'Callaghan's 
candidature for Ararat, in a difficult situation. 
Anyone not bawling for the popular side without 
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~ualification was popularly suspected; the Opposition's 
support for his demands, and his being Duffy's 
co-religionist, made O'Callaghan suspect. Despite 
his previous praise for Grant, and his tardy announce-
ment of support for the Government, the Ministry 
brought up an opponent from Ballarat, 17 and 
O'Callaghan was defeated. 
After the election, the crisis still delayed 
reform. The Sladen Ministry's lack of a majority, 
the urgency of the crisis and the defeat of its 
Lands Minister at the ministerial elections, made 
it powerless. Not until late August, after 
McCulloch's return to office, was legislation possible. 
Yet another meeting18 was therefore held in Ararat, 
16. Argus,· 18 January 1868. 
17. Ararat Advertiser, 1 November 1867, 
24 and 31 January 18680 
18. Ararat Advertiser, 1 September 1868. 
this time by a clause 42 opponent of O'Callaghan. 
As the names of his leading supporters had not 
appeared in the previous organisation, and this 
meeting, unlike O'Callaghan's, was crowded, he 
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was probably right that selectors had previously 
held back for fear of embarrassing their Government. 
The same programme was adopted and a committee formed 
to spread the organisation. 
Four days later, however, new regulations19 
granted the first three points in the programme for 
clause 42 settlers; the maximum area was doubled, 
the operation of the clause extended to practically 
all areas, the rent was reduced to the clause 42 level. 
However, as everyone knew, any further changes needed 
legislation. A few branches of the Ararat League 
were therefore set up in the vicinity and towards 
20 Ballarat. As usual, meetings elsewhere, although 
having the same aims, lacked organisational connection. 
The Hamilton's Free Selectors' League, which from 
its area's close connections with Ararat might have 
been expected to co-operate, added to the usual 
19. Vic. Parlimp.entary Papers (L.A.), Session 1868, 
Vol. 3; Amending Land Act 1865 (Section 42) 
Additional Regulations. 
20. Ararat Advertiser, 11 and 18 September 1868; 
6 October 1868. 
demands, and circulated its proposals to all 
21 M.L.A.s. The Ararat League, meanwhile, held 
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back its memorandum until the goverriment•s intentions 
were clear and called a Melbourne conference. The 
delegates, representing fourteen Western District 
selection centres, were unanimous on practically 
everything. 22 Grant, however, declined to discuss 
deferred payments, or to reveal the Land Bill; 23 
his only definite undertakings were on clause 42, 
where he simply reiterated past promises. His 
main anxieties were the revenue and the need to 
delay alienation until selectors had proved their 
bona fides. The League awaited the Bill. It then24 
expressed general satisfaction, although proposing 
numerous additions which it had never even mentioned 
before. Elsewhere, a mess of unconnected meetings 25 
produced a mess of unconnected amendments. The 
government naturally ignored themo 
21. Hamilton S~ectator, 19 September 1868. 
22. Age, 2 December 1868. 
23. Age, 3 December 18680 
24. Ararat Advertiser, 11 June 18690 
25. Age, 17 and 19 June 1869, 2 July 1869; 
Argus, 24 and 29 June 1869. 
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The Land Bill, further delayed by more 
pressing parliamentary business, a change of 
government, and Upper House amendments, eventually 
passed in December 18690 26 It gave selectors nearly 
everything the Ararat League had originally askedo 
Clearly, however, success owed little to effective 
agitation. Legislation was made necessary by the 
limitations on Grant's administrative powers27 and 
the expiry of the squatting tenure in 1870. If the 
Upper House was to be persuaded to accept the former, 
the renewal of the latter must be tied to it. Party 
politics and Grant's zeal did the rest. 
For a decade, there was some agitation, but 
little organisation. Some groups were discontented 
with parts of the new tenures, but they were smallo 
The only movement which might have come to anything 
was the discontent with Macpherson's administration 
of the Lands office, provoked into organised effort 
by the 1871 election. 
Like 1867-9 movement, this was another scrappy 
26. 33 Vic., No. 360. 
27. Age, 30 November 1866 and 8 February 18670 
thing, mostly of isolated bodies, although some 
grouped themselves into local federations. 28 
Several put test questions to candidates, 29 the 
one at Duck Ponds sought out its own candidate,30 
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but for all the usual talk of colonywide organisation, 
nothing was done. Not until after the elections 
did the Clunes League call the usual ill-attended 
conference. 31 Macpherson, already forced to make 
concessions in his election speech,32 seemed willing 
to meet all the deputation's demands. The League 
therefore waited a month. When it re-assembled, 
the Government had fallen. Its replacement by a 
Ministry in which Duffy was Chief Secretary and 
Grant Lands Minister was sufficient guarantee, and 
the League's last action was to applaud Grant's 
promised administrative reforms.33 Once again 
farmers had their way through anything but forceful 
agitation. Farming votes, the parliamentary 
situation and governmental willingness to concede 
made both unnecessary. 
28. Age, 2, 13, 30 and 31 December 1870; 
13 and 23 January 1871; 2 February 1871. 
29. Age, 8 and 13 February 1871. 
30. Age, 27 January 1871 o 
31. Age, 25 May 1871 o 
320 Ararat Advertiser, 20 January 1871. 
33. Age, 26 June 1871 o 
Under Casey's four-year rule, agitations 
were negligible. His reform of the Lands Office, 
his vigorous use of administrative and quasi-
34 judicial powers and his attempts to amend the 
Land Act, removed some grievances and gave promise 
of removing others. Non-resident selectors, the 
most important of the small groups of malcontents, 
were catered for in his Bills, although he had some 
difficulty in finding eq,uivalent safeguards against 
dummying;35 meanwhile, he proclaimed that genuine 
selectors unable to live on their selections had 
nothing to fear from him. 36 Non-residents' 
agitation was therefore small-scale and localo 
As for the population and politicians in general, 
it became a commonplace that Land Bill debates did 
not interest them.37 
34. Age, 19 December 1872, 7 January 1874, 
25 February 18740 
35. Age, 16 June 1875. 
36. Argus, 10 June 1873, 15 July 1873. 
37. V.P.D., Vol. 14, pp. 379, 887, 889, 8900 
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